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Abstract  
 
This Master’s Thesis studies the press coverage of the demonstrations that took place in Russia after 
the Duma elections in December 2011. The parliamentary elections were thought to be a formal test 
of legitimacy for the leading party, United Russia. However, United Russia suffered a bitter defeat 
and gained only a bit less than 50 percent of the votes. Despite the obvious defeat, the claims of rigged 
elections spread quickly, and people begun demonstrating against the results. A protest movement 
demanding for fair elections spread all around Russia. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to analyze how two Russian newspapers covered the rallies. The empirical 
data consists of articles from two newspapers, Kommersant – an independent newspaper – and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda – typically portrayed as a newspaper faithful to the officials. The method for 
the content analysis is Frame analysis. In a relatively controlled, neo-authoritarian media system the 
Russian media outlets had to balance between the ideals of objective journalism and the pressures 
coming from the Russian authorities. This thesis seeks to make visible what kind of coverage the 
print media produced and how the demonstrations were framed in the newspapers.  
 
My study shows that the newspapers provided various perspectives to the rallies. During the analysis 
period of one week, framing of the rallies changed dramatically. In the beginning, the rallies were 
framed as a typical behavior of belligerent opposition and as a threat to Russia. The split between the 
power and the people was emphasized. Towards the end of the week the framing became softer and 
more humane, and the rallies were framed as harmless folk festivals and as a celebration of a robust 
civil society. 
 
On the surface, the coverage seemed to provide multiple ankles. However, especially 
Komsolmoskaya Pravda framed the rallies in a way that was favorable to the authorities, emphasizing 
the aspects of threat and the need for stability. Furthermore, the shift in Komsomolskaya Pravda’s 
framing was parallel to the shift in the official rhetoric: when the officials acknowledged the need for 
dialogue with the protestors, also Komsomolskaya Pravda softened its approach towards the rallies. 
Kommersant’s coverage showed some signs of following the official rhetoric towards the end of 
week, but compared to Komsomolskaya Pravda, Kommersant provided a more balanced and pluralist 
coverage, emphasizing both the uniting nature of the rallies among the protestors and the fundamental 
split that exists between the power and the people. In addition, Kommersant discussed the potential 
of a political change in Russia and the issue of press freedom.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The State Duma elections in December 2011 were thought to be a formal test of legitimacy for the 
leading party, United Russia. If everything went according to the plan, United Russia would win the 
elections by far and the result would secure and consolidate United Russia’s position in power. In the 
elections, United Russia gained 49.32 percent of the votes, and 238 seats of the total amount of 450 
seats in the parliament. In addition to United Russia, only three other parties crossed the 7 percent 
election threshold: Communist Party (19.19%), Just Russia (13.24%) and Liberal Democratic Party 
(11.67%). The results were a bitter disappointment for United Russia. Compared to the previous 
legislative elections in 2007, United Russia lost its votes dramatically – from 63.40 percent of votes 
falling to little less than 50 percent of votes. Despite the loss of votes and of the relatively modest 
outcome for United Russia, both of which supported the fact that United Russia had not fiddled the 
figures too much, the accusations of rigged elections started spreading quickly in Russia.  
The majority of the Russian population had been publicly living a rather non-political life for 
the past decade, but that was about to change. After the Duma elections, thousands of ordinary 
Russians came out to the streets demanding for fair and clean elections. Many of the participants were 
not politically active citizens; they were people who were participating in rallies for the first time in 
their life. The movement started as small demonstrations. For example, in Saint Petersburg the first 
rallies had only few hundred participants. People continued to protest and attend the rallies to show 
their support to the ones who had gotten arrested in the demonstrations. Already towards the end of 
the first week after the elections the protest activity had grown into a solid movement. 
In the beginning of February 2012, The Central Electoral Committee ЦИК published its report 
about the alleged falsifications. According to the report, the committee had received 1686 reports on 
irregularities in the Duma elections. After the investigation, almost 90 percent of the irregularities 
were said to be groundless. The committee argued that only 11.5 percent (195 irregularities) were 
confirmed to be true after the investigation. However, the phenomenon of unfair elections goes far 
beyond claimed irregularities that take place in the polling stations: the unfairness lays in the 
structures, e.g. the Russian opposition parties have a clear underdog-position compared to United 
Russia. The report did not satisfy the discontent voters and they continued to protest. For example, 
on the February 4th 2012 approximately 160,000 people demonstrated in Moscow.  
The aim of this thesis is to study the immediate coverage of the post-Duma elections rallies in 
the Russian newspapers. This thesis seeks to study the phenomenon of pro-Fair elections movement 
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and how the Russian print media covered the rallies. I became interested in this topic immediately 
after the elections, when the protests in Russia began. I witnessed the people gathering in front of 
Gostiny Dvor -shopping mall in the heart of Saint Petersburg. I saw protesters getting arrested, I saw 
riot police using force and busses full of people been driven to jail. I did not only see the force and 
confrontation, but I also saw the development of the protest – growing from meetings of few hundred 
participants into rallies of thousands of people demanding for fair elections. I was lucky enough to 
witness some of the events and felt that something exceptional was happening in Russia – it was the 
atmosphere among the people, the sense of anticipation that caught my attention. As a viewer and as 
a passer-by I got the impression that people had woken up from a hundred years long sleep. The 
protestors were determinant and not willing to give up before their claims would be met. 
The media content in Russia is an important research topic because of the controlled nature of 
the media environment. Russian media system is often referred to as neo-authoritarian system, in 
which many of the media outlets are subordinated to the control or at least under the pressure of the 
state. The media outlets have to operate in a system where self-censorship is an everyday practice, 
and ideals of good, balanced journalism are not the most important guidelines in the newsroom. 
However, independent media also exists and the Russian media is a mix of controlled, partly free and 
free news outlets. In December 2011, The Russian media had the potential of fostering the protest 
movement, and the media coverage is something that the authorities would wish to control. News 
outlets have the potential in influencing the audiences: depending on the tone and the ways of framing 
the rallies, the protest movement can be seen as for example something useful and necessary for 
Russia, or us something unwanted and dangerous. It is far from self-evident or predictable how the 
Russian newspapers would cover the rallies. This thesis studies how two Russian newspapers, 
Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda, framed the rallies.  
This thesis is structured into two parts. The first part includes the background and theoretical 
foundation for the topic. The research problem will be presented. After that the political context of 
the Duma elections will be provided. These chapters include the discussion of Russia's strong, 
centralized regime and the living conditions of both the organized and the unofficial opposition. Then, 
the events of Duma elections 2011 will be presented, and after that the media environment in Russia 
will be scrutinized in order to create a context for conducting the analysis of the primary research 
material, the news coverage of the Russian press. The second part of this thesis concerns the analysis 
and results. After providing the background and the context for the topic, the analysis method, 
framing and frame analysis, will be presented. In chapter 7, the thesis moves to analyzing the content 
of the press. Finally, the results will be discussed and conclusions will be presented. 
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2. Research problem 
 
At the eve of the Duma elections, the Russian political setting seemed relatively stable, and no 
surprises were expected. The authorities and the population had gotten used to living next to each 
other, minding their own business, and most of the people expected that the elections will go 
smoothly. United Russia would win by great figures; majority of the people would not oppose the 
results. President Vladimir Putin’s trademark is that he promotes the idea of stability in Russia. There 
was no reason why this stability would not continue. However, the discontent had been growing below 
the surface. The results of the elections caused an unexpected burst of anger, discontent and resistance 
among part of the population, and the protests were the largest seen in Russia in almost two decades. 
The Russian opposition had appeared to be somewhat suffocated and suppressed, but suddenly a 
citizen movement was born: people went to streets and they refused to be silent. The aftermath of the 
Duma elections was unexpected to many; it was a hopeful uprising of the Russian civil society – even 
if its extent and significance remain to be argued about.  
This thesis aims to answer to question: how were the rallies framed in the Russian press? 
The analysis seeks to discover how the rallies are portrayed in the news reports. What kinds of 
interpretations are raised and provided to the audiences? What is highlighted, what is left out? 
The Russian political sphere is a battlefield of ruling elite that has a very established position 
and the opposition that is fractured and marginalized. The media also had players in this battlefield, 
part of the news outlets are playing for the winning team, for the rulers, and part of the media are 
playing as independent player, for the ideals of free, balanced journalism. The December 2011 
protests caused an unexpectedly broad turbulence in the Russian society. Suddenly, the group of the 
discontent did not consist only of organized opposition politics, but of ordinary voters and that 
concerned the regime that was getting ready for the presidential elections. For the authorities, it was 
necessary to control to public discourse of the demonstrations and avoid bigger damages from being 
born. 
Different media had a great power of setting the tone for the public discussion. The aim of 
this thesis is to make visible the coverage of the rallies. The fundamental idea on the background is 
that the news coverage has the potential to influence the readers, and it is significant how the rallies 
are presented to the public. An interesting aspect for the study is the press’ working conditions in a 
neo-authoritarian media system, in which freedom is limited. The results of the frame analysis can 
provide information of how Russian media operates in a turbulent situation that this sensitive topic 
for the authoritarian regime.  
7 
 
The empirical data of the analysis are newspaper articles. I chose print media for two reasons. 
First, the print media is a grey area between the controlled main medium television and the free zone 
of the internet. Newspapers have the possibility of reporting in an unbiased manner. However, there 
are also print media that support the status quo and do not aim for balanced, objective reporting. This 
thesis studies two newspapers, representing the both tendencies: independent and state-minded. 
The second reason is more practical. I chose to study newspaper content, because that is the 
most familiar form of media text for me a journalist and my journalistic working experience is from 
the print media. Another reason was that written language in Russian is easier for me to understand 
than spoken. Even though I understand and speak Russian, I am not fluent. I believe that I have better 
chances of analyzing written than spoken media texts.  
The coverage of the rallies is an interesting topic of research, because the rallies form an 
unequalled continuation: despite the massive arrests, people kept on going to streets several days after 
the elections and did not give up. As the events developed, both the media and the authorities had to 
re-estimate and re-shape their response towards the protests. Both parties of the protest, the regime 
and the protestors, had their goals and intentions. The analysis seeks to understand the battle between 
the protestors and the regime, and the media that played a crucial role shaping the image of the 
protests.  
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3. Political context for the elections and rallies 
 
3.1 From the Soviet era to the Contemporary age 
 
The political context for the Russian parliamentary elections of December 2011 was to great extent 
created during the 2000's. Vladimir Putin became the president of the Russian Federation in 2000, 
and during the 2000's he strengthened his grip on power. Putin led the country for the maximum two 
presidential terms, and after the 2008 elections, he continued to lead the country together with Dmitry 
Medvedev. Putin became the Prime Minister and Medvedev was elected as the President, and this 
arrangement has been called tandem or tandem democracy. 
 In this chapter, I will study the roots of the political development and the context that set the 
conditions for the protests taking place after the Duma elections in December 2011. The events of the 
past decade are complicated processes that date back to decades, and it would be wrong to think that 
the current power system is a result of one man: Vladimir Putin. It is necessary to stake a compact 
glance back to time before the presidency of Vladimir Putin and understand that the contemporary 
Russian structures proceed long before Putin became president.  
In Russia, the 20th century was mostly dominated by the era of Soviet Union and communism, 
during which elections had only one candidate to vote for and voting was merely an obligation. 
During Perestroika and after the dissolution of Soviet Union Russia took a spurt towards development 
of democratic institutions, but slowly and surely Russia has reversed back to the more authoritarian 
order. The setting for the 2011 Duma elections was a result of long political and social development 
and circumstances, but I will try to concentrate on the most essential processes. The goal of this 
chapter is to help the reader to understand the context of the elections and the roots of the rallies. 
 
3.2 The legacy of president Yeltsin 
 
The current Russian authoritarian order has its roots deep in the Yeltsin era and in the first post-Soviet 
decade. In the late 1980’s, Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and later, the president of the Soviet Union, initiated ideas of Perestroika (rebuilding) 
and Glasnost (openness). These ideas suggested that Russia might abandon the strict ideals of 
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communism. During Glasnost, the Russian media faced unexpected freedom and the Soviet Union 
took steps towards democracy. At a first glimpse, the Yeltsin era appears to be a period of intense 
democratic development. According to Richard Sakwa (2002), the main theme of the post-communist 
politics in the beginning of the 1990’s was the interaction between continuity and change, between 
the existing conditions in the society and the process of change reacting with these conditions. It was 
evident that the 70-years long Soviet period would influence the post-communist period. In the 1991, 
people who defined themselves as democrats came to power, but it became soon clear that post-
communism was far from being synonymous with democracy. Between the collapse of the old order 
and the establishment of the new order Russia faced a period of disorder. (Sakwa, 2002, 43.)  
According to Ambrosio (2009), the dissolution of the Soviet Union was followed by 
establishment of the Russian Federation, its constitution and order, all of them complicated processes. 
Right after the collapse of the Soviet order, Russia did not adopt a new constitution but operated on 
the Soviet document. Yeltsin sought to strengthen his institutional authority by extra constitutional 
means, and it resulted in legislature’s will to strip many of the powers away from the President. The 
President supported a referendum which aimed to strengthen the president vis-à-vis the parliament. 
He also illegally dissolved the Supreme Soviet, violating the Russian Constitution. Legislators 
responded to Yeltsin's deeds by seeking to replace Yeltsin with his vice president, Alexander Rutskoy. 
As the result, an armed crisis erupted and it ended when Yeltsin ordered the military to shell and 
forcibly seize the Russian parliament building in October 1993. 
Many of Yeltsin's acts were violations towards the Russian constitution and law. Even if 
Yeltsin justified his actions in the name of democratic goals, Ambrosio notes, non-democratic actions 
rarely result in a positive outcome. This was also the case with Russia, and the outcome can be even 
seen in today's Russia. First, Yeltsin had to rely on military to keep him in the power, and this lead to 
the dependence of ‘power ministries’, i.e. defense, interior, and intelligence services. The reliance to 
military undermined the civilian control and it fostered the rise of siloviki, current and former 
members of power ministries, in Russian politics. Second, Yeltsin's administration showed that it was 
scared of democracy. Ambrosio writes that “the Yeltsin administration immediately hedged its bets 
against the possibility that a democratic legislature could again contest the power of the presidency. 
This was done by imposing a very different constitution from the one approved by the July 1993 
constitutional Assembly, which was, incidentally, accepted by Yeltsin at the time.” This draft of the 
constitution enabled the president-dominant system and the concentration of power to Kremlin to 
take place. During the period from 1991 to 1999, democratization in the Russian Federation faced 
several setbacks. Elections became less free and less competitive, the independence of the media was 
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weakened, and the power became increasingly concentrated in a virtually unchecked presidency. 
Ambrosio presents few key events that set Russia on an autocratic trajectory: the constitutional crisis 
of 1993, the subsequent establishment of a president-dominant political system, the 1996 elections, 
and the selection of Putin as Yeltsin’s successor. The roots of the current authoritarian system date 
back to the Yeltsin era. Ambrosio is quite direct when he argues: thus, rather than using the crisis to 
lay a constitutional foundation for democracy, Yeltsin created conditions under which an anti-
democratic president like Putin could build an authoritarian system. (Ambrosio 2009, 30–31.)  
Russia had several elections during the 1990's. The parliamentary elections in 1995 and 
gubernator’s elections 1996–1997 followed the norms and rules of democratic, free elections, but 
democratic values were not visible in the 1996 Presidential elections. Towards the end of this first 
term, President Yeltsin lost his popularity piece by piece. The country was struggling with economic 
problems and losing a war in Chechnya. It was becoming more and more likely that the candidate of 
Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov, would win the elections. Experts in Kremlin were encouraging 
Yeltsin to either rig the elections or cancel them “outright by declaring a state of emergency”.  
Ambrosio claims that it was a positive sign that elections were held in the first place. However, the 
election campaign itself was all but fair. Even if there were multiple candidates, in order to win the 
elections at any costs, Kremlin violated the campaign pending and transparency rules, distributed 
freely financial largesse to regional leaders and sometimes directly to people to fish votes, and 
reportedly falsified at least some returns. The most serious damage done to the future of Russian 
democracy was the relationship between Kremlin and the oligarchs, and the oligarchs and the mass 
media. Top oligarchs and media moguls supported openly Yeltsin’s campaign by turning all of their 
resources toward his reelection. They provided the President with consistently positive television 
coverage and blatantly demonized his opponent Gennady Zyuganov. This rigged campaign fostered 
the corruption on high level and blurred the relationship between government and the media. 
Ambrosio concludes the election process of 1996 by saying, that the election itself was relatively free, 
but the process leading up to the vote was clearly not fair. The elections in 1996, argues Ambrosio, 
were not a step towards democracy, but a sign that Russia's illiberal tendencies were laying just behind 
the surface. Ambrosio (2009, 31–33.) 
After the 1996 elections, key posts in government and administration were given to oligarchs 
and to extreme free-market reformers. The period between 1996 and 2000 elections was mostly 
characterized by economic crises that begun in 1998. As the elections got closer, Yeltsin got more 
and more unpopular. The presidential elections of 2000 could have been a turn towards democratic 
path, if the elections had been genuinely fair and competitive. However, this was not the case. Because 
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of the constitution, Yeltsin was prohibited from running for a third term. He was unpopular and had 
serious health problems, and it was unlikely the voters would have voted for him. He needed to find 
a successor and he appointed Vladimir Putin to be his successor and Prime Minister. Yeltsin allowed 
Putin to run as incumbent, taking advantage of the president-dominant system. In addition, the 
elections were moved to March 2000, due to the rules demanding an early election because of the 
resignation of the President. (Ambrosio, 2009, 33.)  
 
3.3 Towards a centralized state 
 
The Russian political system is closely tied to the position of the President: the president is the fore-
most and final figure of authority in Russia. This understanding was emphasized even more during 
the two terms of President Vladimir Putin. During his terms, Putin recentralized control, strengthened 
the central state and established a solid vertical of power by appointing loyal figures to key positions 
to implement policy decisions. (Monaghan, 2012a, 1.) 
When Putin came to power, he was virtually unknown to the big audience. He had been 
creating his career and he rose all the way to the post of the head of the FSB. On the 9th of August 
1999 Yeltsin surprised Russians and announced that he would support Vladimir Putin as Prime 
Minister and as his successor. According to Goldman (2005), Putin knew what he was getting into 
and what kind of problems Russia was struggling with: due to privatization and economic crisis 
people had lost their savings. Businesses were closed down, people were fired, and market economy 
was shattering. Also government was facing problems, and during a 12 month period of time Yeltsin's 
government had four different prime ministers. Putin promised Yeltsin and his daughter legal 
immunity from any prosecution. (Goldman, 2005, 93.)  
Vladimir Putin was a successor of President Boris Yeltsin, whose period had been somewhat 
chaotic – the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reforms of the society and Yeltsin's personal 
problems all contributed to the fact that the 1990's were turbulent in Russia. When Putin stepped into 
power, he was relatively unknown to the majority of the people, and it seemed like he came out of 
nowhere, but in fact he was a continuation for Yeltsin's heritage. However, Lukyanov (2009) argues 
that the post-Soviet period from Yeltsin to Putin has been one transition, even if the rulers want to 
draw a clear division between the Yeltsin era and the Putin era. The post-Soviet period is marked by 
the need to create new national identity on the ruins of the lost Soviet superpower status. (Lukyanov, 
2009, 118.) 
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During the early 2000's Vladimir Putin became the savior of Russians who were hungering 
for stability and continuity. In his first speech, Putin emphasized the stability and greatness of Russia, 
and he argued that in Russia the state has to have a strong role. Strong state is the guarantor of order 
and the striving force of change. (Luukkanen, 2008, 72.) Putin came to power, when Russian society 
was in confusion. In January 2000, Putin said “Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult 
periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200–300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding 
into the second, and possibly even third echelon of world states" (Putin, 2000, cited in Herspring 
2009). 
According to Herspring (2009), the political and economic systems in Russia were in chaos. 
Herspring argues that Putin had two goals when he step into the power: to strengthen the state and to 
make Russian once again superpower. Putin believed that the domestic policies of Russian Federation 
needed to be created again. The new president started re-creating Russia rapidly. (Herspring, 2009, 
151, 159.) Only one month after Putin came to power, he began to tighten his grip of the state. He 
made Russian troops to return to Chechnya to reassert Russia’s authority there. He also started 
promoting the policy of  “vertical of power”. (Goldman, 2005, 94.) 
One of the reasons for Putin's popularity among the people was that Russia's economy started 
growing during Putin's term. However, this was not entirely thanks to President's smart policies. 
Goldman (2005) claims that the rising oil prices and recovering economy would have made anyone 
look like economic genius. Putin’s credit is that he did not hinder economic growth. (Goldman, 2005, 
96.)  
After the political and economic chaos that Yeltsin left behind, Putin managed to lift Russia 
again back to its feet. He gave Russians something they had lived without for a decade: 
predictability and stability. (Herspring, 2009, 166.) The end of the Putin era in 2008 was marked by 
the growth of the influence of state in all spheres of life: in politics and economy, and in ideology 
(Lukyanov, 2009, 117).  
 
3.4 Recent developments 
 
Monaghan (2012a) claims that Putin's policies of centralization and of the vertical of power have 
contributed to the emergence of several debates related to the nature of Russian politics, especially 
the nature of democracy and its development in Russia. During Putin's presidency the debates were 
touching upon two questions. First question discussed the nature of post-Soviet Russia's transition 
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into a democracy or away from it. Russia attempted to promote the idea of democracy with 
qualifications, i.e. sovereign democracy and managed democracy. Second debate concentrated on the 
backgrounds of the people that Putin appointed to key positions to establish his policies of the vertical 
of power. Many came to the conclusion that the late 2000's Russian democracy was in crises and 
shifting towards autocracy. According to Monaghan, the nature of debate took a turn in 2008, when 
Dmitry Medvedev was elected as President. The debates of transition, Putin's strength and 
centralization continued, but at the same time the analytical emphasis started concentrating also on 
the relationship between Putin and Medvedev, on the so called tandem arrangement, tandemocracy. 
Some analyzers talked about vertical split, as the Prime Minister and President did not agree about 
everything. Medvedev was thought to be more liberal and emphasized modernization of Russia, and 
Putin was focusing on maintaining the status-quo. Despite some of the political distinctions, there 
was no major split between these two leaders. (Monaghan, 2012a, 1–2.) 
According to Monaghan, many observers were surprised that the political tandem lasted all 
the four years of Medvedev's presidential term. Their each speech was studied carefully to find 
disagreements or prove of emergence of rivalry. However, the tandem arrangement proved out to be 
solid and lasting, even in the mid of the financial crises in 2008–2009. The absence of signs of 
dissonance is explained by many observers by the idea of Putin and Medvedev belonging into a same 
team: tandem is a mechanism for guaranteeing continuity after Putin’s presidency. Both Putin and 
Medvedev have emphasized the necessity to establish a sustainable state and for that, according to 
both leaders, Russia needs unified power and a team working together. (Monaghan, 2012a, 5.) 
The regime of the Russian Federation has been a hot topic for scholars studying topics related 
Russian politics and society. Several explanations and interpretations have been provided to explain 
what exactly is happening in Russia. Often the conversation in media is focused solely on Vladimir 
Putin. The term Vertical of power, according to Monaghan, has its roots in the 1990's, but in the 
contemporary Russia the term is mostly connected to Vladimir Putin's regime.  
According to Monaghan, Putin's announcement in 2011 to run again for President made many 
believe that the tandem arrangement between him and Medvedev is coming to an end. Monaghan 
writes (2012a, 16) that ”The re-emergence of a broadly stable ruling group or leadership team – one 
that draws together the state and big business and blends formal structures with informal networks – 
is perhaps the most important development in Russia politics over the last few years”. However, 
Medvedev has remained to be one of the central and visible figure in Russia’s ruling group. He has 
been a central figure in promoting a more liberal path for Russia, but that seems to be a well-thought 
strategy by Putin’s regime. Medvedev’s presence is a balancing factor in a rather authoritarian rule. 
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Medvedev’s presence is also part of the stability that Putin promotes. However, stability can be also 
seen as stagnation. 
In the aftermath of the Duma elections, the political commentators were eager to speculate 
whether or not the rallies would initiate a process that would lead to development or a change of the 
political process. Putin and Medvedev had agreed about switching the posts, which caused anger in 
part of the population. Edwin Bacon (2012) discusses the possible developments of the Russian 
political system in his article Electoral manipulation and the development of Russia’s political system. 
According to Bacon’s article, in the near future there are three possible alternatives or paths of 
political development in Russia. First, the current system of the electoral authoritarianism will 
continue to exist. However, this kinds of systems have their dangers as they can possibly threaten the 
stability that Putin’s regime has promoted. Bacon reminds that in electoral authoritarianism the 
balance of protest and acquiescence is delicate. The second alternative is a turn towards even more 
authoritarian rule. This path became possible due to the events in December 2011, when the blatant 
manipulation of elections’ results lead to street protests. According to Bacon it does not seem that the 
Russian regime would be willing to forget the formal commitment to democracy and take a more 
authoritarian turn. Third, Russia can take a decision to move back to active transition towards 
democracy, which has been Dmitry Medvedev’s goal on his speeches. Bacon argues that this 
alternative is less likely to take place in the near future. However, if this alternative is finally 
discussed, opposition’s persistence with the electoral process could pay off. (Bacon, 2012, 116.)  
It is clear that the opposition does not have much saying about which path Russia chooses, 
and the opposition’s possibilities of having an influence are limited. After the Duma elections, the 
opposition did what they were used to doing: they went and protested in the streets. In the next sub-
chapter, the Russian opposition and its living conditions will be studied in more detail.  
 
3.5 Opposition in the centralized state 
 
In the aftermath of the Duma 2011 elections, thousands of Russians went out on the streets to demand 
fair elections, and in the public discussion, the demonstrators were often referred to as the opposition. 
In this sub-chapter, the essence and the living conditions of Russian opposition will be briefly 
discussed. The goal of this thesis is to analyze the frames of rallies and protesters in the Russian press, 
and because of that it is necessary to understand the living conditions of opposition in the 
contemporary Russia. For this thesis it is not necessary to go into too much detail in explaining how 
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Russian opposition parties and groups could function in the Russian political system. However, I find 
it important to scrutinize at least a bit the living conditions of the Russian political opposition. 
According to White (2011, 658), opposition is an identifiable group, or groups, normally 
opposed to the policies of the governing regime in a given state. One of the often referred piece of 
work related to Russian opposition is Vladimir Gel'man's (2005) article “Political Opposition in 
Russia: A Dying Species?”. According to the article, in the first half of the 2000's, real political 
opposition did not exist in Russia. Gel'man seeks to answer why political opposition in Russia has 
become extinct, and he claims that many explanations provided by observers are insufficient. 
Defining what opposition is appears to be a challenging task, but Gel'man suggests it is useful to 
perceive opposition as continuum. In the one end is semi-opposition, i.e. parties outside ruling elite 
that seek to join the government, but they do not necessarily plan to implement major political 
changes. On the other end of the spectrum is situated principal opposition, i.e. political parties that 
are seeking power because they want to radically change the existing political order. Placing Russian 
opposition to this spectrum is difficult, because during Putin's first presidency opposition parties were 
moving along this space. (Gel'man, 2005, 227–228.) 
According to Gel'man (2005), during Putin's first term, much of the power was concentrated 
to the elite close to the president and the new elite group around Putin dominated the Russian political 
scene. As a result, all the remaining elite sections, such as parliamentary factions, other political 
parties and media, were forced to accept their subordinated role or lose their elite status as such. The 
political opportunities of the opposition shrunk. (Gel'man, 2005, 233–234.) This phenomenon was 
visible for the past four years before 2011 Duma elections, based on the consistence of Duma. In 2007 
elections, only four parties were elected: United Russia (64.30%), Communists (11.57%), Liberal 
Democratic (8.14%) and A Just Russia (7.74%).  
Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi (2012) claim that the Russia opposition is dispersed and that 
different opposition groups have difficulties to agree upon anything. In addition to the political 
differences, the disagreements are rooted on a more personal level between leaders of different 
opposition groups. The tradition of a leader-centered way to lead that dates back to Soviet times, and 
it is continuing strongly in the contemporary politics, not only in the United Russia, but also among 
the opposition groups. For example, Solidarnost’s Boris Nemtsov and Communists’ Gennady 
Zyuganov are defining the parties more than their political programs. Authorities take advantage of 
this disparity of opposition, and they use the rule and divide -tactic. Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi 
provide an example of this tactic related to the rallies in December: the authorities were setting 
conditions about where the rallies should take place and how many people were allowed to 
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participate. The opposition groups were not able to agree if they should accept the conditions set by 
authorities of if they should have an unsanctioned rally according to their own will – the debate was 
pulling the groups apart from each other. The divide and rule -tactic has been used before, when the 
opposition wanted to arrange protests, and the opposition groups had fundamental disagreements 
related to the matter: some of them emphasized that the possibility to protest is the most important 
thing, and others, the more radical ones, saw that a compromise is the worst enemy of the opposition. 
(Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi, 2012, 53.)  
Putin’s regime, according to Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi, has also used aggressive rhetoric 
towards opposition: the groups have been associated to hooliganism. Putin’s regime has succeeded in 
presenting the opposition as a revolutionary movement, reminding the people of the past, of the 
bloody revolutions. Putin has also warned people of the possibility of new revolutions and he has 
emphasized that a revolution would be destructive for Russia. In addition, Putin has warned people 
that the West wants to interfere to politics of a sovereign state. This kind of rhetoric fosters the idea 
that change in Russia is always towards the worse – and by using this kind of rhetoric Putin is 
persuading the people to support the status quo. (Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi, 2012, 53.)  
At the moment, due to both internal and personal disputes and due to tactic measures by 
authorities, Russian opposition remains to be scattered. After the 2011 Duma elections and at the eve 
of the presidential elections in March 2012 it seemed very unlike that there would be a person that 
could unite the disperse opposition groups – unlikely it was, and unlikely it is now in April 2013.  
 
3.6 Growing discontent and shattering social contract  
 
The mass protests came as surprise to many, because for the past two decades Russians had not been 
politically particularly active. According to Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi (2012), Russians are often 
portrayed as politically apathetic and as unwilling to participate into civil society activities. For 
example, activists in youth organizations have claimed that young Russians are anti-political and 
cynical, which is even bigger problem than the censorship and suppression of opposition exercised 
by the authorities. A second reason for apathy is a feeling of powerfulness. According to Levada 
Centre’s opinion poll, 80 percent of Russians feel that they do not have a possibility to have an impact 
on federal or regional politics. (Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi, 2012, 50–51.) 
During the Putin era and Tandem era, a rather small political opposition existed in Russia, and 
most of the Russian citizens belonged to a silent and passive majority. According to Koesel and Bunce 
17 
 
(2012), in authoritarian regimes, compliance with the regime is a norm and inaction is typical. 
Moreover, the leaders in authoritarian societies can be popular, tolerated by the citizens or seen as 
invincible. Challenging the regime can be risky for personal safety or for losing personal benefits. 
The existing political opposition can be seen as ineffective and weak, a less tempting alternative for 
the status quo. (Koesel and Bunce, 2012, 404.) 
The growing discontent in Russia has its roots in the economic situation. In 2008, financial 
crises shook the world and also Russia faced some consequences, as country’s economic growth 
turned down. As a result, for the first time in a decade, the political elite had severe disagreements: 
Vladimir Putin supported reflationary politics and the minister of finance Alexey Kudrin was in favor 
of firm fiscal policy. The disagreement ended when Medvedev fired Kudrin. Due to the slow 
economic growth the officials were no longer able to distribute resources to people and in that way 
buy popularity from them. On the other hand, part of the middle class had already prospered and the 
class had split into different groups based on their professional level, such as civil servants in 
government and municipality positions, and students and intelligentsia.  
Kangaspuro (2012) refers to students and intelligentsia as a group who either is not dependent 
on officials or does not care about the officials. This group of people perceives corruption, inequality 
in front of law and authoritarian way to rule as something against their values and interests. They do 
not see the authoritarian regime and the modest malpractices of power as a guarantor of wealth and 
stability, but as obstacle that is preventing the fully developed middle class from progressing in the 
society. (Kangaspuro, 2012, 1–2.)  
Even though the economy had been growing during the 2000’s, the inequality, especially in 
terms of income level, is massive in the society. Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi remark that as the 
radical and deep social stratification was born in Russia, the concepts of social justice, equality and 
social classes disappeared from the political discourse. (Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi, 2012, 55.)  
According to report published by Carnegie Moscow Center, Putin’s regime failed to heed the 
warning signs for December 2011 post-elections rallies. The discontent among the people had been 
growing already for two years. The most alerting example of discontent is that in November 2011 
Putin had been booed at fighting matching on national television. The final straw were the events in 
United Russia Party conference, when Putin’s and Medvedev’s announced that they would swop 
places. (Rojansky & Balzer, 2011, report online.) 
The previous chapter discussed the position of the political opposition in Russia. However, in 
December 2011 rallies, many participants wanted to make a distinction between political, organized 
opposition and between voters who were simply annoyed by the Russian political system, unofficial 
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and unorganized opposition. Some of the participants wanted to emphasize that they are ordinary 
people without any political ties. For the past decade, most Russians had been passive in participating 
in political life. Duma elections were getting closer and closer and it looked like they would come 
and go without any significant dissidence.  
According to Makarkin (2011), the order in contemporary Russia is based on social contract 
between the authorities and the people. The social contract relies on the idea that the state is able to 
provide and guarantee to majority of its citizens reasonably good quality of life. The politics become 
relevant to population only when the contract is not fulfilled. The possibility of Russian people going 
on streets to protests as a huge mass is not likely, because people have low expectations and they do 
not demand a lot from the authorities, just as during the Soviet Union. Makarkin claims that it would 
take a strong provocation, such as monetization of welfare benefits, to threaten the contract and 
provoke protests on streets. (Makarkin, 2011, 1462, 1471.) 
When Russians started to go on the streets after Duma elections, scholars and media discussed 
the meaning of the rallies. Was the amount of people significant? Were the rallies a mass phenomenon 
or simply marginal protests? Makarkin argued in his article in 2011, that it would take a strong 
provocation to provoke protests on streets. A reason to provocation is easily spotted in the Russian 
politics. The source of December 2011 rallies, a provocation, leads to Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev. 
Already in September 24th 2011, it became clear who would be the next President in Russia. 
Medvedev spoke in United Russia Party congress and declared his support for Putin and said that 
Putin should run for President in the March 2012 elections. Putin accepted this proposition and 
suggested that Dmitry Medvedev should be the next Prime Minister of Russia. To public, this 
announcement came across as if everything has already been decided – which appears to be true. 
There were no eligible alternatives to the current regime, as the centralized political system had long 
ago suppressed and smothered the political opposition. In addition, the Russian political opposition 
was scattered and could not find consensus in most of the matters. It was clear that the new president 
would come from the United Russia. However, the way in which Putin and Medvedev handled the 
announcement of changing posts was contemptuous and belittling towards the Russian voters, as the 
outcome of the elections was announced months before the Election Day. Therefore it is not 
surprising, that the post-Duma elections rallies grew into a large protest movements.  
In the next chapter the essence of the rallies will be discussed. In addition, media’s response 
will be introduced.  
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4. Pro-fair elections protests in 2011 
 
4.1 Rapidly growing protest movement  
 
Large protests have been a rare phenomenon in Russia during the Putin era. According to Volkov 
(2012), small, isolated protests and civic activities have taken place in the past years, but they have 
been actions of small groups. These groups have been faced with the corrupt nature of Russian 
political elite and government, and in the process these small groups have politicized. Volkov claims 
that this increased political activism has led to conflict, because the civic groups, due to the nature of 
Russian political system, have been incapable of addressing Russia’s systemic corruption through 
political or juridical means. Open conflict has increasingly become a regular feature of Russia’s 
political system, and the current system of top-down control is designed to block rather than ease 
systemic change. In Russia, authorities have tended to ignore the problems until the frustration of 
citizens has escalated into protest. Then, according to Volkov, officials have “adopted some mixture 
of repression plus halfhearted measures to redress grievances, hoping that unrest will subside and 
the public mood will improve”. (Volkov, 2012, 55–57.)  
The extent of the post-Duma elections rallies came as a surprise to many. What started as 
small protests grew into a larger movement quickly. First the protestors gathered in Moscow and 
St. Petersburg, but soon the rallies spread to cities all around Russia. The protest movement did not 
fade away after few meetings, but instead it kept growing and spreading. The main target was the 
Presidential elections in the beginning of March 2012. In February 4th, protests were arranged in 113 
Russian cities and towns.  
A.C. Monaghan (2012b) argues that the sense of political and public stagnation and frustration 
was made explicit by the parliamentary elections in December 2011. United Russia won 238 seats, 
which was enough to secure a small majority in the Duma. The main focus of attention was not on 
the elections results, but on the flawed nature of the elections. Monaghan lists that critique was 
directed into “blurred lines between the government and United Russia, the use of government and 
administrative resources slanting the campaign in favor of the ruling party, and the refusal to allow 
political parties to register”. In addition, there were prove of ballot stuffing, and Russia’s only 
independent election watchdog organization Golos faced obstacles while trying to do its work in 
observing the elections. (Monaghan, 2012b, 6.) 
The outcome of the elections was interpreted as a catastrophe for United Russia, and the result 
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reflects the decline in United Russia’s wider public support. However, Monaghan notes, the election 
result does not necessarily mean that “a new opposition movement is spurring a democratic 
transformation in the country”. Instead, Monaghan binds the result into a wider political context: the 
economic crises of 2008 that affected strongly Russia’s economic and social affairs, the extent of 
corruption, and the public disenchantment when Putin and Medvedev announced they are switching 
jobs – these are factors that all influenced the election result. Monaghan emphasizes that the 
widespread public fatigue, disenchantment, and opposition to the status quo should have not come as 
a surprise. (Monaghan, 2012b, 7.) 
The protest movement that began after the Duma elections made many question the idea of 
Russians as politically apathetic people. According to Lyytikäinen and Salmenniemi (2012), the most 
enthusiastic commentators suggested that the protests were a sign that Russian civil society had 
woken up from hibernation of managed democracy. Before the December rallies, street protests had 
been a risky small scale activity. For example, the Strategy-31-movement gathered to protest every 
month that had 31st date, and the goal was to show that the authorities do not respect the 31st article 
of constitution, the freedom of assembly. The unsanctioned opposition protests were smothered and 
often turned into arrests and beatings, but despite the violent nature usually they did not get much 
publicity, as they were marginal and fragmental. However, in December 2011, Putin’s and 
Medvedev’s regime had to give in to unofficial opposition’s demands and the officials sanctioned 
mass rallies. Even state television channels showed footage from the protests. (Lyytikäinen and 
Salmenniemi, 2012, 50–51.) 
According to Koesel and Bunce (2012), the rallies were surprising for two major reasons. 
First, mass protests in Russia were rare, and when rallies took place they were quite contained with 
geography and their issue focus. Second, Putin has had the support of Russians, opinion polls 
registering ratings for 60 percent or more giving approval for Putin. Electoral fraud had been widely 
reported in elections in 2003 and 2007, but back then they did not catalyze mass protests. (Koesel and 
Bunce, 2012, 412–413.) 
The scale and the significance of the demonstrations has been a topic for discussion. The 
rallies started small, but by time they grew bigger. On Saturday December 10th over 40 000 people 
protested in Moscow, and in December 24th rallies were organized in 90 cities around the country and 
altogether over 100 000 Russians gathered to demonstrate. (Monaghan, 2012b, 8.)  
It is obvious that the rallies were so large that the authorities could not afford to ignore them. 
In the next sub-chapters, first the scholarly responses to elections and protests will be presented. Then, 
the demography of the protests and the authorities’ response to protests will be discussed.  
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4.2 Expert analyses of the rallies and election results 
Scholars agree that after the parliamentary elections in 2011, the political situation in Russia changed. 
The Carnegie Moscow Center, a center for scholars specialized in Russia, published expert comments 
soon after the Duma elections, in 13th of December 2011. According to Dmitry Trenin (2011), after 
spending one decade focused on their private lives, people begun to turn towards the public sphere. 
People have become wealthier than in the entire history of Russia, and the level of their tolerance has 
changed. The behavior of the authorities has begun to raise resistance. For example, the 
announcement of Putin and Medvedev exchanging their posts was by many people considered as an 
insult. However, even if the political atmosphere among people has changed, Trenin argued that the 
change of the moods of people did not promise regime change yet, instead it was a promise of livelier 
politics in Russia. For the past decade, Russia had been “an authoritarianism with the consent of the 
governed”, but according to Trenin, this is not the case anymore. (Dmitri Trenin, 2011, Duma 
Elections: Expert Analysis by Carnegie Moscow Center.)  
According to Maria Lipman (2011), the post-Duma elections rallies brought a remarkable 
change to Russia. After the elections, the political message of the new generation of voters, of young 
and angry Russians on the streets, was clear: United Russia, the leadership, and Vladimir Putin were 
not wanted. During the past decade, the discontent had been growing, but it had remained to be 
discussed in the nongovernmental media and in the internet, not in wider platforms. During the 2000's, 
political rallies did not manage to attract people and the amount of participants was count in hundreds. 
What took place after the Duma 2011 elections was something different. In December, thousands of 
people came out on the streets around the Russia. Russia saw a protest movement that had not been 
seen in two decades. (Lipman, 2011, Duma Elections: Expert Analysis by Carnegie Moscow Center, 
Online report.) 
During the 2000's, the political scene of Russia was completely cleansed from forces or figures 
that were not welcome. Public participation was eliminated, and the governance and the people lived 
in a relationship which Lipman (2011) describes as “an informal, nonintrusive pact, or a divorce 
contract: the government made their decisions and people minded their own business.” The divorce 
contract was put under a test during the parliamentary elections, when people were voting for the 
government that many had begun to detest. Especially Putin–Medvedev-tandem's decision to switch 
positions made people angry and deepened the existing resentment. President Medvedev did not 
embellish the trading-places process, instead he said straight that “We decided on this many years 
ago”. The moods of people were souring, and the government had to do something to get the wanted 
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outcome in elections. In order to get the needed high turnout, the administrators resorted into unlawful 
tricks. The tricks were many, online and in real life: activists and election observers were harassed. 
Websites that were attempting to unveil the election fraud were cut off by cyber-attacks and this online 
harassing lasted for the Election Day.  
All this resulted in a phenomenon that Lipman describes as “unprecedented antigovernment 
mobilization”. Young voters rushed to vote and their only purpose was to undermine the party of 
swindlers and thieves - Партия Жуликов и Воров, i.e. United Russia. In addition to the enthusiasm 
to vote anyone but United Russia, many people become active, responsible member of the civic 
society, and they volunteered as elections observers and reported of fraud. In the elections, United 
Russia got a little less than 50 percent of the vote, when in 2007 elections the party had received 64 
percent of the vote. Already the next day after the elections, people started demonstrating and 
opposing the result and accusing the authorities of elections fraud. The protesters had a clear idea of 
who was guilty to the elections fraud, and anti-Putin slogans were shouted at the rallies. However, 
the protesters lacked an alternative that would unite the whole country. (Lipman, 2011.) 
Monaghan (2012b) discusses the lack of unifying factor among protest movement. The protest 
movement has been perceived by many as “re-politicization of Russian society and as the emergence 
of a frustrated but increasingly politically active urban middle class led by a new wave of opposition 
figures”. However, Monaghan underlines, the rallies have consisted of a wide range of participants – 
from urban middle class to small unregistered parties. The participants have been both from systemic 
and non-systemic opposition, i.e. groups that are not in parliament. Even though the opposition has 
succeeded in organizing large rallies, it has not managed to achieve the important wider goals, and 
neither has it been able to form a united front. Instead, the opposition leaders have disagreed even 
with each other, even about falsifications. 
Opposition has also failed to find consensus of the form the rallies should take: some 
proposing more provocative and combative rallies and others refusing such an approach. Monaghan 
adds that the non-systemic opposition leaders have failed to make the wider electorate to understand 
that something must be done, and due to his the rallies have not converted into a larger public 
movement. In addition, the public opinion has not turned in opposition’s favor. (Monaghan, 2012b, 
11–12.) 
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4.3. Demography of protests 
 
The protests got plenty of space in the front pages of newspapers, and thanks to the media publicity 
they might have seemed bigger and more influential than they were. As discussed in the beginning of 
the chapter, the consistence of the protest varied from systemic to non-systemic opposition – from 
opposition politicians to ordinary citizens. Volkov (2012) discusses the demographics of the 
protestors in his article based on information provided by Levada Centre’s public-opinion polls. Right 
in the beginning of the protest movement, majority of the participants seemed to be young people 
who were mobilizing with the help of social networks. However, relatively quickly the movement 
started growing and people from different ages groups came to rallies. By February 2012, participants 
from age-groups 18–25 were just a fifth of all, and roughly the same number of people was age 55 or 
older. Most of the protestors were middle-aged – what started as a youth movement developed into 
something else. (Volkov, 2012, 56–57.)  
According to Levada Center’s data, from 60 to 70 percent of participants identified themselves 
as liberals or democrats. Practically all participants expressed dissatisfaction with Putin. The 
motivations for participating in protests included “dissatisfaction with the current situation in 
Russia” (73 percent), “indignation over electoral fraud” (73 percent), “dissatisfaction that key 
decisions were being made by politicians without citizen input” (52 percent), and “disillusionment 
with President Medvedev’s promises of modernization” (42 percent). Some expressed solidarity with 
opposition parties (15 percent) or individual protest organizers (13 percent). 
Participants differed from the average population of Russia. They were atypical Russians in 
general and even in Moscow. About 80 percent of them had some postsecondary education – only 30 
percent of Russians have that much schooling. Almost two-thirds of them were male, while Russia’s 
population is mostly female. As key sources for information they used mostly internet (70 percent), 
radio (45 percent), friends and acquaintances (30 percent), television (17–18 percent) and newspapers 
(15–18 percent). In comparison, 81 percent of Russians in general receive their news from television 
and only 13 percent read news online. Finally, around 70 percent of the protestors said they are 
relatively well off – from all Muscovites only half and a quarter of Russians did so. (Volkov, 2012, 
57). Based on the data, the participants of protests were more educated and better off than average 
Russians. It appears that the protestors did not represent Russian population as a whole, but merely a 
fraction of it.  
According to the data, the differences between the privileged, protest-friendly minority and 
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the patient majority were obvious during and after the Duma elections. Volkov (2012) argues that the 
silent majority opted for voting the devil it already knew – the majority was afraid of change, because 
in Russia change has usually made things worse. (Volkov, 2012, 60.) In the next sub-chapter, the 
silent majority of Russia will be discussed.  
 
 
4.4 Silent majority and the public opinion 
 
Dmitriev and Treisman (2012) remind that the participants of the protest were only a tiny fraction of 
Russia’s 143 million population. According to them, the outcome of the protests would be defined 
based on how much support the politicized vanguard would get from the silent majority living outside 
the big cities, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where the biggest rallies took place. Dmitriev and 
Treisman note that the stereotypical picture of a provincial Russian is “of a politically apathetic 
conformist who is resentful of pampered Muscovites, socially conservative, generally pro-Putin, 
suspicious of the West, and nostalgic for Soviet order”. 
This stereotype has been proved to be somewhat inaccurate thanks to new data collected after 
the Duma elections. From March 2012 to May 2012 the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Research 
(CSR) conducted a study of 62 focus groups in 16 Russian regions – in small, medium and large 
cities, in the remote East and West. Discussion leaders asked the participants, who varied in age, 
gender, education, and social and economic status, about their political values, policy concerns, and 
assessments of current and potential leaders. According to Dmitriev and Treisman, the answers were 
surprising, and the study provides more nuanced picture of the Russian mainstream. (Dmitriev and 
Treisman, 2012, Online version.) 
According to the data, Russians outside big cities are not tempted to participate in noisy street 
protests, shouting abstract slogans. However, the people are far from being content with the current 
political system that they see as corrupt and incapable to provide basic services. Their support for 
Putin has been steadily decreasing, and a massive economic crisis could easily tempt them to large-
scale street protests. When the metropolitan activists dream of greater freedom and democracy, the 
mainstream Russians want honest police officers and better health services. Dmitriev and Treisman 
claim that the biggest challenge for Russian liberal activists is to emerge these two strands of 
dissatisfaction into one united coalition for change.  
Even though the mainstream Russians living outside metropolises share a certain discontent 
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with citizens of the big cities, some essential differences occurred in the study. Dmitriev and Treisman 
write that the focus-group members showed little empathy to anti-government protesters and were 
not eager to join them. Whether or not the participants perceived the Duma and Presidential elections 
as fair, they accepted the results of the Duma elections as final. Furthermore, they did not want violent 
or revolutionary challenges to regime. Dmitriev and Treisman argue that “their responses help 
explain why the protests against ballot stuffing and other electoral irregularities have not spread to 
the rest of the country”. The scholars add that the results of their study are consistent with the figures 
published by Levada Center’s opinion poll in March 2012. According to the Levada Center, 52 
percent of Russians opposed the demonstrations, 32 percent supported them. Only eight percent said 
that they were willing to march in one. 59 percent of the population surveyed accepted the results of 
the parliamentary elections, and only 21 percent wanted the government to annul them and call new 
elections. (Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012, html-version.)  
There was a wish for change in other groups then liberal activists in big cities, but the goals 
for the change vary. Whereas the protesters in Moscow marched behind abstract concepts such as 
fairness and democracy, the majority of the country is not fond of ideological concepts, but cares 
more about concrete, local issues – across classes the majority of Russians is mostly concerned about 
the state’s lacking capability to provide basic services such as health care, education, housing and 
effective courts. According to the study, most of the focus-groups participants would gladly see major 
changes of the ruling elite, even though they do not wish for revolutionary change. According to 
Dmitriev and Treisman, the erosion of support for Putin, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and their 
party, United Russia, is almost as significant among provincial Russians as among the big-city elites. 
The results suggest that the Putin brand in exhausted nationwide. (Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012, 
html-version.) 
 
4.5 Authorities’ response 
 
The first rallies took place right after the elections, in December 5th in Moscow. The comments by 
the leaders of Russia were expected, but it took a while before the authorities commented on the 
rallies and the accusations that the elections were rigged. According to Koesel and Bunce (2012), the 
regime responded with variety of tactics to discredit, co-opt, fragment, and counter the opposition. 
The way in which Putin responded to the rallies changed in the course of action. 
Immediately after the rallies begun, the government adopted several ways of framing to 
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undermine the opposition and its goals. Putin claimed that the protests were orchestrated by the West 
and that it was West’s attempt to destabilize Russia. He even called the election monitors Judases. At 
the same time, the regime was drawing parallels between the Russian protests and Color revolutions, 
warning people about Orange threat. If the protests continued, they could possibly derail the economic 
recovery, cause political instability and even lead to civil war. (Koesel and Bunce, 415–416.)  
Prime Minister Putin commented the rallies in 8th of December, acknowledging the need for 
dialogue between the opposition and the officials. According to news agency Itar-Tass, at a meeting 
of the federal coordinating council of the All-Russia Popular Front Putin said that “With regard to 
street democracy activities, my attitude is as follows: if people act within the law, they should be 
entitled to express their opinion”. Then he added that “if someone is violating the law, then the law 
enforcement authorities shall demand compliance with the law by all legitimate means." Putin also 
emphasized the necessity of dialogue, saying: “We need to engage in a dialogue with those who are 
oppositionally-minded to give them a chance to have it out, using the constitutional right to 
demonstrate.” Furthermore, underlining the need for dialogue, Putin expressed a negative reaction to 
US State Secretary Hillary Clinton’s statement, in which she criticized the Russian elections as unfair. 
Putin accused Clinton for trying to influence Russian domestic politics and for giving signals to 
opposition. Putin said: “We must protect our sovereignty, and we should give thought to increasing 
the responsibility of those who act on assignments from foreign states to influence political 
processes”. (Itar-Tass, 8th of December on its webpage.)1 
Putin’s rhetoric concerning the rallies emphasized two matters: the need for dialogue within 
the boundaries of law, and the fact that foreign countries should mind their own business and keep 
aside from Russian politics. The first one suggests that the dialogue needs to be conducted under 
conditions set by Putin and his regime. The latter one is clearly focused on the idea of sovereignty: 
foreign states should not interfere with Russia’s business.  
As the protests continued, and regime’s tactics seemed to only encourage the opposition 
movement, Putin’s approach to rallies changed into more mediating one. Putin claimed “he was 
pleased with the protests because they signaled the robustness of Russian democracy and the vibrancy 
of its civil society”. At the same time, the popular media started writing about what kind of country 
Russia would be without Putin. Prime Minister Putin and his team responded by launching a slogan 
If not Putin, who? which underlined the lack of prominent alternatives. To counter the protests, several 
rallies to support Putin were arranged around the country, and the pro-Putin events received plenty of 
attention in the mass media. (Koesel and Bunce, 2012, 416.)  
                                                 
1 The article by Itar-Tass is available in http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/292939.html 
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According to Monaghan (2012b), Kremlin leadership reacted to the demonstrations quickly 
also in terms of action. One of the early responses was to dismiss some personnel and emphasize that 
after the election there would be “rotation” of personnel. After the Duma 2011 election, several city 
mayors and regional governors resigned or were fired, because of the poor results for United Russia 
in their region. Medvedev and Putin began to make numerous appointments in the Presidential 
Administration, in senior parliamentary positions, the governing cabinet, and in ministerial positions. 
The authorities initiated reforms to meet some of the demands made by the opposition. Monaghan 
lists three reforms as the most important ones. First, Putin proposed to have video cameras, i.e. closed-
circuit cameras, in every polling booth for the presidential election. Second proposal was the 
possibility to return to direct election of regional governors, instead of the central regime appointing 
them. Third, Dmitry Medvedev proposed to ease the regulations governing the registration of political 
parties. This reform was implemented in March 23rd 2012, when the parliament passed legislation 
that says that parties need only 500 signatures to register. The new law has been criticized, due to the 
fact that it might cause further fragmentation of the opposition. (Monaghan, 2012b, 12–13.)   
At a first glance it can seem that Putin’s regime’s reforms were liberalizing the country. 
However, Koesel and Bunce (2012) argue that it is not the case. Instead, the reforms helped the 
preserve the regime’s monopoly of the power. For example, fragmentation of the party system would 
mean than instead of few important opposition parties there would be multiple small actors. The 
fragmented party system is easier for the regime to control, because it can confuse and the divide the 
electorate. Furthermore, it can prevent or at least make more difficult the formation of effective, 
united opposition. (Koesel and Bunce, 2012, 416–417.)  
According to Monaghan (2012b, 13), in addition to the reforms, Putin’s most significant 
response to the rallies and accusations was his presidential campaign. Putin’s campaign was 
exceptional, since he had not campaigned before. He based his campaign on promoting the stability 
and elaborating the benefits the stability that Putin and his team had brought to Russia. From the 
perspective of the focus of my thesis Putin’s campaign is far ahead in the future – but it is interesting 
to be aware that stability became the central theme in Putin’s campaign.  
Dmitriev and Treisman (2012) write that as an attempt to secure the status-quo, Kremlin 
sought to build a firewall between the urban protestors and their provincial compatriots. It was clear 
that the Putin team had already lost the urban middle class, and the demotion of Medvedev from the 
presidential post suggested that Putin acknowledged this fact. The next step for Putin was to stop the 
erosion of confidence in his rule. The presidential elections were getting closer, and Putin chose to 
use two tactics. First, he committed to promises such as raising pensions and wages of doctors and 
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teachers if he was re-elected as president. In addition, in January 2012, he doubled the wages of the 
military. Second, he chose to exploit the gap between the cultural divisions between big-city liberals 
and more traditional, blue-collar provinces.  
One dimension of the authorities’ response to protests was dealing with media publicity. The 
Kremlin spokespeople sought to portray the mass rallies as entertainment, as amusement for 
pampered Muscovites, disreputable celebrities, angry anarchists and unpopular minority groups. 
During the months after Duma elections, the authorities strengthened their grip and introduced new 
law initiatives: United Russia launched a campaign against gay-rights activists, promoting the idea 
of punishing for pro-homosexual propaganda. Dmitriev and Treisman argue that the “the barely 
concealed goal is to cast the antigovernment protesters as a cabal of feminist punks, church 
desecraters, and sexual deviants”. Putin also ordered a harsher approach towards the demonstrations, 
arresting more people and increasing the size of fines. However, these methods did not scare the 
protestors. According to a sociological survey conducted in a rally, 90 percent of the interviewed 
protestors (total amount of 112) said that they would continue participating even if the sentences and 
fines were dramatically increased. (Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012, html-edition.) 
It was clear that the authorities reacted and responded to the discontent of the protesting 
minority on all fronts. They acknowledged the need for a dialogue and initiated reforms. At the same 
time, the significance and extent of the protests were undermined, and some of the protestors were 
stigmatized as deviant. Authorities’ response was comprehensive and it suggests that the regime could 
not take the protests lightly. The possible threat for the status quo was recognized. The main concern 
was to secure the support of silent majority, and that was done by emphasizing the gap between the 
minority and majority and by marginalizing the protest-movement.  
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5. Media in the contemporary Russia 
 
5.1 Neo-authoritarian media system 
 
In this thesis, the primary research material are Russians newspaper articles. Despite the fact that the 
focus of this study is not on freedom of speech or on professional journalistic values, it is necessary 
to be aware of the circumstances in which Russia media work. Russian journalistic practice is not 
guided by the same journalistic values as in the Western countries, but reporting is a process of 
complex rules of a regulated media system, and in the system different media have different rules and 
restrictions, due to their relationship with the government. This chapter is a background overview of 
the situation of Russian media. The contemporary Russian media system is a result of developments 
that have taken place during Putin’s era. It has been formed partly due to rules and regulations and 
have been implemented from above, and on the other hand partly due to the rapid development of 
new forms of media.  
According to Lipman and McFaul (2001), Vladimir Putin's election as president had a 
significant effect on press freedom. In the beginning of his presidency, Putin's rhetoric emphasised 
the notion of a free press and the importance of democracy. However, Lipman and McFaul claim that 
Putin did not fully understand the essence of these concepts. In Putin's Russia, state-media was bound 
to dominate the information market, since the state was solely capable of providing Russian citizens 
objective information. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001. 121–123.)  
In September 2000 President Putin signed the Doctrine of information security, which 
established a principle on information security. The content of the doctrine suggested that state was 
the one calling the shots in the relationship between media and the state. Media should bend under 
the will of officials in order to preserve informational integrity of Russia. According to the officials, 
“The doctrine of information security of the Russian Federation is the sum total of official views 
concerning goals, tasks, principles and guidelines for ensuring the information security of the Russian 
Federation.” (Simons and Strovsky, 2006, 202.) This doctrine limits freedom of speech in anti-
terrorist operations. Limitations are justified by arguing that free broadcasting from the sites of 
terrorist attacks allows terrorists to adjust their plans. (Azhgikhina, 2007, 1255.)  
Simons (2010) writes that one of the aims of the doctrine is to guarantee that both Russian 
and international audience get truthful information about the state policy and Russia’s official stands 
in significant events home and abroad. Simons explains the content of the doctrine by interpreting 
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that the information coming from non-governmental sources might not be accurate, as only the 
information from official sources is truthful and reliable. Putin wanted the state-owned media to 
dominate the media market so that people could get objective information. Putin met with journalists 
on 13 January 2001, and in the meeting he made it clear that he wanted to see the creation of “single 
information space” taking place in Russia. The intention of this creation is intended to ensure the 
integrity of the state, most of all to defence of the state. Putin was quoted as saying “any talk about 
unity of the Russian state apparently starts with the formulation of its tasks and goals. A single 
information space is a priority task. It would be worth noting that the word came first”. (Simons, 
2010, 23–24.)  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, market reforms had stimulated the rise of independent 
media, and businessmen had understood the potential power and influence of media as a political 
tool. Businessmen had built media empires in Russia: Vladimir Gusinsky was the head of Media Most 
and Boris Berezovsky owned shares of Russian television network ORT. However, Russian state 
remained the dominant actor in both Russian media and politics sectors. After his election, Putin did 
not attack straight against journalists, instead, he went against the media owners. Media mogul 
Gusinsky and his Media Most, including NTV, were first on Putin's agenda. Media Most was 
economically the most independent company, and Gusinsky had not support Yeltsin's party in 
parliamentary elections in 1999 or Putin in presidential elections in 2000, and Putin remembered that. 
From the perspectives of Putin, Gusinsky was both the enemy of the state and the enemy of Putin 
personally. After series of complicated power struggles, the so called media wars, the will of Putin 
came true and Gusinsky had to give up his position. According to Lipman and McFaul, state's 
campaign against NTV is an example of what happens to a news organization that gets on the way of 
Kremlin. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, 117–119.) Taking into account the history of the media wars, the 
current media owners cannot afford to ignore the fact that it is a wiser business strategy to support 
the status quo than to attack against the authorities and official policies in the media coverage. 
However, when it comes to stepping in the way of Kremlin, the press seems to be enjoying more 
freedoms than television, and a natural explanation is that television is the main media that reaches 
most of the Russians. Newspapers have relatively small circulations when compared to the millions 
of people television broadcasts gather as their audience. Striking exception is an online television 
channel Rain TV (Dozhd) that is very critical in its content and for example during the 2011 and 2012 
elections the television channel was reporting about the elections’ falsifications and rallies. However, 
Rain TV does not have as large audience as the national television channels:  
At least in the 2000’s, Putin's attitude towards the independent press turned out to be 
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complicated, even resentful. According to Lipman and McFaul, in Putin's Russia, reporters can be 
free as long as they don't get in the way of the president and his agenda. (Lipman & McFaul, 2001, 
121–123.) According to some estimations among the media industry, the worst censors are the media 
themselves. Pavel Gutiontov of Russia’s Union of Journalists described the pressures on Russian 
journalists by saying that Russian journalists have an “inner slave” mentality: ‘The sad thing is that 
it is the press that is readily guessing what the authorities would want it to print... The internal censor 
is once again becoming the main censor... We have to do a lot of work in eradicating our inner slave 
from ourselves, from our editing rooms, from television. (Gutiontov, 2004 in Simons and Strovsky, 
2006, 194). 
Jonathan Becker (2004) is a scholar that introduced the term “neo-authoritarian media system” 
in the Russian media studies. He suggests that neo-authoritarian media system has some key features. 
First, state-owned media have limited autonomy and key posts are given to politically loyal people. 
Second, access to media might be open and private ownership is accepted, but media content is 
controlled by other means. The state does not practise direct pre-publishing censorship. Instead, 
critics of the state are silenced by economic pressure and by legal actions against the owners of the 
media. In addition to this, journalists might get criminal and civil penalties. Becker compares Russia's 
current neo-authoritarian media system to managed democracy. It looks like Russia has democratic 
institutions, but in reality these institutions are rotten. (Becker, 2004, 149–150). Becker claims that 
Putin's regime did allow a relatively free print media to exist, but the most influential medium, 
television, was subordinated to state control. However, Becker points out that during Putin's first term 
the media coverage was not controlled as tightly as during the Soviet Union. Under the Soviet regime, 
all issues were controlled, but in the 2000's, the state controlled only the most central issues, such as 
elections and the situation in Chechnya. (Becker, 2004, 157.) 
One should remember that Becker's article was published in 2004, when Putin had been 
president for one term. During Putin's second term press freedom took a turn in the direction of further 
control. Another thing that should be remembered is the dominance of television during the 2000's. 
The circulation of most newspapers was and is relatively slow in comparison to the amount of people 
that got their news from television. Due to the small circulation, the critical newspapers are allowed 
to exist, as they are not threatening the regime. The truly influential medium, television, remains 
tightly under control.  
Samuel A. Greene (2009) argues that the situation of media in contemporary Russia is quite 
depressing, especially if one studies political communication. Greene also writes that Vladimir Putin 
launched neo-authoritarian media system in Russia, and in this system, the state is smothering press 
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freedom. (Greene, 2009, 56.) Centralising the ownership of television into the hands of the state is an 
obvious example of this smothering. This sub-chapter has discussed the development of neo-
authoritarian media system during the 2000’s and during the two presidential terms of Vladimir Putin. 
In next sub-chapter, the more recent developments of the Russian media environment will be 
discussed.  
 
5.2. The smothered press freedom 
 
In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev was elected as the President of the Russian Federation, and expectations 
for liberal developments were high. Medvedev promised reforms in politics and party system, in 
economy and in fighting the corruption (Sakwa, 2011, 318). The four year period of President 
Medvedev did not bring significant changes to the Russian media environment: he ruled the country 
as tandem with Prime Minister Putin and they followed the familiar principles of the 2000’s. The state 
television channels remained the most important sources of information, reaching almost 100 percent 
of the population in Russia. However, the Medvedev–Putin-tandem faced an information source that 
was beyond their control. The role of the internet as an alternative information source has grown 
steadily since the 2000’s.  
Maria Lipman has written a chapter to book Return to Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future 
Uncertain. The fifth edition of the book was published in 2012, and Lipman’s chapter provides more 
recent evaluations of the contemporary Russian media. Lipman states that there are plenty of sources 
outside the sphere of tight government control. To name a few, she mentions newspapers 
Kommersant, Vedomosti and Novaya Gazeta, and a radio station Ekho Moskvy. Naturally the internet 
is full of free sources. According to Lipman, during the Tandem era of Putin and Medvedev, most of 
the Russian media established platforms online. Lipman emphasizes that the problem in Putin’s 
Russia is not the absence of alternative sources of information. She claims that these alternative 
sources are even necessary to Putin’s Russia, where the politics is securely under Kremlin’s grip. The 
existence of alternative media gives a platform for the critically minded to express their opinion and 
let off steam. The true problem in Putin’s Russia is the lack of political competition. Furthermore, the 
legislature has become a tool of the executive, judicial rulings follow Kremlin’s will, and autonomous 
public activism is marginalised. Under these conditions independent media cannot make a difference 
in policy making. They simply remain as politically irrelevant. (Lipman, 2012, 135.)  
In contemporary Russia, the state media does not provide balanced news even on the state 
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high-level events and decisions, nor does it provide a platform for open discussion. Instead, the state 
media attempts to provide the viewers an officially-approved version of what is happening in Russia 
and in the world. Furthermore, the state media discredits the oppositional voices that are critical of 
the incumbent powers. The systematic repression has led to lack of independent, local news and to 
lack of analysis of political relevance. Only some radio programs and limited amount of print press 
are able to tackle serious issues of politics, corruption and public affairs. Even though Russian 
consumers of news have access to diversity of information, they do not necessarily have access to 
meaningful coverage of policy and politics. The authorities aim to block the discussions of the most 
important matters, such as policy making and budget decisions. (Orttung and Walker, 2013, 2, 5.) 
In 2013, on the indices that measure media freedom Russia is doing poorly. For example, on 
the Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index Russia ranked 148th out of 179 countries. The 
report claims that “Russia (148th, -6) has fallen again because, since Vladimir Putin’s return to the 
presidency, repression has been stepped up in response to an unprecedented wave of opposition 
protests”. 2 According to Freedom House’s Map of Freedom (2013), Russia is not a free country in 
terms of press freedom. Freedom House is concerned about the turn towards worse that took place in 
Russia after Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency. Freedom House argues that since his 
inauguration in May 2011, Putin took calculated measures in order to restrain independent political 
and civic activity. He pushed through several laws that are smothering the societal opposition and 
restricting social protest, limiting the work of NGO’s and attempting to limit the freedom of 
expression in the internet. (Freedom House Report, 2013, 7.) 
As has been showed in the previous chapters, Russian media does not enjoy the freedom of 
expression. For example, politically relevant topics are often not covered based on journalistic choice, 
but rather based on the will of the authorities. In this respect, it is important to study the Russian 
media content and while doing so it is essential to remember that the work of journalists is guided by 
many pressures, such as the pressure to cover issues in a manner that servers the official agenda. In 
next sub-chapter, the main focus is the coverage of the rallies in the Russian media.  
 
5.3 Coverage of the rallies 
 
The Russian media, especially state-controlled television, were eager to fall silent and not to cover 
the post-Duma elections rallies in December 2011. First days after the elections, the main channels 
                                                 
2 Reporters without Borders, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013,1054.html 
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ignored the rallies in their news shows, and the main source for information remained to be internet. 
For example, according to BBC, one could easily imagine that the Russian national television 
channels and newspapers where reporting of different countries: Television stations did not mention 
the opposition protests, but they did mention the pro-Putin rallies that were held in Moscow. The only 
television channel that reported about the elections on Tuesday was REN TV that is considered to be 
the only liberal television station on Russia. However, as main national channels are accessible all 
around the country, REN TV is accessible mainly on urban areas. On the comparison to state 
television, newspapers were reporting freely of the rallies and of their violent dispersion. BBC reports 
that newspapers gave a total different picture of the rallies – news of police beating and arresting the 
protesters. 3 As the protest movement grew stronger, state-controlled media had to give in and they 
started reporting about the protests. Some journalists working on state-controlled television channels 
insisted that the rallies should be covered. For example, a journalist and news anchor of television 
channel NTV, Alexey Pivovarov, refused to go on air, if the protests would not be part of the 
broadcast. 4 As a result, the prime time news broadcast of NTV in Saturday the 10th begun with a 
report from the big demonstration, and Pivovarov said that “today Moscow has been the scene of 
perhaps the most massive rally in decades”. It is significant that the state-channels did not fall silent 
but continue the rallies. Typically the state-channels would not cover topics unfavorable to the regime.  
According to Lipman (2012), the coverage on the federal channels was cautious, restrained 
and frequently biased. Despite these shortages, Lipman finds something positive in reporting: at least 
the rallies were covered, and Russians could see people marching with signs saying “Russia without 
Putin”. In addition, many of the controversial figures that had been on a blacklist were suddenly 
invited to talk shows. However, few remained to be persona non-grata, considered too dangerous by 
Kremlin, most of all opposition activist Alexey Navalnyi. Even though the grip of the control was 
loosened and protests made it to the national television, it did not mean that television would have 
been freer. The national channels remained faithful to the administration, and they were protecting 
Kremlin’s interest. While some talk shows interviewed political activists, some programmes smeared 
the activists and portrayed them as “immoral agents of the evil West”. (Lipman, 2012, 138–139.) 
Whereas national television was cautious and biased to authorities, another kind of point of 
view was available online and on cable. Independent internet and cable television channel Dozhd 
(Rain TV) started covering the rallies right from the beginning. According to BBC, it was the channel 
that reported most extensively and rapidly about the rallies. The channel soon became famous for 
                                                 
3 See BBC’s (7th of December 2011) article in http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16067899 
4 News article on gazeta.ru http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lastnews/2011/12/10/n_2129454.shtml 
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their journalists wearing white ribbon, the symbol for fair elections -movement, during the show. This 
was interpreted as bias, but the owner of the station Natalya Sindeyeva claimed that showing the 
ribbon was more a mark of sincerity than an act of propaganda. Many urban citizens were following 
the coverage of Dozhd, but for larger audience it remained marginal source of information. The 
authorities did not appreciate the pro-protest content by the channel. In December 15th 2011, President 
Medvedev unsubscribed to Dozhd news feed on Twitter. Dozhd had been the first Russian mass media 
outlet that Medvedev had chosen to follow on Twitter. 5 Later, Dozhd faced problems due to its 
coverage. Lenta.ru reported that “the station was subsequently told to provide copies of its broadcasts 
to Russia’s communications watchdog for “analysis of its abiding by the Russian Federation’s mass 
media laws”. In February 2012, Dozhd-channel was investigated due to its protest coverage. The 
prosecutors said they were investigating where the channel received its funding for live broadcasting 
the mass rallies in 10th and 24th of December 2011. The probe was initiated by Rober Schlegel, deputy 
of ruling party United Russia.6 Journalist Brian Whitmore of Radio Free Liberty claimed that the 
investigation was a sign that the Empire was striking back after being on defense for months. “Putin 
is trying to get control of the media narrative by reining in independent voices,” Whitmore claimed 
and asked, whether or not it is possible in the era of Youtube, Livejournal and rising internet 
penetration. 7 
Also radio station Ekho Moskvy faced problems due to its protest coverage. Few of the leading 
figures were forced out from the board, and some of them were known for criticizing Vladimir Putin’s 
government. Later on an interview Putin accused Ekho Moskvy for serving U.S interest and 
“smearing him nonstop from dusk to dawn”. The former head of the Russian Union of Journalists, 
Igor Yakovenko said to CPJ that all these moves – firing Kommersant’s editors, investigating Dozhd, 
dismissing Ekho Moskvy's independent directors - were attempts to intimidate the media. 8  
The media content did not focus only on reporting of the mass protests and discontent. Putin’s 
supporters went to streets as well, expressing their support for the regime. According to Koesel and 
Bunce (2012), the pro-Putin rallies were widely reported in the media. They got more attention than 
the pro-fair elections rallies, and they were reported to have more participants than their counterparts. 
However, Koesel and Bunce claim, it is unsure if the pro-Putin rallies rehabilitated the image of 
                                                 
5 See article on Moscow Times (15th of December 2011) 
http://www.themoscownews.com/politics/20111209/189273084.html 
6 Article about the investigation of Dozhd. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/russian-tv-faces-probe-over-protests-
coverage 
7 The Empire strikes back. http://www.rferl.org/content/the_empire_strikes_back_-
_at_independent_media/24486805.html 
8 http://www.cpj.org/blog/2012/03/ahead-of-elections-russian-media-has-been-duly-war.php 
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invincibility. The local media claimed that the meetings were being staffed by the regime, and that 
busloads of people were brought from the countryside to participate the meetings. (Koesel and Bunce, 
2012, 416.)  
The traditional media, especially television but also to some extent radio and print, were 
regulated by the regime and by the silent rules of neo-authoritarian media system. However, forms of 
new media, i.e. social networks online, managed to provide an alternative route for receiving 
information about the protests. When the rallies began, social media started working as a platform for 
mobilization. Groups to oppose elections results were created in Vkontakte, in the “Russian 
Facebook”. People were using Twitter to keep up-to-date about what was happening, where and when. 
Many of the rallies were arranged with the help of spreading word on social media. There was no 
official organizer. 
The reporting demonstrates the power of media. The battle for dominating frames was fierce, 
as Putin’s regime was fighting for its legitimacy and the protesting masses were trying to get their 
message of rigged elections and their claims through in the media. Putin’s regime had the advantage 
that most important national television channels were supporting Putin and shaping the image of the 
rallies into one that favored Putin. In this thesis, the empirical data consists of newspaper articles. 
Newspapers are a grey area between the state-controlled television and free online media. They face 
pressures by authorities but are much freer than television.  
The news coverage of the rallies in the Russian newspapers will be studied in detail with the 
help of frame analysis. The focus of this thesis is to how the protests are covered in Russian 
newspapers. The mass protests on the streets were something unexpected and unprecedented in the 
context of Russian political sphere of the Putin era. Such an unexpected event posed a challenge to 
media that had been balancing between demands of professional journalism and of pressure for 
censorship and self-censorship by authorities.  
The next chapter will present and discuss framing as a tool used by journalists, and frame 
analysis as a methodology will be presented in more detail.  
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6. Framing 
 
6.1 A fractured paradigm 
  
The concept of a frame is a constructionist one. It is based on the idea that media do not simply reflect 
reality, they also actively participate in creating it. (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 2000). The 
constructive idea of media’s role is the starting point for the analysis in this thesis. I believe that media 
and journalists do not only reflect the reality, but by covering news events and choosing certain ankles 
they are active subjects who construct the images of the reality. In this thesis, journalists are not 
passive bystanders.  
The origins of framing are in the fields of cognitive psychology (Bartlett, 1932) and 
anthropology (Bateson, 1955/1972) (Van Gorp, 2007, 60), and the concept of frame was created by 
sociologist Erving Goffman in 1974.  During the past decades, especially in the 1990’s, framing has 
become a popular approach in the media studies. In this thesis, framing is used as understood by a 
media scholar, Robert M. Entman, who is one of the leading scholars in studying how media framing 
works. 
Framing has become a popular research method in media studies over the past decades. 
However, it has remained a fractured paradigm. Entman (1993, 51) writes that “Despite its 
omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of 
framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves 
manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking.” Because of the fractured way of 
understanding framing, the ways of conducting analysis vary. Scheufele (1999) argues that framing 
as a media theory is full of theoretical and empirical vagueness. Van Gorp (2005, 485) emphasizes 
that the way in which a frame is understood by a scholar affects the results, the scope and the 
comparability of the findings. 
Paul D’Angelo does not agree with Entman that the study framing is incoherent. According 
to D’Angelo, Entman’s argument is based on the presupposition that framing should be a single 
paradigm. Unlike Entman, D’Angelo argues that “theoretical and paradigmatic diversity had led to 
a comprehensive view of framing processes, not fragmented findings in isolated research projects”. 
(D'Angelo, 2002, 871–873.) D'Angelo claims that there is not neither there should be a paradigm of 
framing. Instead, he suggests that framing is more a research program than a paradigm, and that inside 
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this research program are three paradigms: Cognitive, Critical and Constructionist. (D'Angelo, 2002, 
876.)   
In journalism studies, framing can be used to study content, production, and reception. In this 
thesis, I concentrate on analyzing the content. According to D’Angelo (2002), the core of news 
framing research is based on four empirical goals: 1) identifying thematic units called frames, 2) 
investigating the previous conditions that produce frames, 3) examining how news frames activate, 
and interact with, an individual’s prior knowledge to affect interpretations, recall of information, 
decision-making and evaluations, and 4) examining how news frames shape social-level processes 
such as public opinion and policy issue debates. (D’Angelo, 2002, 873.) In this thesis, the goal is the 
first one, to identify the thematic units called frames and to analyze them. In next sub-chapter, the 
nature of frames will be discussed.  
 
6.2 Frames are tools 
 
Framing is based on the idea of social constructivism – mass media actively set frames and audience 
actively use them to interpret and discuss the events. (Scheufele, 1999, 105.) The notion of frames 
was introduced in media studies by Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980). According to Tuchman 
(1978), frames are essential so that people could understand world that is complex and unorganised. 
The news frame organizes everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality. 
(Tuchman, 1978, 193.) 
Väliverronen (1995) writes that frames help us to observe, recognize and name events. One 
could say that the starting point for framing is to understand what is happening in the world. The 
concept of frame helps us to grasp the continuity that is typical for journalism. Journalism does not 
tell about single item of news, but that in fact this single news are a part of wider process. 
(Väliverronen, 1995, 9.) 
During the past decades, the concept of frame has been developed widely. One of the leading 
contributors is media scholar Robert M. Entman. According to Entman, framing implies selection and 
salience. Selection is made by the news media – they decide to emphasize certain elements. In his 
well-known article of framing, Entman (1993, 52) writes: “To frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
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recommendation for the item described”. Frames are located in four levels in communication process: 
the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. In all these locations frames fulfill similar 
functions: they select and highlight elements to construct an argument. Frames are not universal, but 
it is not insignificant how issues and events are framed. Frames set the guidelines for readers, and 
they determinate how people understand and remember the issue in focus. The meaning of the 
message is created in the interaction between the mediator and the receiver, and because of that it is 
impossible to say how the frames effect the reader. (Entman, 1993, 53–54.)  
Frames consist of reasoning and of framing devices. Fully developed frames typically have 
four functions: problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment, and remedy promotion – these 
are so called reasoning devices. According to Entman, framing works through priming. Frames 
introduce ideas that are important. The goal of this is to encourage the target audience to think in 
certain way. (Entman, 2007, 164).  
Karina Horsti (2005) conducted a frame analysis on her dissertation. Horsti emphasizes that 
the construction of frames is based on selection – some aspects are promoted, some are dispelled. 
Points of views, sources, words, expressions and visual images used in the articles are all a result of 
selection. One should not ask only what is included in the research material, but also what might have 
been left out. (Horsti, 2005, 71.) In her dissertation, Horsti presents framing devices that help the 
researcher to define frames. She divides devices into four categories: Metaphors, examples and 
comparisons, catch-phrases and nominations, descriptions and images. When conducting a frame 
analysis, Horsti writes, recognizing and interpreting metaphors is a crucial tool in understanding the 
cultural and social meanings of a text. Metaphors help to concretize abstract and complicated 
phenomena. Examples and comparisons help to create contexts. Horsti argues that the way in which 
an event is combined to other, previous events defines how this event is being discussed in the public. 
Catch-phrases and nominations are influential ways of defining events and issues. When giving a 
name to an event, one reasserts a certain perspective and its legitimacy. A name makes an event more 
concrete and more visible. Finally, frame analysis studies also images. Images can have metaphoric 
functions – do they support what is being said in the text or are the pictures saying something 
different? According to Horsti, one should also analyze the content of images, i.e. who are in the 
pictures, what are the people doing? (Horsti, 2005, 71–76.) 
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6.3 Journalists select and highlight 
 
Framing studies concentrate on defining and analyzing the frames embedded in media texts. But how 
do journalists frame articles? Van Gorp ( 2005, 485) poses a question of whether a frame is an 
objectively observable news characteristic used or created by journalists, or whether it is a heuristic 
tool constructed by the frame analyst who imposes it on the news story. 
According to Entman (2004, 5), the standard definition of framing in media studies can be the 
following: “Selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections 
among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution”. This refers to 
the fact that journalists actively create frames – journalists select and highlight certain aspects of 
reality.  
Karvonen (2000) says that the concept of framing is closely connected to how journalists 
process the flood of information. In communication, one can by choosing a certain frame make events 
look as wanted. In his article, Karvonen presents a thought of Todd Gitlin: With the help of frames, 
journalist can process a large amount of information very quickly. Reporter can recognize that 
something has news value and after that he/she can quickly transform this event into a news form. 
Karvonen also presents the idea of William Gamson, who claims that a journalist who is working on 
a news story is guided by a frame. For example, elections can be seen as a horse race. Because of this 
frame, an experienced journalist has already in the beginning of a news process a structure of news 
article in his/her mind. In this structure, there are certain gaps that vary, such as actors and places, 
which need to be filled. Both journalist and the audience recognize these frames, and because of this 
journalist only has to activate a wanted frame in the minds of audience. Karvonen says that with the 
help of framing journalists can make people think in a certain way of different events. (Karvonen 
2000, 78, 80–82.) The proposition made by Karvonen is supported by results of studies that will be 
presented later, in a chapter discussing studies framing controversial issues. 
Scheufele (1999) argues that based on the previous research, five factors may potentially have 
influence on how journalist frame issues: social norms and values, organization pressures and 
constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines and ideological or political orientations 
of journalist. (Scheufele, 1999, 109.) In Russia’s case the journalists face plenty of pressures that can 
influence their work and the way how they are framing news stories. There is a pressure to cover the 
stories in favorable way for the authorities, so that the personal safety and benefits of the journalist 
and newspaper would not be jeopardized. At the same time, there can be the pressure for objective 
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reporting: large masses of people are rallying all around Russia, and it is something the country has 
not seen in years. Journalists and media should naturally cover this, if they serve their audience and 
not the rulers. The pressure for self-censorship can be a dominating factor in shaping the framing 
process. 
Van Dijk (1985) suspects that the way in which journalists frame stories depends on social 
and professional routines. According to Horsti (2005), a journalist does not come to a reporting 
situation with empty frames. A journalist already has his or her own ways of interpreting the world: 
professional and personal frames and wider, social and cultural frames. Furthermore, journalist faces 
frames produced by different sources and institutions. (Horsti, 2005, 53.) News texts and the frames 
embedded in them are influenced by these factors.  
Van Gorp (2005) refers to a frame as a media package. It includes all the framing devices by 
which a frame can be identified, i.e. metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, lexical choices, selection 
of sources, graphics, stereotypes, dramatic characters. Van Gorp also refers to reasoning devices, 
presented by Entman - defining a problem, assigning responsibility, passing a moral judgment and 
reaching possible solutions. These devices can be manifest. However, framing theory suggests that if 
the device is not manifest but explicit, it will still be evoked by the frame message during the 
interpretation process of the reader. Frame gives advice and instructions to reader of how to 
understand the message included in the frame. (Van Gorp, 2005, 486–487.) 
Scheufele (1999) refers to Gamson and Modigliani when explaining how journalists frame 
stories: framing can be explained by interaction or journalists’ norms and values and the influence of 
interest groups. (Scheufele, 1999, 110.) Van Dijk (1985) recognizes the importance of social and 
professional routines in news work. He claims that “It seems plausible that the structural forms and 
the overall meanings of a news text are not arbitrary, but a result of social and professional routines 
of journalists in institutional settings, on the one hand, and an important condition for the effective 
cognitive processing of news text by both journalists and readers, on the other hand. (Van Dijk, 1985, 
70.) 
As already mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, D'Angelo (2002) presents three 
paradigms of framing: Cognitive, Critical and Constructionist. Journalist's role in frame building 
varies in each paradigm. According to critical paradigm, journalists consciously collect information 
and frame events in a certain way in order to support status quo, or journalists omit information to 
make sure that a specific frame will not exist. These frames are thought to dominate the news 
coverage. Cognitive paradigm claims that journalists strive to frame events in several ways. They 
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routinely collect information and meaningfully frame single event in different ways. In constructionist 
paradigm, journalists are seen as information processors: they build “interpretative packages” of the 
positions of politically invested sponsors. (D'Angelo, 2002, 876–877.) 
The division into paradigms is interesting but it raises some questions about categorizing the 
ways of framing into isolated blocks. Because the ideas and rules guiding journalists are diverse and 
complex, each of the paradigms seems to be too isolated and narrow to work and explain framing 
process individually. D’Angelo (2002, 878) reminds that many researchers use the synthesis of 
different paradigms.  Content analysis of the media coverage does not answer to the question of how 
journalists have frames their stories and what have been the guiding principles behind the framing 
process. However, it is necessary to be aware of the paradigmatic distinctions to understand that 
framing processes are influenced by several factors, such as norms and values, and pressures coming 
from outside the newsrooms.  
 
6.4 Examples of framing studies 
 
There have been several studies on how different frames affect people's conceptions of different 
issues. Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley (1997) have studied the effects of 
framing on people's attitudes in the article Media framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effect 
on Tolerance. Their article presents the results of a study on how different ways of framing Ku Klux 
Klan demonstration can effect on people's tolerance towards the organisation in question. In the study, 
research participants were shown two different kinds of frames of Ku Klux Klan demonstration. 
Nelson & al. (199, 567) write that “Framing is a process in which a communication source, such as 
a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy”. In the first frame 
in the study, the demonstration was defined as an issue of freedom of speech, and the second frame 
presented the demonstration as disruption of political order. The research was conducted in a 
laboratory. As a result, the scholars claim that different ways of framing can have influenced people's 
tolerance. They argue that the choices reporters make in covering the story, such as choosing words 
and phrases, can have significant effects on how the readers perceive the issue. (Nelson et al. 1997, 
576.) 
Frames can affect and guide the way in which people's opinions about the controversy are 
developed. Two studies completed by Nelson et al., verify the assumptions. Different ways of framing 
Ku Klux Klan activities influenced the attitudes participants' in different way. When Ku Klux Klan 
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demonstration was framed as an issue of free speech, the attitudes of people were much more tolerant 
in comparison to framing the demonstration as a potentially explosive clash between two angry 
groups. Nelson et al. argue that “Participants in this experiment, who witnessed news reports about 
the very same event, expressed significantly different opinions depending upon the media framing of 
that event”. (Nelson et al. 1997, 568, 574.)  
Also Patti M. Valkenburg, Holli A. Semetko and Claes H. De Reese (1999) have studied the 
effects of different ways of framing controversial issues. In their article The Effects of News Frames 
on Reader's Thought and Recall, they argue that framing has significant importance to the 
interpretations that people make. In their research, the participants were asked to read one story about 
crime and about the introduction of the Euro. They were assigned to four different framing conditions: 
conflict, human interest, attribution of responsibility, and economic consequences. Scholars claim 
that, according to literature, news is often framed in these four ways. Valkenburg et al. state that 
according to their study, the way in which the stories were framed had remarkable effects on people's 
thoughts on both issues, crime and Euro. They argue: “News frames give the audience direction on 
how to conceive of a specific issue or event.” They make the conclusion that, as many studies have 
suggested, the news media can have the capacity to not only tell public what issues to think about, 
but also how to think about them. (Valkenburg et al. 1999, 551, 565–567.) 
These studies presented above suggest that framing is an influential tool used by journalists. 
Decisions and choices, conscious or not, may affect people's attitudes towards the issue in question. 
This thesis is going to define, with help of frame analysis, the frames in which the outcome of Russian 
Duma elections was portrayed in the Russian press. The aim of this thesis is not to study what kind 
of effects the frames may have on audience's point of views. However, based on the studies presented 
above, it is justifiable to argue that different ways of framing may, and most likely do, have an 
influence to readers' attitudes. 
By studying the frames, one can make visible the underlying meanings that shape public 
opinion. It is likely that different newspapers frame the elections outcome in different ways, which 
means that the readers of various newspapers form different images of the topic. Entman has studied 
framing as part of bias. He (2007, 164) suggests that “We can define framing as the process of culling 
a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among 
them to promote a particular interpretation.” The fundamental assumption while completing the 
analysis will be that different ways of framing conflict most likely has some influence in readers' 
attitudes – and due to this it is crucial to research this topic. Only by making visible the ways of 
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covering elections, one can start to understand the possible effects that frames can have on the 
audience. The intention of frame analysis in this thesis is to find out what kind of a reality is being 
constructed in the pages of newspapers.  
 
6.5 Criticism of framing studies 
 
As a fractured paradigm, the vagueness of frame has raised questions of reliability and validity of the 
frame analysis. After reading several articles of framing, it can be said that very few of them tell in 
detail how the research result, the frames, were defined. 
Media scholars Jorg Matthes and Matthias Kohring (2008) criticize the vagueness of frame 
analysis, and propose a more solid way of conducting a frame analysis. They read an extensive 
amount of framing studies and separated five methodological approaches to conducting a frame 
analysis: a hermeneutic approach, a linguistic approach, a manual holistic approach, a computer-
assisted approach, and a deductive approach. Common to all these approaches is that within each one 
of them are studies that are vague in explaining how the frames were defined. According to Matthes 
and Kohring, there is a great risk that a researcher finds the frames they are consciously or 
unconsciously looking for. Matthes and Kohring develop and propose their own methodological way 
to conduct frame analysis. Their method combines both manual and computer coding. However, they 
admit that other approaches can be valid as well, but to ensure validity one should in detail explain 
the steps taken in defining the frames. (Matthes and Kohring, 2008, 259.)  
Horsti (2005) conducted a frame analysis on her dissertation. Horsti writes that that separating 
frames from the text is an interpretation and it is not always unambiguous. According to Horsti, one 
of the problems of frame analysis is whether or not the frames actually are frames or rather themes. 
In her research, Horsti solved the problem by calling her subject matter, immigration, as the theme. 
In this thesis, Horsti's solution will be utilized, and the outcome and the reactions to the elections, 
will be perceived as the theme of a study. As said, separating the frames is an interpretation, and 
because of this full objectivity is impossible to reach. Horsti reminds that by its nature frame analysis 
is open to various interpretations, and researchers should accept this. More emphasis Horsti gives to 
predominance and repetition of frames: the more dominant the frame is the smaller is the possibility 
of multiple interpretations. (Horsti 2005, 51.) In some framing studies, researchers have preliminary 
hypothesis and frames that they seek to find in news texts. 
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However, for example Väliverronen has used a material-based method in his research. Instead 
of looking for preliminary frames, he defined the frames based on the research material. Väliverronen 
emphasizes that interpretations do not rise from vacuum – they are connected to theoretical and 
methodological approaches that researcher is using. (Väliverronen, 1995, 11.)  
Väliverronen (1995, 20) emphasizes that defining the frames is highly subjective. One has to 
also remember, that one cannot be fully objective, when defining the frames. Previous knowledge of 
the topic will affect to how the researcher understands the material. The writer of this thesis is 
conscious of reliability and validity problems of conducting a frame analysis. In addition, language 
poses a great challenge, especially concerning understanding nuances and metaphors. In order to 
overcome the validity question, I have attempted to make my reasoning as visible as possibly in the 
analysis part of this thesis. In next chapter, I will present the material of the frame analysis.  
  
46 
 
7. Material 
 
7.1 Selection of material  
 
The material for content analysis consists of rally coverage in two newspapers: Kommersant and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda. I chose to analyze newspapers, because it is a form of media that is situated 
between the zone of free internet and of the more controlled medium, television. Russia has a long 
tradition of being a reading nation, despite the fact that circulations of newspapers have decreased in 
the post-Soviet era due to the increase of prizes and due to the changes in media use, i.e. people using 
more often internet for source of news. 
The selection criterion for the material was following: the main theme or focus of the article 
should be reporting of/from a rally or analysis of the rallies. The goal was to study and analyze in 
particular news coverage, i.e. reports from the rallies or reports of the upcoming rallies. The analysis 
period was from 6th of December to 12th of December, i.e. one week after the first post-Duma elections 
rallies. That week was the most intense one, and the protest movement grew during the week, 
culminating in the big rally on Saturday December the 10th.  
I used the Integrum Profi database to collect the primary material. The database provides 
access to most Russian newspapers. I searched the database using key words such as rally (митинг 
and демонстрация), elections (выборы), opposition (оппозиция) and unauthorized action 
(несанкционированная акция). After searching with key words I double-checked the material by 
browsing through the newspapers during the research period. I collected the material from pdf-
editions of the newspapers to be able to analyze the articles as a whole, seeing the pictures and layout, 
as they all construct a journalistic entity. In the beginning, I searched material in several Russian 
newspapers. The amount of articles varied a lot from a newspaper to another. For example, state-
minded Rossiiskaya Gazeta only had two articles during the period. Based on a preliminary reading 
it was clear the newspaper was following the official Putin-oriented way in its reporting. As I came 
to realize that analyzing Russian newspaper text would be a challenging task, I narrowed down the 
data to two newspapers.  
For the content analysis I chose Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda, because they are 
identified as different kinds of newspapers: one of them independent and the other state-minded, and 
because they had quite an even amount of articles during the research period. I found that to be 
important for the comparison of how the framing processes of rallies proceed. 
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The total amount of articles in this study is 18 – Kommersant 8 articles and Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 10. Kommersant followed the events more regularly and evenly during the week, whereas 
Komsomolskaya Pravda published articles on three days, typically several small articles during the 
same day. The material is listed in more detail in appendix 1.  
 
7.2 Kommersant 
 
Kommersant is a Russian nationally published daily newspaper. The newspaper was originally started 
in 1909, but later in 1919 it was banned by Bolsheviks. After a break that lasted for decades, journalist 
Vladimir Yakovlev re-established the newspaper, and now Kommersant has been published since 
December 1989. Kommersant is often referred to as business newspaper, because in the early 1990’s 
it focused on business and economics. Quite quickly after the newspaper had been launched it started 
to develop towards a newspaper without any specialty – and nowadays it covers business, politics, 
crime, culture and sports. 
According to Koikkalainen (2009), during the period of dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Kommersant was launched as a project of reformist journalists and it searched for new ways of doing 
journalism. 
The establishers of Kommersant understood that Russia needed a newspaper that would 
provide information from the spheres of economy, politics and enterprise, now that the private 
ownership was permitted in the country. Kommersant led the way in showing what quality journalism 
is, and it was the first newspaper in the post-Soviet Russia that claimed to be neutral in its reporting. 
(Koikkalainen, 2009, 115–117.) 
Vladimir Yakovlev was the main owner of the newspaper until 1999. Russian oligarch Boris 
Berezovsky bought the newspaper in 1999. Allegedly Berezovsky bought the newspaper in order to 
strengthen his position as a background force in the 2000 presidential elections (Koikkalainen, 2009, 
120). 
In 2006 Berezovsky sold Kommersant to a businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili, who relatively 
soon sold the paper to current owner, Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov. According to magazine 
Forbes, in 2012, he is the richest person in Russia, with a 1,8 billion dollars fortune and in the entire 
list he is the 28th richest person in the world. Most of his fortune is tied to his company, iron ore and 
steel producer Metalloinvest. (Forbes, 2012.) According to Finnish Embassy in Russia, Kommersant 
had remained a relatively independent actor in the Russian press, despite the fact that the owner 
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Usmanov, according to Russian media, has close connections to the Russian leadership and to the 
company Gazprom.9 
In addition to daily Kommersant, the publishing house also publishes Ukrainian edition of 
Kommersant, and a weekly edition of Kommersant Vlast – Power, Kommersant Dengi – Money and 
Kommersant Avtopilot about cars. In December 2011, the editor in chief of Kommersant Vlast Maxim 
Kovalsky and the head of the publisher's holding company, Andrei Galiyev were fired by the owner 
of Kommersant Company Alisher Usmanov. The weekly edition has published claims that Duma 
elections had not been fair. According to Usmanov, there had been an ethical breach. Usmanov 
underlined after firing Kovalsky that he has no intentions to intervene in the content of his 
newspapers. According to Committee to Protect Journalists, Kovalsky’s removal angered dozens of 
journalists working in Usmanov’s newspapers. They published an open letter, titled “We are forced 
into cowardice”. (CPJ, http://www.cpj.org/blog/2012/03/ahead-of-elections-russian-media-has-been-
duly-war.php). Even though Kommersant Vlast is not part of analysis in this thesis, it is useful to be 
aware of what kind of outcome the elections’ coverage resulted inside Usmanov’s media company.  
According to several internet sources, Kommersant is the one of the biggest daily newspapers 
in Russia. Circulation Audit Bureau (Бюро тиражного аудита) provides relatively fresh figures of 
Kommersant’s circulation. Within the borders of the Russian Federation, the Monday edition has on 
average a circulation of total 82,768 copies. All in all, 28,290 copies were subscribed and 52,747 
were sold as newsstand copies, the rest, and 1,731, were free copies. From Tuesday to Saturday the 
circulation is on average 96,395 copies; 38,367 subscribed, 55,787 bought and 2,241 free copies. The 
data was published on 23th of April in 2013, and it is based on the fourth quarter of the 2012. 10 
During the analysis period of this thesis, Kommersant published articles on five days: the 6th, 
7th, 8th, 9th and 12th on December.  
 
7.3 Komsomolskaya Pravda 
 
Komsomolskaya Pravda was founded in March 1925. During the Soviet Union, it was the official 
newspaper of the Communist Union of Komsomol Youth. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
the paper became a national newspaper. Tabloid-formatted newspaper comes out daily except on 
                                                 
9See more on Finnish Embassy report on Russia http://www.finland.org.ru.  
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=31125&contentlan=1&culture=fi-FI) 
 
10 See Circulation Audit Bureau http://www.press-abc.ru/ 
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Sundays, and it is claimed to be the largest daily newspaper in Russia. 
Currently the newspaper is owned by Media Partner, which in turn is owned by businessman 
Grigory Berezkin’s oil company ECN. Berezkin and his energy company are claimed to have 
connections to Kremlin and to Gazprom. The newspaper has been accused of bias, and Echo Moskvy 
radio station criticized the newspaper for been “a propagandist newspaper”, because they do not 
publish criticism of the government.  
According to BBC, Komsomolskaya Pravda has built its reputation on “a gentle nostalgia for 
the Soviet period, firm backing for Kremlin policy and a keen interest in celebrity news and scandal 
from home and abroad”. 11 
Based on Circulation Audit Bureau’s figures, Komsomolskaya Pravda’s circulation in the 
Russian federation in the fourth quarter of 2012 (published 23rd of April 2013) was the following: 
Monday edition had a circulation of 413,126 copies: 52,918 were subscribed, 268,502 were bought 
on newsstands and 91,707 were distributed as free copies. Unfortunately the statistics do not provide 
an explanation to the high amount of free copies distributed on Mondays. The edition published from 
Tuesday to Saturday has a circulation of 435,532 copies; 110,357 subscribed, 315,404 sold in 
newsstands and 9,771 free copies. The weekly edition of Komsomolskaya Pravda has a circulation of 
total 1,597,484 copies within the borders of the Russian Federation. 12 
Komsomolskaya Pravda published articles about the December 2011 rallies on three days: 7th, 
9th and 12th of December.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 BBC’s report on Russian media, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4315129.stm. 
12 See Circulation Audit Bureau http://www.press-abc.ru/ 
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8. Frame analysis 
 
The empirical research of this thesis consists of a comparative analysis of two newspapers – 
Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda. The starting point of frame analysis was a material based 
approach. I studied the empirical data closely by reading and studying the content, marking down 
expressions and connotations, studying the structure of the article and how it was constructed. 
The analysis chapter moves on step by step, analyzing each article one by one. I chose this way 
of moving to help the reader to understand how I have reached the interpretations of the articles and 
to make the research as transparent as possible. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter about framing, continuity, selection and salience are the 
common features for framing. In my analysis I attempt to trace the process of framing the rallies by 
analyzing what has been emphasized, and what has been faded away and left out. Important reason 
for presenting the analysis step by step is to make visible the development of framing and how it 
changes and evolves during the analysis period. I argue that by presenting only the results, i.e. the 
frames, an important aspect – the process – would be left out and the outcome would be inadequate.  
I begin the analysis by studying the coverage of Kommersant. 
 
8.1.1 Kommersant 
 
8.1.1.1 Kommersant, 6th of December 
It is the first day after the rallies, and Kommersant lifts up the rallies on its front page. The title and 
subtitle say: Elections were brought to Chistye Prudy – Riot police dispersed the march of discontent 
people. The article starts by saying that non-parliamentary opposition came to streets to protest the 
results of the elections. The key themes in the article are people’s discontent in elections and the 
unexpected large amount of people coming to rallies. The estimates of the amount of participants vary 
from 500–4,000, but all in all it’s more than anticipated. 
According to the article, the amount of participants grew because people understood that the 
Monday rally is the only sanctioned meeting where people can express their unhappiness – this would 
be their only chance. Opposition figure Alexey Navalnyi is cited saying that the official organizer of 
the meeting is Solidarnost, but that in the end it does not matter who organizes the event – it concerns 
everyone. Navalnyi is promoting the idea that the demonstration is not a meeting of organized 
political opposition and that the meeting is not based on political or party division. Instead, everyone 
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should participate no matter what kind of political stand one supports. 
Navalnyi comes across as a person who wants to unite the dispersed political opposition and 
ordinary people who have earlier been passive bystanders into one movement demanding fair 
elections. At this point, in the beginning on the demonstration week, the people coming to streets are 
defined as non-parliamentary opposition, as a large faceless group of people.  
The large amount of participants is strongly emphasized in the article: Police had to take the 
metal detectors away, because the amount of people was so big. Some people were standing 200 
meters away from the stage, because it was impossible to get closer. Both of the examples are in a 
concrete manner underlining the size of the rally. Some participants admitted that they came to the 
rally for the first time in their life, and the presence of first-timers raises a question if the rally is a 
beginning for a larger movement. 
An essential component of the article is the juxtaposition between the discontent people and 
the ruling power group. Musician and critic Artem Troisky is cited saying that everyone should vote 
in the upcoming presidential elections “for Russia without goons, cowards and scoundrels”. All in 
all, slogans of participants are present in the coverage. People have been shouting “Russia without 
Putin”, “We won’t forget, we won’t forgive” and “We want different President”. The demonstrators 
are seen a “tolpa”, as one big mass of people, and ordinary citizens are not interviewed. Portraying 
the rally as a faceless mass of people mediates the idea of participants as united force protesting 
against falsifications. A quote by “The Poet and the Citizen" Dmitry Bykov supports this 
interpretation: he says that he has never seen such unity of opposition-minded people. 
A strong interpretation rising up from the text is the opposition as united force. Picture is of 
the article a crowd of people, and the caption says that there were too many people to fit the area. 
Little details paint a picture of a unified mass protest.  
Kommersant’s article is chronological – the arrests are not lifted to the main focus, to the 
immediate beginning of the article. Instead, the article's emphasis in the beginning is on the amount 
of people and on the fact that a rally this large is something that takes place rarely in Russia. A clear 
development in the chain of events is present in the article: the rally turns from a sanctioned meeting 
into a non-sanctioned one. Based on the narration, police seem to be cooperative in the beginning of 
the rally, but suddenly things change. The article describes how riot police have shields, but yet some 
people manage to break through the cordon. A commander gives an order “to catch everyone” and 
the crowd stars to push. A woman with crutches was pushed to ground by policemen, and people 
shouting slogans were arrested. The reporter is describing the situation: little fights took place, 
OMON was beating demonstrators. As a conclusion, the article states that the amount of 
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demonstrators arrested was something around 200. Police continued to arrest people and people on 
the streets continues to shout slogans such as “Russia without Putin”´. 
The first rally article in Kommersant appears to be a on the scene -story reporting from the 
events relatively chronologically. This is a choice that the journalist has made. One could have chosen 
to lift something to the beginning instead of proceeding on a chronological manner. One of the 
dominant things is the fact that ordinary people are participating to the article and several quotes are 
emphasizing the unity of the participants. In Kommersant’s coverage, I distinct two frames. The first 
one is protests as uniting Russia, the second frame emphasizes the conflict between people and 
authorities – a split society. 
 
 
8.1.1.2 Kommersant, 7th of December 
Second day of the rallies brings a clear shift to Kommersant's coverage. The article it titled Central 
beating station – Центральный избивательный участок. The expression is a word play twisted 
from an expression Центральный избирательный участок, which means Central polling/electoral 
station. The title itself is full of emotion and takes clear stand to events. The subtitle of the article is 
“Protests against the result of the elections were suppressed in Moscow”. As a whole, the main title 
and the subtitle guide the reader to understand the wordplay. This cooperation of title and subtitle can 
awake in reader's mind the question of, first, who were the people who were beaten, and second, the 
question of who was the one beating. Even without mentioning the actors – demonstrators and riot 
police, one can very fast figure out who are the main actors in this article. Based on the idea of 
continuity in reporting, one can assume that Kommersant's readers can already have some kind of 
model to interpret these events. As Entman (2007, 164) argues, framing works though priming: 
framing presents ideas that are important in order to encourage the audience to think in a certain way. 
Kommersant's article sets the scene clearly: the main focus is that a protest turned in to mass arrests 
and that the police are using force, one might even say unnecessary amount of force in the rallies. 
After the title, Kommersant moves onto informative recap of the events. Opposition continued 
to protest against the elections results, and the meeting ended in mass arrests and beatings. 
Kommersant's journalist Alexander Chernykh was arrested and beaten up in the meeting and his 
experiences are included in the article. The citation of Chernykh supports the idea that Kommersant 
it highlighting the senseless violence of riot police. Chernykh says: ”I was approached by two 
policemen wearing helmets and batons. One of them suddenly hit me on my leg. I said I am a 
journalist working in a newspaper. They grabbed me from hands and threw me to a car (автозак). 
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One of the policemen put his feet on my chest, the other came and jumped on me. Then they left, the 
car drove me away and I was sent to jail.” This quote continues the emphasis set already in the 
beginning of the article – the arrests and violence by riot police are presented as senseless and even 
needless way of acting. The problem definition in the article is targeted to the unbalanced relationship 
between the power and the people: the authorities, in this case the riot police, are subjects that are 
subordinating and oppressing objects, i.e. the protesters. The unbalanced relationship is a result of 
fundamental disagreements and of a disability to understand each other.  
After Chernykh's quote, Kommersant proceeds to telling that the information about the 
meeting spread on social networks and that the organizer of the rally remains unknown. The article 
also mentions that supporters of the regime gathered on Victory square, for instance members of 
Nashi movement and young supporters of the United Russia. They were beating their drums, shouting 
Russia. Kommersant casts a shadow on the motives of United Russia's young supporters to gather to 
a meeting. The newspaper provides a quote of mother of 17-years old boy. According to the mum, 
the classes were cancelled at her son's school and the teacher ordered the students to leave. This quote 
is clearly suggesting that this is how the young people have been persuaded to come to the pro-Putin 
rally.  
According to my interpretation, Kommersant's article is constructing juxtaposition between 
the people participating in protests against the elections results and meeting supporting the United 
Russia. People protesting the results of the elections are there on their own will, despite the threat of 
getting arrested and beaten up. The people supporting United Russia are there because of some kind 
of pressure or at least encouragement by teachers and school – not because of their own initiative. In 
reality, this might not be the case at all, as there are surely people who genuinely want to support the 
existing power. However, what is important, is the fact that the article is construction this image of 
juxtaposition and possibly awakening this interpretation in reader's mind. There are people who 
genuinely want to attend rallies and there are people who have been pressured into participating. A 
split exists not only between the rulers and the ruled, but between citizens supporting the status quo 
and opposing the status quo. As a result, the dominant frame is juxtaposition between the supporters 
of status quo (including both authorities and pro-government minded people) and of people wanting 
a change. I name this frame as the split society –frame.  
A second frame of the rally coverage rises from all the violence committed by the police. 
Beatings and unnecessary violence can raise strong emotions in the reader, and the article is 
highlighting the senseless violence committed by arbitrary authoritarian rule. The order in Russia 
appears to be against its own people. I name this frame as the frame of arbitrary violence. It is 
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closely connected to the split society –frame, because in a way arbitrary violence is a result of 
juxtaposition and split. The split between the government and anti-government-minded people has 
become so wide, that the officials feel a need to suppress the resistance. Kommersant has chosen to 
lift the violent conflicts into its coverage, which is interesting, because for the officials this kind of 
coverage is definitely unwanted: it makes Russia appear as a police state. I get the impression that 
Kommersant is not concentrated on pleasing the authorities and reporting according to the official 
governmental line. On the other hand, it is possibly that the authorities wish to give a signal that any 
unsanctioned resistance will be smothered and this kind of coverage can work as an exemplary, 
attempting to prevent future rallies. Kommersant’s coverage could possibly mediate the warning 
signals to people who consider participating in the protest movement. However, I interpret that 
Kommersant’s way of framing the protests is more favorable to the protestors than the regime, as the 
acts by the authorities are being portrayed as senseless, unnecessarily hard violence. The protestors 
appear as victims, who have to suffer simply because they want to express their discontent. 
 
 
8.1.1.3 Kommersant, 8th of December 
Kommersant’s article on Wednesday 8th of December is a recap of the two rallies and the amount of 
people that have been arrested. The newspaper article starts by saying that police has made a record 
in how many people they have arrested during past two days - almost thousand people have been 
taken into jail. Breaking a record is often seen as something positive, but in this case the expression 
turns against itself and loses its positive meaning. Instead, the large amount of people been arrested 
appear to have initiated by arbitrary acts of authorities. A deeper interpretation suggests once again 
juxtaposition between the rulers and the ruled, the authorities and the people participating to rallies. 
The juxtaposition is so extreme that conversations cannot solve it. Instead, the authorities resort to 
forceful methods.   
This article does not have a picture and its language is quite administrative with long sentences 
– it is an informative recap with few feelings embedded in it. The news story includes some comments 
by human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human rights Watch. According 
to representatives of Human rights watch, the massive arrests that took place in a peaceful meeting 
do not speak in favor of the government. The organizations express their concern that people have 
been arrested despite the fact that they have not caused any provocations against the police. They 
demand that the arrested people should be freed from the jail. 
In the article, the arguments presented by human rights groups and the figures of amount of 
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people been arrested clearly suggest a point of view that the authorities have been using unnecessary 
hard means to suppress the rallies.  
The article does not provide any reasons for why it was necessary to arrest protesters in the 
rallies. On the contrary, the story tells about how people participating in a peaceful meeting have been 
taken into police busses and then to jail for 15 days. 
As a result, the selection and salience of the facts and events presented suggests that the arrests 
have been unnecessary and over scaled. On the other hand, the article does not give face to the 
protestors and their goals either. The main emphasis is on the acts of authorities that are a result of 
juxtaposition, and the frame is arbitrary violence. This frame emphasizes the senseless nature of the 
arrests and the behavior of the riot police. Below the surface it promotes the idea of Russia as an 
authoritarian state that has features resembling a police state. The rights of ordinary citizens are 
secondary, and the control of the dissent is the main goal for the regime.  
 
 
8.1.1.4 Kommersant, 9th of December, article 1 
In Thursday 9th of December, Kommersant continues to cover the topic of post-elections rallies. The 
newspaper has two articles related to the topic – the first one talking about how Putin and Medvedev 
have admitted the need for regime to have a dialogue with the opposition, and the second article 
writing about arrangements for the upcoming rally in 10th of December.  
For the first time during the rally coverage, Kommersant lifts up positive and developing 
comments by the leaders. Both Putin and Medvedev acknowledge the need for more open, politically 
more competitive society in Russia. However, the article continues, representatives of the regime 
doubt the sincerity of these statements, because the development of genuine dialogue would need 
reform of the political system, and according to the sources the leaders are not ready for that. Experts 
fear that the government underestimates the changes that have taken place in the political 
consciousness of the society and people. Right from the beginning of the article – once again – 
juxtaposition between the regime and the opposition is present.  
Kommersant explains that people’s discontent towards elections and their result has 
influenced the way in which the tandem Putin-Medvedev thinks about their political opponents. 
Formerly they were in dialogue mostly with parties that are in Duma, but now the tandem 
acknowledges the need to be in dialogue with all the opposition, parliamentary and non-
parliamentary. The leaders emphasize that all the opposition-minded people need to be entitled to 
gather to meetings and express their opinions. 
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After presenting the noble comments of the leaders, the article continues to tell that opposition 
is not convinced about the genuineness and sincerity of these statements. According to Kommersant, 
it is unclear who the regime sees as opposition and what kind of dialogue the regime wishes to have. 
The identity of opposition is one of the key questions, since not all the discontent people that are 
rushing out to streets are members of political groups, but merely politically unorganized people that 
have gotten tired of the current political system.  
The photograph and the caption of the article support the existing juxtaposition. In the 
photograph, people are standing on a street and one of them has a sign saying “While you are thinking 
about yourself, he decides everything for you”. The caption of the photograph says that “the activities 
of street democracy are a risk to current government”. The juxtaposition is crystallized in this 
sentence: there are two camps – people and ruling government – that have different goals. This 
caption helps to interpret and develop frames of juxtaposition and of arbitrary violence further. It 
becomes clear that people participating to street rallies are seen as a threat to the rulers: by going to 
streets people threaten the existing order. In order to maintain the stability and order in Russia, 
authorities have no choice but to smother the street rallies. The rallies in fact are a threat to the 
authorities. It seems that the leaders of Russia have chosen a twofold tactic to deal with the rallies: 
On the one hand, they use force, mass arrests and violence to smother the protests. On the other hand, 
they use more conciliatory approach, admitting that a dialogue between the government and the 
opposition is necessary. According to the article it seems that even the authorities are not sure how 
they should handle the unexpected mass rallies and maintain the existing order. They have no choice 
but to tiptoe and retell the claims of the protestors, but at the same time they attempt to suppress the 
protest movement. The twofold tactic suggests that the regime is doing everything in its power to 
secure its own position in the power. The rallies come across as a threat to Russia’s stability.  
Kommersant reminds that social order in Russia has changed. Alexander Auzan, the leader of 
the national institute of Social Order, says that the participants of the rallies are people who do not 
belong to any parties and they do not have any leaders. According to Auzan, it remains to be a 
question how the power can build dialogue with the people, because most of the feedback channels 
are blocked. Due to this, Auzan explains, the authorities have failed to notice that the social contract 
between the power and people does not hold anymore. The social contract in Russia was based on the 
idea of mutual understanding: we (the people) give you political freedom, we (the leaders) give you 
stability (вы нам — политические свобо-ды, мы вам — стабильность). The social tension that has 
arisen after the reported elections’ falsifications causes distress among the authorities that see the 
mass protests shaking the stability of the country. As a conclusion, the article states, the power needs 
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to do something quickly or otherwise they are in danger of losing the public’s support and confidence. 
The threat is tangible – the authorities need to find a way to overcome the threat. 
 
8.1.1.5 Kommersant, 9th of December, article 2 
Side by side to the previous article, Kommersant has a second story related to the rallies. The article 
is titled “The second round of the Elections – the mayor and the opposition negotiate on the place of 
protests”. The headline proposes that the Duma elections are not over – people are willing to fight 
for their rights. Right from the beginning it becomes clear that the city governance and the opposition 
do not see eye to eye, as they have failed to agree on the place where the pro-fair elections rally should 
be held on Saturday 10th of December. The city governance and the opposition have failed to reach 
compromise of the place where a large rally against elections’ falsifications would take place. The 
article continues by saying that the police are ready to ensure the safety of the participants, but in case 
the opposition tries to start marching police will rigidly prevent the march. Once again the emphasis 
is on the split between protesters and the power – a split society. Authorities do not give sympathy 
for the protesters.  
The article is looking into the future rally that will take place on Saturday. Expectations are 
high: the Saturday rally might be the first mass rally that has been put together with the help of social 
networks such as Vkontakte, Facebook and Twitter, and tens of thousands of people are expected to 
participate. Especially significant is the fact that participants “are not professional opposition, but 
ordinary intelligentsia, managers, who have not attended to rallies ever before”. According to 
Kommersant, the protesters will demand the annulment of elections’ results and immediate release of 
people who were arrested in the rallies after the elections. A lawyer Vadim Prokhorov says that in his 
experience the police might arrest anyone without any grounds, even people simply passing by the 
scene of the rally. Prokhorov also gives advice for people attending rallies: keep calm, help people 
near you, if police officer tries to arrest you, ask him to introduce himself. 
The idea of ordinary people being the essential component of the protest starts to rise in this 
article. Advice is given to ordinary people who are inexperienced in participating rallies. It becomes 
clear that not only professional opposition is going to the streets, among them will most likely be lots 
of “ordinary people”. It seems that the reporter wants to emphasize the identity of the protesters – the 
fact that many of them identify themselves as ordinary people rather than a part of established, 
professional opposition. The second frame in this article is the frame of rallies as people’s grass root 
movement. The frame emphasizes that many of the protestors citizens who have had enough of the 
current rule. It becomes clear that the protest movement is different from the rallies that Russia has 
58 
 
seen past decade: this time the participants are not all politically organized people, but merely average 
voters. 
 
8.1.1.6 Kommersant, 12th of December, article 1 
The rallies demanding fair elections gathered tens of thousands of Russians to streets around the 
country on Saturday 10th of December. The protests were clearly the hot news topic that one could 
not ignore. Kommersant’s title and photograph play well together forming a symbolic unity. The title 
says “Only once in a lifetime” and the picture shows just married couple enter the demonstration area 
through metal detectors. A connotation that arises in my mind is that you only get married once – it 
is a unique moment. Same kind of uniqueness is embedded in the idea that many protesters were 
coming to street rallies for the first time in their life – first and only time is memorable, there is 
something solemn in it. According to the analysis of Kommersant’s reporter, the mass rally indeed 
was unique – it was a protest by satisfied people. 
The article begins by describing disagreement between leading opposition figures that are 
having a dispute about the place where the rally should take place – in the sanctioned square or in the 
square where opposition wanted to gather. Part of the opposition figures have left the Revolution 
square and headed to the sanctioned Bolotnaya square. The dispute comes across as petty and 
secondary, but it a symbolical way it manifests a split inside the so called professional, 
institutionalized opposition. However, the dispute constructs a contrast between the uniqueness of 
first-timers coming to the rally and the experienced opposition-politicians that are used to protesting. 
It seems this is a conscious goal of the writer: to promote the one of a kind protest movement that is 
being born in Russia.  
The subtitle turns out to be the dominant theme of the article: Moscow attended the meeting 
like a party. The reporter scrutinizes what kind of people have come to the rally, and he divides the 
participants into two: into first-timers “who for the first time have become subjects of street 
democracy” and into “everyone else”. The reporter notes that the participants are “sincere, not 
homeless, not stupid, people who have eaten breakfast. But they are sick and tired”. I interpret that 
the reporter suggests that the people coming to rally are content with their living conditions but they 
have had enough of the political situation, of the reported elections’ fraud and of how the country is 
being led. Their private lives are satisfactory, but now they are starting to become politically aware 
and active as well.  
The journalist describes the rally as a fashionable party that everyone wants to attend, a high 
society party (светская вечеринка). Women are dressed up nicely, according to fashion. Presenting 
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the rally as a fashionable party is a clear example of framing. The obvious denotation of “party” is 
that it is something fun and positive, but demonstration as a party provides connotations. The reason 
for the demonstration – people being angry because of the elections’ falsifications – is serious, not at 
all uplifting. However, the atmosphere at the meeting is party-like, and people appear to be more 
hopeful than angry. Presenting the rally as a party makes the protest seem as not marginal. It seems 
that the reporter wants to emphasize that ordinary citizens, in addition to the professional opposition, 
are tired of the rigged elections and they have come to express their opinion publicly. The article is 
highlighting two ideas: lot of people participating for the first time in their life and the rally being as 
something unique, a party-like meeting. All in all, Kommersant’s article is portraying the rally in a 
positive way – no violence, no beatings, but hopeful first-timers expressing their opinions in a 
sanctioned meeting, in which also police is behaving well.  
Uniqueness and first-timers are a dominant theme in the article, but also professional 
opposition gets their message published in the newspaper. The reporter is citing several opposition 
politicians that have spoken in the rally. The main message by the speakers is targeted against Putin 
and United Russia, and people are shouting slogans “Russia without Putin” and “Russia will be free. 
“The party of thieves and crooks – it’s magic. It has united us. Everybody hates party of thieves and 
crooks”, says Konstantin Krylov, leader of Russian Civil Movement. The main demand is that the 
results of the elections should be annulled. This clearly is connected to the ongoing theme of 
juxtaposition between protesters and authorities: the frame of split society is present in this article.  
Kommersant’t coverage is a combination of positive and negative. The positive is connected 
to the participants and their goals, the negative is connected to the rulers and to rigged elections. Once 
again juxtaposition between the power and the people is present. In addition to the continuous frame 
of juxtaposition, I distinct a second frame that is the dominant one in this particular article – I name 
this the frame the frame of rallies as harmless folk festival.  
 
 
8.1.1.7 Kommersant, 12th of December, article 2 
In addition to the demonstration article, Kommersant also provides analysis of the rallies taking place 
all over Russia. The article consists of a large graphic map of Russia, pinpointing all the 
demonstrations and the amount of participants according to police and according to media. The map 
has several details: at what time the rally started, what was the temperature, whether the rally was 
sanctioned or unsanctioned. The temperature is an important detail: in December in can be very cold 
in Russia. For example, in Novosibirsk the temperature was -20. The map also provides information 
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of how many participants were arrested. In addition, the map shows protests that have taken place 
abroad. The map is an essential tool constructing the meanings – it demonstrates how people have 
organized rallies around the country, promoting idea that Russia is experiencing a civic movement all 
around the country.  
The title of the article “Россию забюллетенило” was difficult expression to translate. I 
consulted a professional translator, who suggested that the meaning of the headline is “Russia had to 
go on a sick leave”, embodying the idea that Russia is somehow ill. The headline seems to be 
constructed in a manner that it can potentially awake connotations: the verb in the title reminds the 
word “Бюллетень” which can be associated to expression Избирательный бюллетень – a ballot. I 
interpret that headline as wordplay: Russia had to go to a sick leave because of the elections. Being 
sick means that something is wrong and one needs to be cured, and interpreting this thought further 
one can say that Russia needs to be cured from all the falsifications that took place during elections. 
Who will cure Russia? The doctor can potentially be the thousands of Russians who have participated 
to protests against rigged elections.  
In this article, the dominant the interpretation is that Rallies are uniting Russia. This frame 
is a result of a week long process of protests and Russians coming to streets. It is a result of journalistic 
process of striving to understand what is happening in the country, and promoting a certain point of 
view and interpretation for the events. The emphasis on this article is on the uniting force of the 
rallies. In the very first article of the Kommersant the rallies were frames as uniting Russia, and this 
article has the same focus as in the beginning of analysis week. This frame works together with the 
split society –frame that occurred in an article on the previous page. The split society –frame portrays 
the enormous gap that has been born between the rulers and the voters. The feeling of injustice is so 
strong that the angry citizens need to experience something that unites them – the protests. They 
cannot get acceptance from the authorities, but they need consolation from somewhere. They rely on 
each other, with the congenial people. 
 
8.1.1.8 Kommersant, 12th of December, article 3 
The third article of Kommersant focuses on the media coverage of the rallies. The title of the article 
is “Television went to Bolotnaya (Square) – The Federal Channels reported from the 
demonstrations as they could”.  According to the article, the Russian state television channels had 
changed their approach to covering the rallies. In the beginning of the week, the viewers did not 
hear a word about the demonstrations, but towards the end of week the state-channels could not fall 
silent anymore. They had to cover the rallies – in detail. 
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The reporter of the article explains that she spent a large part of the rally observing the 
work of the television channels: All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company 
VGTRK (owning the important state-channels: Rossiya 1, Rossiya 2 and Rossiya K) had the biggest 
amount of staff in the rally, but also NTV and REN TV were present. The reporter of Kommersant 
had spoken to many of the journalists from the federal channels and asked them what kind of 
coverage the channels would broadcast. Many of the journalists did not want to comment officially. 
Unofficially, many of them told to Kommersant’s reporter that they did not accept the decisions 
earlier that week of the not reporting from the rallies. According to them, the strict ban of not 
covering the rallies had come from above, from the presidential administration. However, Kremlin 
would not comment these claims. Now the television channels are at venue, with big teams of 
journalists and cameramen.   
In the article, the reporter of Kommersant also analyzes the content of the television 
broadcasts. According to her, the coverage of the federal channels in December the 10th was 
surprisingly balanced. The news reports from the demonstrations begun around 4pm and continued 
all evening on different television channels. In addition to Moscow protests, the other 
demonstrations around the country were also mentioned. According to the reporter, the amount of 
participants was underestimated, but based on the footage the scale of the rallies was obvious. REN 
TV and NTV were the most accurate in covering the rallies, saying that the rallies were largest in a 
decade. All in all, the main federal channels show panoramic footage from the rallies, celebrated the 
peaceful nature of the protests, the correct behavior of the police and the absence of provocation. 
The news reports emphasized that the rallies took place because people wanted to protest against 
the rigged elections and falsifications. However, not once was the name of Vladimir Putin 
mentioned. According to the sources of Kommersant, the leadership in all the three main TV 
channels had fought hard in order to have the permission to cover the December 10th rallies. The 
article ends when the reporter of Kommersant asks a source how the administration has reacted to 
the coverage. The answer is “Well, what do you think? It is sure that no one there [in the 
administration] said thank you”.  
This article is the first and the only article in Kommersant’s coverage that is discussing the 
complicated situation in which the Russian media operated. It provides a relatively detailed analysis 
of the coverage of the federal channels, discussing the pressures coming from above and the battle 
that the media has to fight in order to be able to report from the rallies. It also points out that the 
state media has come to a situation where they do not automatically obey the orders from above. 
Furthermore, Kommersant is acknowledging the successful outcome of the reporting. 
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Publishing this article is a sign that Kommersant is not afraid to report about 
standpoints that are sensitive, such as the work of the federal media. They have chosen to analyze 
the coverage of the state-channels, well knowing that the coverage of these channels, at least to 
some extent, has been dictated and influenced from the above. The coverage of the rallies in state-
media is an important news topic, because usually the state media does not cover topics that are not 
in the interest or in the advantage of the highest administration. It is clear that this article is 
discussing, not straightforwardly but nevertheless, the freedom of press in Russia. The beginning of 
the article sets the dominant tone for this news story: at first, the viewers of the state channels were 
not able to receive information about the demonstrations, but now that has changed. The state media 
is more open and more balanced than before, it is historical. Based on the evaluation of 
Kommersant’s reporter, it is because the journalists and the leadership of the channels have fought 
for this open approach, it is thanks to the professionals of journalism. The article is clearly speaking 
on the behalf of the professional values and competence of the journalists: they have taken the 
decision-making into their own hands. 
Based on my analysis, this article frames the rallies as small victory for the press 
freedom. The article suggests that the extent of the rallies is so massive that is has even influenced 
the way in which state media operates. The frame is constructed on two facts. First, typically 
Russian federal channels obey official guideline in their coverage. This was the case in the 
beginning of the rally week, when the protests were not covered and the viewers could not receive 
balanced – or any – information. Second, now a change has taken place – the federal channels have 
come to the protest venue and they produce relatively balanced information, and this is a news 
worthy story. Combined these two facts form an entity that focuses on the issue of press freedom 
that is struggling in Russia. The article does not issue the problems of media control and press 
freedom explicitly but it constructs the frame in a very convincing manner. The reader is left with a 
feeling that the state media went against their superiors. They did not receive praises, but who 
cares? Covering the rallies is a small victory for the freedom of the press.  
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8.1.2 Overview of Kommersant’s frames 
As a result of analysis, I separated 8 frames in Kommersant’s coverage. Some of the frames are 
continuous and present in several articles. Some of them are present only once during the analysis 
period. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Kommersant’s frames  
 
The frame 
 
Date 
1. Protests uniting Russia 6.12, 12.12 
2. Conflict between protestors and authorities 6.12 
3. Split society 7.12, 9.12, 12.12 
4. Arbitrary violence 7.12, 8.12 
5. Threat to Russia’s stability 9.12 
6. People’s grass root movement 9.12 
 
7. Harmless folk festival 
 
12.12 
 
8. Small victory for the press freedom 12.12 
 
 
While analyzing the articles I sketched frames. Typical for frame analysis is that in the beginning 
several themes and frames arise as a result of close reading and interpretation. Earlier in the thesis I 
presented Van Gorp’s (2005, 468–487) idea of a frame as a media package that includes all the 
framing devices by which a frame can be identified, i.e. metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, 
lexical choices, selection of sources, graphics, stereotypes, dramatic characters. According to Nelson 
& al. (1997, 567), framing is a process in which a communication source defines and constructs a 
political issue or public controversy. One should remember that frame analysis, such as any content 
analysis, is by its nature subjective. To some extent researcher is like any reader, making his or her 
own interpretations of the content. During the analysis process I struggled with the question of 
validity. I have attempted to make my process of analysis and interpretation visible to overcome the 
issues of subjectivity and validity.  
Karina Horsti (2005, 51) talks about the dominance of frame: the more dominant the frame is, 
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the smaller the possibility for multiple interpretations is. By studying the table of Kommersant’s 
frames one can notice that few frames appear few times, and some are present only once. However, 
the dominance of the frame is not only connected to the whole process of one week, but a frame can 
be dominant in a single article. That was the case for example with the frame of conflict between the 
authorities and protestors.  
Next, I will analyse Kommersant’s framing process – how the framing developed and 
proceeded during the analysis period. 
 
 
8.1.3 Kommersant’s framing process 
 
Kommersant’s framing process reflects the course of the events that escalated from small rallies into 
a mass rallies all around the country. In the beginning of the week, the protests were portrayed as 
quite normal post-elections behavior by the opposition, and the dynamics between the opposition and 
the authorities were familiar already from the past.  
However, as the protests continued, the newspaper begun to show the bigger picture. The 
whole week, clear continuity of juxtaposition was present in Kommersant’s coverage – I call this 
frame the split society -frame. I argue that the frame of juxtaposition is the most dominant frame in 
Kommersant’s coverage. The aftermath of the Duma elections and the chain of events captures in the 
idea that a portion of Russians are disagreeing with the regime and the authorities. Even if reporting 
about the controversy may seem self-evident, I claim that it is not. In the beginning of the protest 
week, the topic of post-Duma elections rallies was excluded from the national state television 
channels. It was by no means self-evident, that all media outlets would cover the rallies.  
In Russia, newspapers enjoy more freedom than television, and in this respect newspapers 
have a possibility to cover the topic more independently, without exercising as much as self-
censorship that takes place for example in state television channels. I interpret that the continuous 
juxtaposition is in fact a result of journalistic process of framing, of selection and salience. Instead of 
serving as a mouthpiece of authorities, Kommersant attempts to portray the large gap that has spread 
between the ruling elite and ordinary citizens. The newspaper does not talk too much about how big 
the amount of people is participating on rallies, and it does not provide the other point of view – the 
people who are happy with current rule. Instead it emphasizes on the fact that people do participate 
and go to streets to express their discontent; they are a unified mass, people who have been unified 
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due to the feeling that they have been deceived. For Kommersant, it is irrelevant how large portion 
of Russians demand the annulation of election results. Kommersant is promoting the rallies as mass 
movement – the expression “mass rally” is used continuously.  
In the beginning of the analysis week Kommersant was not too favorable towards the 
authorities, instead, it was clearly underlining the split in the society and the forceful measures taken 
by the police. The coverage of the newspaper suggested that the riot police was taking measures that 
were over scaled and too violent. The articles manifested the deep split that exists between the rulers 
and the ruled. The mass arrests were also a good news story – dramatic and unexpected, and that can 
be a reason why the harsh measures were the main focus. 
Frame of arbitrary violence suggests that the protesters have a right to come to streets and 
express their opinion and discontent. Police’s and authorities’ response appears to be excessive. In 
the beginning of the post-elections week I used the frame of arbitrary violence as its own frame. 
However, as a result of analyzing one week’s content and following the ongoing process of reporting 
the frame of arbitrary violence integrated into the frame of rallies being a threat to the existing order. 
During the week it became clear that what in the beginning appeared to be senseless violence was in 
fact motivated by the authorities’ fear that rallies and protests are posing a threat to the status quo, to 
the stability of the country. Violent mass arrests are the way in which Putin’s regime has sought to 
suppress the discontent and uprising.  
A shift in the coverage shows its first signs in 9th of December, and by 12th of December the 
tone and the emphasis of reporting had developed into something quite different than in the beginning 
of the week. From threats and violence the emphasis has moved to people – people who are organizing 
the rallies as a grass root movement and the atmosphere that is a party like. The frame of a split 
society is still present, but towards the end of the week it ceases to be the dominant frame. 
On Monday 12th of December Kommersant has a whole spread about the large Saturday rally 
but only one article is showing the disagreements and conflict. For some reason, the newspaper has 
chosen to fade out the whole reason for the rallies – the conflict that has arisen from elections 
falsifications and injustice. The main focus in now on positive – on the growth of Russian civil 
society. However, Kommersant does not proportion the amount of participants to the population of 
Russia, and the paper does not analyze how significant the rallies are in their size and influence. 
Leaving this kind of speculation out of the content, the newspaper is promoting the frame of rallies 
as people’s movement and as movement unifying the country. The silent majority of content Russians 
is not on the focus, as more important is the smaller minority that acts and protests. One possible 
reason to this way of framing is that the smaller minority of protestors is far more interesting than 
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then passive majority. The protest movement is something new and unexpected, and it is natural to 
emphasize those features and leave the estimation of the significance on the background. The time 
for in-depth analysis of the protests will be later. 
On Monday the 12th, Kommersant presents a whole new approach to the rallies as it lifts to 
focus the freedom of press and the controlled nature of the television channels. It is discussing the 
coverage provided by the main federal television channels. In this article, the dominant frame is 
A small victory for the press freedom. The frame is a reminder of the nature of the Russian society – 
vertically ruled by a few. By lifting the limited coverage, the press freedom and the media 
environment to the focus, Kommersant is reporting in a manner that is not favorable to the authorities. 
The newspaper promotes the idea that the state media has rebelled against the instructions coming 
from above. It is unexceptional and highlights the potential for something changing in the society.  
Based on the analysis, Kommersant was striving towards objective and balanced coverage. 
Especially in the beginning of the week it was clear that Kommersant did not serve as a mouthpiece 
of the authorities. Instead, it portrayed the rallies in a manner that was more favorable to the 
protestors. Kommersant’s coverage suggested that the measures taken by the police were too harsh. 
At the same time, the protestors were portrayed in a positive light, demanding for civil rights, such 
as right to express discontent publicly. Towards the rest of the week the rallies were portrayed more 
as a party and celebration. The development in the coverage towards the end of week make me wonder 
whether or not the shift in coverage was somehow connected to the change in official rhetoric – the 
mass rallies in the big cities were sanctioned. Sanctioning the rallies was authorities’ way to show for 
the rest of the world that Russians are allowed to protest, and that freedom of assembly and freedom 
of speech have not been smothered in Russia. However, simultaneously with the positive party 
coverage Kommersant provided media criticism, when it analyzes the broadcasts of the federal 
television channels. That is a sign that it does not attempt to please the authorities.  
It is impossible to estimate if the newspaper was genuinely excited about the rise of civil society 
and wanted to emphasize the celebration of blossoming civil society, or whether the way of covering 
the rallies as party was connected to the wish to adapt to official rhetoric. However, based on the 
knowledge of the newspapers reputation as an independent actor I suspect that it was more the first 
reason than the second. All in all, especially in the beginning of the analysis period, Kommersant 
used quite subtle ways in framing the events, and it left space for the readers to draw their own 
conclusions.  
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8.2.1. Komsomolskaya Pravda 
 
In this sub-chapter I will analyze the content of Komsomolskaya Pravda. The newspaper published 
articles on three days during the study period. Each article will be studied individually.  
 
8.2.1.1 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 7th of December 
 
Komsomolskaya Pravda’s first article is on the first glance almost invisible, since it has a small 
headline and no pictures from the demonstration. Nothing in the layout persuades the reader to stop 
and read the article, but below the surface the article is full of controversial expressions. The reporter 
includes himself partly in the article, and the story seems to be either a mix of news article and opinion 
text or an analysis of the events. I find it problematic that nothing guides the reader to understand 
what kind of genre the article presents, and as a result it is complicated for the reader to decide how 
to regard reporter’s opinions. The article seems to be of a column or opinion text, but it is situated in 
the news sections and the layout suggests it is a news story.  
Komsolmolskaya Pravda’s story explains that a rally in Moscow ended in unprecedented mass 
arrests, and police arrested 300 people - Полиция «свинтила» 300 человек. The article states that 
both the opposition and the human rights fighters accused authorities for being “stranglers of 
freedom”, and they claimed that Alexey Navalnyi and Ilya Yashin, arrested in the rally, are prisoners 
of conscience. By choosing this kind of words and expressions the newspaper is clearly providing a 
set of interpretation possibilities to readers: Russia is smothering human rights and freedom of 
assembly. 
Right after these sentences the journalist steps in personally and expresses his opinion by 
saying “I do not personally understand...” He writes that he does not understand the accusations 
towards police, since in his opinion the police has done their best to cause as little discomfort to the 
protesters as possible. Police had only “asked, not demanded” that protesters would stop assaulting 
police officers. Clearly the reporter marks that he does not agree with the accusations made by human 
rights groups.  
The reporter also questions the acts of the opposition leaders (Yashin especially) by asking 
why they had to call an unsanctioned march, when there already was rally that was peaceful and 
sanctioned. The reporter claims that opposition politicians as experienced such as Yashin must have 
known what will be the result of encouraging people to unsanctioned march and what will be the 
reaction of police officers. The reporter suspects that the opposition in fact wanted to provoke 
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authorities, they wanted beatings and mass arrests; the liberal democratic fight wanted to own the 
slogan used by Bolsheviks: The worse, the better - чем хуже, тем лучше. According to the journalist, 
opposition did not choose a wise way to fight against falsifications: they broke the law in order to 
supervise that law is being adhered, and that is a road that leads nowhere or to an impasse and to 
bloodshed.  
In this particular article, opposition is presented as belligerent, trying to catalyze the peaceful 
demonstration into a battle between the authorities and protesters. The article highlights the 
opposition leaders as a mischief-maker. The idea of “you get what you ask for” is embedded in the 
text: “the prisoners of conscious” were sent to jail for 15 days, but only because they did not settle 
for sanctioned meeting, but wanted an unsanctioned march that was bound to provoke the authorities. 
It is clear that the opposition is the guilty one, and the accusations made towards the riot police are 
groundless.  
It is visible in this article that the first rally after Duma elections was seen as typical rally 
organized by organized opposition. The anger against rigged elections is not present, it seems to be 
left aside in the article. Instead, the story is concentrating on opposition figures that want to rock the 
boat and clash with the riot police. The article has a traditional point of view of established opposition 
groups causing problems to authorities, and idea of the rallies potentially spreading and growing into 
larger movement is absent. As said before in the framing chapter, journalism seeks explanations to 
events, and framing is a way to categorize, interpret and name events in the massive information load. 
This particular article is situated in a continuation – it is connected to the fact that opposition has 
organized rallies before and it is natural response by the opposition to demonstrate the elections’ 
results. As a result of selection and salience, the article takes a stand. Based on my analysis, the rally 
is framed as typical behavior by belligerent opposition. It is seen as one time protest that most 
likely will not result in new protests.  
 
8.2.1.2 Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9th of December, article 1 
In 9th of December, Komsomolskaya Pravda published several articles related to the rallies. They 
have a whole page that is divided into smaller entities. Komsomolskaya Pravda continues to report 
from the rallies in a quite a different way compared to Kommersant, choosing its own personal ways 
to frame the events – emphasizing on the role of social media. 
The article on Wednesday 9th of March starts by saying that the “rebellion of social networks 
is been tested on Russia soil, and the Russian protesters are copying the methods that were used in 
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uprisings in Moldova, Egypt and Tunisia. According to the report, the scenario is one and the same 
in these countries – people are not happy with how the elections went, and that is why they started 
protesting in blogs and in Twitter. The events in Russia have raised interest abroad, “among our 
lovely foreign partners”. The last sentence can be interpreted in ironic way, since it is well known 
that Russia does not want foreign actors and countries interfering with its domestic politics, and 
several times Russian leaders have accused the West for trying to influence domestic politics. Taking 
into account this context, I interpret the sentence of lovely foreign partners as some kind of a warning: 
foreign countries are following the Russian events and rallies closely, and they might try to get in the 
middle of the events, for example by donating money to Russian opposition. The reference to 
uprisings in other countries draws a connection to revolutions: the Russian protestors are behaving in 
the same way as people in countries of the Arab Spring.  
The reporter writes that there is nothing illegal in post-Duma elections’ actions, if the protests 
do not break the law. It becomes clear that the article looks at the protesters and rallies as a threat: 
“Can the generation of bloggers become a battering ram that will batter down the Russian 
authorities?” The article uses rich and solemn language in describing how this could take place: By 
making the power tremble, forcing the authorities to new concessions and finally turning them into a 
handful of weak-willed people who could be whisked away from the political arena with one click. 
There is anticipation and even fear that for example a scenario such as the revolution in Egypt will 
repeat itself in Russia. Based on the previous uprisings and revolutions in the near past, there is in 
fact evidence suggesting that this kind of scenario is possible – and this potential gives the perfect 
chance for the West to interfere, or at least so the reporter implies. 
“People went to their homes from the Victory Square – and no one understood whether the 
young generation, having taken a breath of fresh air, went back to their computers; whether something 
had changed irrevocably.” This part of the article describes the unknown – in the past people 
demonstrated on the streets, took part to rallies. Today, the protests do not take place only in public - 
instead, they continue online.  
The article repeatedly mentions the foreign actors. According to the article, in the West, the 
main question is: Is it time to start help the opposition to rock the boat which has an uncompromising 
captain, who does not want to play by the Western rules? The article ends in saying that both Hillary 
Clinton and Catherine Ashton have expressed their concern due to the violations that took place 
during the Duma elections. The reporter makes his own interpretations and argues that the statements 
by the Western politicians are giving a clear signal both to the authorities and to the protesters: “Hold 
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on, we are with you (with the protesters). And the color of the Russian democratic revolution – that 
we will choose later.” Especially interesting is the verb form of choosing – we will choose refers to 
the fact, that the West will be part in choosing the color. As I mentioned before, Russian authorities 
oppose foreign influence strongly, and presenting the topic in this manner can provoke resistance 
among citizens. It is possible that this way of framing can guide the readers into seeing the rallies in 
solely negative way, because they could possibly shake the Russian regime and result in the increase 
of foreign influence in the country. Russia does not need West’s help in choosing the color of 
democratic revolution.  
This article was so far the most stand-taking article during this content analysis, and it is 
strikingly different from Kommersant’s content. It supports the official rhetoric’s of the authorities, 
the idea of the West interfering into Russian politics is clearly embedded it: rallies give the West a 
strategic weapon to destabilize Russia. The article is in favor of Russia and national interest. In the 
analysis, I distinct two frames for the rallies: First, Rallies as a threat to Russian stability. Second, 
opposition is seeing as an ally of the West and Rallies as West’s possibility to destabilize Russia. 
Both these frames support the official rhetoric’s of Russian authorities, and the frames are 
connected to the attempt to prevent revolutionary movement in Russia. Robert Horvath (2011) has 
written about Putin’s preventive Counter-Revolution: about how in his second term Putin began 
rejecting the threat of colored revolutions that had taken place for example in Georgia and in Ukraine. 
The active phase in preventing the threat of velvet revolution began in 2005, and included several 
pillars to regime: Nashi youth supporting Kremlin, managed NGO sector, propaganda on television 
and the concept of sovereign democracy. Horvath claims that the struggle against velvet revolution is 
connected to the consolidation of an undemocratic regime in Putin’s Russia. According to Horvath, 
“In their public utterances, the Kremlin’s political technologists presented the revolutionary threat 
as a Western conspiracy. For them, the essential facts about the ‘colored revolutions’ were that they 
were ﬁnanced by Western foundations, they utilized Western political technologies, their activists were 
coached by Western trainers, and their outbreak was coordinated by Western diplomats and 
intelligence agencies.” Horvath adds that the sincerity of evaluations considering West’s role is 
questionable and gives an example of a comment of one mouthpiece of authorities: in a television 
broadcast this Kremlin propagandist was strongly accusing West, but after the cameras were turned 
off he had said: “the crisis situation in the country is being produced by the actions of the regime 
itself, and not from abroad”. (Horvath, 2011, 21–22.)  
Horvath’s example is useful for analyzing Komsomolskaya Pravda’s frames and content, 
71 
 
because it clarifies the newspaper’s position and role in the aftermath of the Duma elections and 
connects it to wider perspective of media serving as authorities’ mouthpiece, and promoting official 
points of views. By presenting the rallies as a threat to Russian stability and as West’s possibility to 
destabilize Russia, the newspaper’s way to supports the official propaganda and current order. The 
rallies are connected to a larger entity of Russian sovereignty and official rhetoric: the Russian rulers 
do not want outsiders intruding into Russia’s politics. Portraying the rallies as a threat and as part of 
West’s conspiracy the coverage introduces negative connotations to readers. The rallies are not simply 
a movement of angry, disappointed Russians, but West’s chance to hit Russia below the belt. 
The post-Duma elections rallies were bound to alert the regime: large amount of people 
running to streets all around Russia protesting could have been a sign of an upcoming color revolution 
and the fears of the leaders’ had suddenly come true. No wonder the rhetoric aimed against West, and 
the rallies were presented as a threat and as something unwanted, even harmful to Russia’s stability. 
 
8.2.1.3. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9th of December, short articles 2 and 3 
In December the 9th, Komsomolskaya Pravda published two small articles that are comparing Russia’s 
situation to the West. A short article (article 2) is telling how in the United States during the Occupy 
Wall Street –protest the police has been using tough measures in arresting the protesters. There is a 
picture of riot police arresting a person in Moscow, with caption that says “The Moscow police is 
being accused of excessive use of force. But if you look at the picture down on this page…” And the 
picture on the lower part of the page has American police officers arresting a protester in Wall Street 
protest, with a caption saying “…Then it turns out that participants of the action Occupy Wall Street 
are facing even tougher response. But there no one is worrying…” The captions of the pictures are 
guiding reader’s interpretation into believing that the claim is true. By looking at the pictures it is 
difficult to understand why the protesters in USA would face tougher response from the police than 
in Russia. The captions of the pictures are purposeful, attempting to frame the West as negative and 
showing that things are actually worse in the West than in Russia. 
Another short article reports (article 3) of how American television channel “has organized” 
rallies in Moscow: thousands of discontent people are marching on the streets, people are throwing 
Molotov cocktails towards police, windows have been broken, there are small fires and then suddenly 
palm streets are visible in the picture. By using the expression “organize” Komsomolskaya Pravda 
implies that the television channel has constructed, framed, the events to look in a certain way, and 
that they really have done. It is revealed that the Fox News has used footage from Athens riots when 
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reporting about Moscow rallies, and the idea of a revolution starting is being spread to American 
homes. According to Fox New it was an embarrassing error, but Komsomolskaya Pravda is keen to 
see the underlying meanings: that the Western audience has seen that the Orange revolution has begun 
in Russia, the streets of Moscow are in flames and that the representatives of OSCE and US 
government condemn Kremlin. This article continues framing the events as West’s chance to 
destabilize Russia. It is the evil West that is attempting to influence Russia’s domestic politics by 
encouraging interpretations of revolution to audiences. Covering these too incidents – comparing the 
US and Russian rallies and using wrong footage – is trivial, but the meaning of both incidents comes 
from the way in which they are portrayed. They are framed in a purpose-oriented way, and the articles 
seek to present that the enemies come from outside Russia 
 
8.2.1.4. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9th of December, article 4 
On the same page with previous article Komsomolskaya Pravda has another story reporting about the 
upcoming large rally and about how social sites in internet are playing a great role in gathering people 
together: several protest groups have been created online. The article tells that large rallies will be 
organized in Russia Saturday 10th of December. In Moscow, the police has sanctioned a protest for 
300 people, but based on internet’s social groups tens of thousands of people plan to participate. The 
article is titled “We will take with us flowers and balloons”, and the title emphasizes peace and 
violence free protest – the social groups online encourage people to peaceful fight. The moderators 
of internet groups tell people to paint a picture or tie white ribbons to clothes. However, as the reporter 
claims, people’s answers are not that lyrical: members of the protest groups anticipate that the rallies 
will turn into beating. “People are on an aggressive mood, and because of that there will be beating”, 
writes one person. Peaceful, pro fair elections-oriented people get some space on the article with 
balloon and flowers, but they are blended into the ideas of rallies turning into violent clashed and of 
anti-West propaganda. The West and the USA are mentioned in this article as well: the threat of West 
interfering is mentioned, and that seems to be the continuous theme on the whole page. The goal of 
the people, demanding fair elections, drowns into the sea of threats and negative sides of the rallies: 
even the possibility of civil war in mentioned. 
However, the final paragraph clarifies the idea of the rallies, citing opposition. “Stop talking 
about civil war. That is when a brother is against brother. What is happening here with us is the people 
uniting – it has not happened in a long time. In Europe due to any reason people go on streets, 
expressing their discontent. Our laws do not work, what remains? How else can we force them to 
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have a dialogue with us?” The final paragraph underlines the goal of the opposition, which is to have 
a dialogue with the authorities.  
The articles published 9th of December in Komsomolskaya Pravda form an interesting entity. 
Mostly the page highlights negative sides of the protests, emphasizing the destabilizing effects and 
West’s role in the equation. However, in one of the articles opposition can expression their opinion, 
and the emphasis is on the fact that social media is to great deal influencing the development of events 
and how people are being mobilized. Naming the frame was challenging, because the dominant ideas 
seems to be a mix of, on the one hand, people being mobilized with the help of new technologies and, 
on the other hand, the emphasis is on the peacefulness that the organizers are seeking. I name the 
frame of this article Rally as people’s grass root movement.  
The essence of this movement and frame is captured in the white ribbon emerged that as a 
symbol of political opposition in Russia, and after the elections it became a wide-spread symbol for 
people who were demanding fair elections. The white ribbon is a symbol of the violence-free 
meetings, of forming a dialogue between the power and the people. Komsomolskaya Pravda’s article 
has traces of the ideology behind the simplistic symbol, white ribbon. Even though the article 
discusses possible clashes emerging and Western influence, the article is constructed in such a way 
that the peaceful opposition point of view remains to be the dominant frame – the beginning and the 
end are owned to the statements of people who are pro fair elections. The dominant interpretation is 
that people want to go to streets to show their discontent, but they want to do it in peaceful manner, 
wearing white ribbons, carrying flowers – wanting to reach their goal which is to have a dialogue 
with the authorities, not to fight with each other or be beaten up by riot police. The rallies are meetings 
by ordinary people, not by organized opposition groups. The rallies are foremost peaceful meetings.  
 
8.2.1.5. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12th of December, article 1 
After the big rally in Saturday 10th of December, Komsomolskaya Pravda has a whole spread for 
articles related to the protests. I will analyze each article as individual pieces of text.  
The first article is titled “Omon (riot police) were given flowers and journalists could rent 
balconies”. The tone of the article is very much different than the other articles I analyzed from 
Komsomolskaya Pravda. The report from Bolotnaya Square starts by saying that people from 
different groups gathered to the rally: communists and democrats, liberals and anarchists, 
monarchists, nationalists, football fanatics and simply Muscovites – it felt like all the offended ones 
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had gathered to the rally. The emphasis of the article is clearly on people: what kind of people came 
to the protest and what is their reason for participating? The article provides multiple answers, 
demonstrating that the participants are from different social groups and age groups: young boys at 
age 14, politically savvy and all-knowing grandmothers, young girls shivering because of the cold 
weather. The participants have few things in common, but the uniting factor is the demand for 
annulling election results and the demand for fair elections. “All the crooks, every one of them should 
retire, and return the voice back to people”.  
The organized opposition groups have been the ones negotiating with the city officials about 
the arrangements of the rallies, but other than that the role of the organized opposition seems to be 
minor. The article is clearly highlighting the significance of ordinary people from different spectrums 
of society gathering to express their discontent. The rally is framed as people’s grass root movement. 
Reporting the rallies as people’s movement is a clear shift in Komsolmoskaya Pravda’s coverage. 
Unlike some of the previous news articles that were focusing on the idea of rallies as typical acts of 
the organized opposition, this kind of reporting emphasizes the unexceptional nature of the protests: 
in two decades Russia has not seen such big rallies. The reporter and the newspaper have chosen to 
acknowledge that something unique is happening in Russia. The rallies are frames as people’s 
movement, as activity of normal citizens, not only political activists.  
The second emphasis of the article is on the peaceful nature of the rally. People are giving 
flowers to the riot police, who are behaving themselves accordingly and politely, some even smiling. 
There are no arrests, no beatings – the difference to the beginning of the protest week is striking. The 
peaceful nature of the protest is of course at least partly a result of the path chosen by authorities: 
they have sanctioned the rally, and the riot police has most likely been told to act politely and 
peacefully. If a rally that gathered tens of thousands of people turned into mass arrests and violent 
clashes between the protesters and the riot police, the outcome would be unpredictable and it could 
lead the country from stability to instability. The article is saying how the riot police is behaving well, 
but the reporter does not talk about the role of the authorities in this equation. There are no questions 
of the strategy of authorities, but I believe that the sanctioned mass rallies were a smart move from 
the authorities – they were the only way to control the discontent.  
The article emphasizes that the rally is approved by the authorities. Based on this I distinct a 
second frame, in addition to people’s movement -frame, the article has a frame of rally as protest 
approved by the authorities. The Saturday rally gave discontent people a feeling that they can 
openly show their dissatisfaction, that they can demand a change in the country – and possibly their 
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voice can be hear by the leaders. I believe that is was a strategy chosen by the officials, a message 
that the authorities, the leaders of Russia, wanted to give to the people. 
In a way these two frames are opposite of one another: the discontent people have unified and 
gathered into mass protest, but at the same time this process of protesting is regulated by the officials. 
The officials have sanctioned the rally and let people protest, because it might the only way to control 
to growth of the protest movement: smothering the movement would only make people demand their 
rights louder. The news coverage in this article is on a first glance promoting the idea that freedom in 
Russia is doing well. People are protesting happily, the policemen smile and receive flowers. 
However, this way of framing the rallies portrays the fact that authoritarian rule is strong in Russia: a 
peaceful rally can only take place when it’s sanctioned by the officials. In Russia, political grassroots 
movements can only exist with the permission of the rulers.  
 
8.2.1.6. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12th of December, article 2 
The second article is more analytical than the previous one, digging deeper into analyzing the reasons 
to participate to rallies. In the beginning of the story, the rally is tied to the context of Ukrainian 
Orange Revolution, The journalist is asking from other protesters if they want revolution, and they 
answer “We are not here for that reason. If we would not come, we would lose all self-respect”. The 
color revolutions have been an ongoing theme in the rally coverage, and it is understandable: the 
sudden mobilization of people could lead to scenarios such as Orange revolution in Ukraine, and it is 
a natural for the journalists to introduce this possibility. In the previous articles in Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, the possibility of revolution seemed higher than in this article, and the revolution was 
connected to Western influence and West trying to interfere with Russian politics. 
In this article, the ordinary Russians, participants of the protest, are saying that they do not 
want a revolution. I argue that this is a typical process of framing, choosing a certain quote from 
people and lifting it to the beginning of the article, highlighting it as important fact that represents a 
larger opinion. I am sure the journalist could have found in the crowd people who would have said 
that they want a revolution – maybe the revolutionary-minded protesters would have been in the 
minority, but nevertheless that would have been a possibility. It seems that the newspaper wants to 
emphasize that the pro-fair elections movement is not that big that it would turn into a revolution, and 
neither is a revolution a goal of the protestors.  
Unlike the previous article, which showed the rally as people’s movement, this news story 
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provides a different ankle, emphasizing the somewhat disorganized nature of the protest and the 
feeling that the first-timers have. The first-timers are not sure how to behave in the rally, and they are 
even a bit afraid, that the protest would escalate from a peaceful meeting into something else. The 
journalist writes that the participants are not fans of those opposition parties that organized the rally. 
The audience was not too responsive to the speeches given by the people on the stage, but it could be 
due to the fact that they did not hear them: there were no big plasma screens or amplifiers. People are 
not too shouting slogans but they have started to think, the reporter writes. The article makes the rally 
seems as somewhat unorganized and not led by anyone: it comes across as a mix of but then the 
reporter reveals the reason for that: many of the participants are first-timers and because of that they 
are careful: they are doing everything consciously, being suspicious when someone in the crowd asks 
people to shout slogans – what if the people encouraging to shout have ulterior motives?  
The article describes the rally has turned into народное гулянье – folk festival. People are 
drinking shampanskoe, “because the atmosphere is like in New Year, or even better”. The people 
shout that they will come again, but the reporter is bit skeptical about that. “After all the shampanskoe 
has been drank and all the leaflets have been read, people leave from the Square, feeling good about 
themselves”. The article suggests that maybe one time is enough for the protesters and that no more 
big rallies will follow. The reference to New Year supports this idea, as you only celebrate New Year 
once a year and then you are content for a while.   
Based on the article I argue that the rally does not threat the status quo in anyway – the story 
is emphasizing this in subtle and less subtle ways. I name the frame rally as harmless folk festival. 
I argue that this kind of reporting is beneficial for the officials. First, it becomes clear that people are 
allowed to express their discontent in Russia – no one in the West can say that Russians are forbidden 
to demonstrate. Second, the rally does not seem to pose any threat to the existing order: many of the 
participants are first-timers, insecure in their demands, mostly observing and trying to understand 
how to behave in the mass rally. The movement is not organized to its roots; people do shout slogans 
and demand fair elections, but concrete actions and goals are missing. The protest is as a big party – 
people have harmless fun.  
 
8.2.1.7. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12th of December, article 3 
On the next page the rally coverage continues. The dominating piece of a puzzle is a large photograph 
taken in Moscow. The picture is taken in bird’s eye view, from somewhere high, possibly from a 
helicopter or from a roof of a high building – it makes the protesters look like ants and the rally looks 
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like ant’s nest. The powerful picture manages to capture something that words are not able express. 
The picture shows the protest-area and the latitude of the rally: there are tens of thousands of 
protesters, people as far as the eye can see. The caption of the picture says: “These kinds of mass 
rallies Russia has not seen since 1993. Based on different evaluations, 25,000 to 50,000 people came 
to the rally.” This picture itself captures very well the frame of rally as people’s movement, a frame 
that the previous article had. The emphasis is on people, and the picture portrays the people as one 
unified mass, and looking from high up, all the people look the same and ideological and political 
differences do not matter. The main message embedded in the picture is: the protesters are unified.  
The article below the picture reports about rallies that have taken place across the country – it 
is a short overview of the events taking place in Russia. It becomes clear that in many cities the 
protesters have tried to avoid using the word rally (митинг), and instead they have referred to the 
rallies as public meetings or meetings with the deputies. The reason for avoiding a certain word it that 
authorities have not sanctioned the rallies everywhere. For example, in the city of Perm, the protesters 
stood in the street two meters away from each other, showing signs as a way to avoid been accused 
for organizing a rally.  
In this Twitter-account, the Kirov gubernator called the demonstration as a test for the power 
and for the society. According to him, the country needs to pass this test without blood, abuse, 
hysterics and violence. And so it did, says the article. People gathered to shout slogans demanding 
fair elections and after that they left. The first part of the article resembles the frame of rally as folk 
festival – people gathered, protested peacefully. Sophisticated music was played, by Schubert, 
Boccherini and Tchaikovsky. This part of the article is telling about the sanctioned meetings. But then 
the reporter reminds that in some cities the protesters and the local authorities could not reach a mutual 
understanding about how to organize protest, and people got arrested in unsanctioned rallies – for 
example in Kazan’ out of 700 protesters 100 got arrested.  
The protest meetings and their outcome vary, depending on if the rally was sanctioned or 
unsanctioned one. The sanctioned ones are peaceful, resembling folk festivals, and the unsanctioned 
ones turn easily into violent chaos and mass arrests. The article does not tell in detail why the local 
officials and opposition have not reached a mutual understanding in organizing the rally, and the 
justification hangs in thin air, leaving the reader a bit confused. The test, about what the governor or 
Kirov talked in the beginning of the article is both passed and failed – in cities of sanctioned rallies, 
the people and officials passed the test, in unsanctioned rallies the test was failed. 
The article is constructed on the idea of the Saturday rallies as being as test for the country, 
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and the coverage shows both sides of the outcome. In this respect, the coverage is balanced, not 
emphasizing one side more than the other, not been guilty of the typical media sin of exaggeration. 
The reader can draw the final conclusion whether or not the country passed the test.  
Three frames of the rallies are dominating in the same article – the rallies as harmless folk 
festivities, the rallies as threat to the stability of Russia and split society. The inability to agree 
about the place to organize rallies is an example of the split society -frame. The article is presenting 
the situation all around Russia, and it becomes clear that the split it not present only in big cities such 
as Moscow and Saint Petersburg, but also in other parts of the country – and this emphasizes the 
strong nature of the split society –frame. 
 
8.2.1.8. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12th of December, article 4 
A journalist Maksim Kononenko has written a short analytical commentary of the rallies. He is 
drawing it all together, providing the reader an evaluation of the events and their significance. He 
starts the commentary straightforward, arguing that the main reason for the largest mass rallies since 
1993 is that people have gotten sick and tired of what they see every day. He claims that Kremlin has 
the ball now – it is obvious that people are unhappy, and they (the officials) need to negotiate with 
the people so that these rallies would not become a habit. According to the author, it is part of human 
nature to want changes, and that people believe that thanks to changes the life will get better – but 
that is not always the case.  
Kononenko says that that is the scenario that is taking place in Russia – people want to get rid 
of the current authorities, believing that the new ones will be better – but in the end people will 
understand that nothing has changed. Nevertheless of the outcome, the genuine wish for change was 
present in the Saturday rallies, Kononenko argues. As a result of the rallies, demands were made by 
the opposition, demands such as annulling the results of the elections and changing the electoral law. 
Kononenko concludes his commentary by saying that the authorities should at least notice such mass 
protests. The commentary is short and because of that quite superficial, typical for newspapers. It is 
simply presenting few key points. 
Konenonko is trying to open up the complicated nature of the rallies and the fact that it is 
difficult to estimate how significant for the country’s future the protests actually are – whether or not 
they matter at all. Instead of answering questions he is making the readers think about the real 
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meaning of the rallies – would the change of rule change anything? The question remains to be 
answered, but the conclusion is that a dialogue between the power and the people is necessary, and 
that the authorities cannot afford to ignore the people anymore. Because of the discontent of the 
people and the protests, the relationship between the power and the people need to change somehow, 
or that is at least the only way for the current leaders to keep their position.  
This commentary article is framing the rallies as a factor that influences the relationship 
between the officials and the citizens, despite the fact that the latitude of the influence remains to be 
a question. However, it is clear that these large rallies are influencing the country somehow, possibly 
as a growth of civil society and growth of citizens’ activity in participating in public life. On the other 
hand, the effects could be destabilization of the country, escalating into larger mass movement and in 
the end even into revolution – or the rallies could be suppressed and life would continue as it was. I 
name this frame as rallies as unpredicted factor in Russia’s development.  
 
8.2.1.9. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 12th of December, article 5 
The last piece of Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage is also a commentary, written by a journalist 
who was reporting from the Saturday rally. The commentary is discussing the unity of the protesters, 
a point of view that has been talked about quite little in the coverage so far. The reporter is saying 
that it would be naive to believe that all the protesters are soul mates – единомышленники. The 
protesters have not been able to even agree about the arrangements of the really. Despite the 
disagreements between different opposition groups, the reporter claims, on Saturday rally they all – 
patriots, liberals, communists and even gay – thought about one same thing: that there is too much 
injustice. That it is no longer possible to fall silent. That despite everything a civil society in Russia 
exists. 
The reporter emphasizes that people came to the rally without having been paid to come. This 
is a clear reference to pro-Putin rallies, because often the participants of the pro-government rallies 
have been accused of participating only because they have been paid or pressured to participate. Then, 
the journalist continues describing the participants: they are young people who care about how things 
are, people who are afraid of revolution, people who understand that it is not possible be silent 
anymore. Strong emphasis is on the diversity of the participants, people have come for different 
reasons. But what is next? The reporter argues in the near future nothing changes and effects won’t 
be big, but that it is difficult not to notice such a big crowd of people. The professional opposition 
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only had a technical role, organizing the protest, but people did not come to support the opposition 
groups but their own rights.  
The reporter argues: “The authorities of course understand this. And so do they understand 
that in Russia there are not only inhabitants, but also citizens”. Just like the previous commentary, 
this article also evaluates the meaning of the rallies, inspecting them from slightly different 
perspective – from the point of view of civil society. The quote of Russia having not only inhabitants 
but citizens suggests that Russians are beginning to be politically and socially active. The article is 
framed in the same way as the one on the previous page, as people’s grass root movement. This 
frame portrays the rallies in a very positive and joyful way, and emphasizes the growth of civil activity 
in Russia.  In addition to people’s movement frame, a second frame existing below the surface it the 
rallies as threat to the Russian stability. It appears that in a way these frames coexist. Russian 
authorities have gotten used to living with the organized, established opposition, but pro-fair elections 
movement is something different, because it has gathered a large amount of ordinary people to streets. 
Rallies as people’s movements have possibility to turn even into larger rallies, and in that way they 
can shake the status quo, and as such this possibility threatens the current rule. 
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8.2.2 Overview of Komsomolskaya Pravda’s frames 
 
In Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage I separated 8 frames. One can notice the shift in the coverage 
taking place after the big rally in Saturday, as the news coverage becomes more diverse in content: 
the articles published in 12th of December had more frames than the ones published earlier during the 
analysis period.  The following table shows a summary of Komsomolskaya Pravda’s frames. In 
Monday the 12th of December the newspaper had several articles related to the rallies, and that is why 
some frames occur more than once during one day. Those cases are indicated by use of x (i.e. 12.12 
x 2). The framing process will be analyzed in next sub-chapter.  
 
Table 2. Overview of Komsomolskaya Pravda’s frames 
 
Frame Date 
1. Typical behavior by belligerent opposition 7.12 
2. A threat to Russia’s stability 9.12, 12.12 x 2 
3. West’s chance to destabilize Russia 9.12 
4. People’s grass root movement 9.12, 12.12 x 2 
5. Protest approved by authorities 12.12 
6. Harmless folk festival 12.12 x 2 
7. Split society 12.12 
8.Unpredicted factor in Russia’s development 12.12 
 
8.2.3 Komsomolskaya Pravda’s framing process 
 
In the beginning of the analysis week, Komsomolskaya Pravda was more upfront than Kommersant 
in providing interpretations to readers, and supporting the status quo and the leaders. First, they 
introduced the rallies as typical behavior of opposition – the framing was clearly a continuation from 
the past. Unsanctioned opposition rallies have taken place regularly, for example the Strategy31-
rallies supporting the freedom of assembly. It was quite a natural way to cover the rallies in this 
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manner, since it was impossible to predict the future and foresee that the protests will continue and 
grow into a larger movement, where not only organized opposition but also ordinary citizens 
participate. The frame “Rallies as typical behavior of belligerent opposition” is a good example of 
how journalists process information and connect it to a larger context. I argue that framing the first 
rally as typical behavior of belligerent opposition is a classic example of news framing: It is a process 
in which one does not only highlight certain aspects and fade out others, but where one also attempts 
to find the historical context and put the events into a continuum.  
Progressing towards the end of the week Komsomolskaya Pravda started to change its way of 
reporting into direction that was more favorable for the protesters than the authorities. The frames 
and framing of events developed in the course of action, by small changes in tone – from rallies being 
framed as a threat to the society to being framed as more human, as people’s movements. In the article 
published on 9th of December two frames were dominant on the coverage: split society and people’s 
grass root movement.  
According to Korteniemi (2012), the rallies followed by the elections effected on Putin’s 
rhetoric: he mentioned several times political competition and he highlighted that political 
competition is a necessary part of democracy, its driving force. Putin emphasized that the authorities 
need to listen to people and their wishes, and they need to respond to these wishes. However, Putin 
believed, the changes should not come true through revolutionary actions, but through evolution and 
development. As a result of the demonstrations, Putin also started to speak more about the opposition. 
According to him, protests are a normal phenomenon and the existence of opposition is essential. 
However, Putin’s rhetoric was connected to law and norms: opposition needs to act according to law, 
and opposition’s acts and rallies can be acceptable only if they are obeying the constitution. 
(Korteniemi, 2012, 62.) 
As a result of my analysis, I argue that the shift in Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage is 
connected to the change in official rhetoric. At first the officials ignored the rallies, and state television 
did not mention them at all. However, as it became clear that the officials could not afford to ignore 
the events, the authorities stopped ignoring the protests. I claim that the shift in Komsomolskaya 
Pravda’s coverage is the newspaper’s way to adapt to the official rhetoric. It would be necessary to 
compare in detail the comments and speeches given by authorities in order to say for certainty how 
much the newspaper is attempting to adapt to the official rhetoric.  
Based on Korteniemi’s (2012) examples on Putin’s rhetoric and on several newspaper articles 
where Putin has been said to want a dialogue with the opposition, I dare to estimate, that framing the 
protests as people’s movement, as folk festivities and as rallies approved by authorities are reflecting 
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the idea of opposition as necessary part of democratic order. The frame of rallies as harmless folk 
festivities can be seen as example of opposition of following law and order, just like Putin’s rhetoric 
emphasizes. However, simultaneously the articles include frames that show rallies as possible threat 
to sovereign Russia’s stability and as unpredicted factor for the country’s future. For example, the 
threat-frame clearly suggests that the current rule and rulers are the best choice for Russia and its 
stability. The unpredicted factor -frame supports this idea by implying that if the current rule is 
dethroned Russia will most likely face turbulence and disorder.  
As a conclusion, the overall interpretation is that the coverage works in favor of the officials: 
on the one hand, Russia is shown as free country, where the opposition can gather and express their 
discontent, and it is even encouraged to do so. On the other, the rallies and opposition’s growing 
influence could shake Russia’s stability, and that is why it is better to have the current leaders in 
charge of the country. The coverage in Komsomolskaya Pravda was diverse in content but based on 
the analysis it was uni-lateral in its outcome: none of the articles were challenging the outcome of the 
elections; instead they were supporting the status quo.  
 
 
 
84 
 
9. Discussion and critique 
 
The protest movement that began after the Duma elections in December 2011 sparked a hope of both 
political change and rise of a strong civil society in Russia. Now year and a half has passed since the 
protest movement began. Looking back, one can recognize the contradictory feelings of fear and hope 
that were present after the elections and in the demonstrations. The citizens participating to rallies 
appeared to believe that the protests could make a difference, and the claims of annulling the elections 
results could be met. The atmosphere in the rallies was anticipatory, as if something unique could 
happen. The week after the Duma elections was full of political turbulence, as the authorities 
understood that they have to react to the accusations made by the protestors. During one week of 
content analysis, the framing of the protests developed a great deal in the newspapers. Earlier in this 
thesis I have analyzed the framing processes of Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda 
individually. In this chapter, the frames of both media outlets will be discussed in parallel. 
In the beginning of the analysis week the strongest frames were rallies as typical behavior or 
belligerent opposition (Komsomolskaya Pravda) and rallies as conflict between protestors and 
authorities (Kommersant). Both of the newspapers understood the rallies as part of a continuum of 
opposition’ protest movement. The Russian opposition had regularly organized small, unsanctioned 
protests that often resulted in clashes between the protestors and the riot police. In the December 5th 
rally the amount of participants was bigger than usually, as several thousands of people protested. 
However, nothing else than the amount of people suggested that the first protests would be only a 
beginning for the rapidly growing protest movement. 
The coverage of the first rally was a typical process of framing. The reporters were seeking 
continuations and they connected the individual event into a larger entity. The protests were put into 
a historical context: Russian opposition had a habit of going out to the streets after the elections and 
accusing the authorities of rigged elections and falsifications. The first rallies were portrayed as 
activity of small group of people, a group that for long had been dissatisfied with the policies of 
officials. At this point, Putin and Medvedev had not yet commented the rallies in any way. They did 
not have the reason to believe that the rallies would continue and grow larger. Furthermore, the 
national television did not cover the first, unexpectedly large rallies. Instead they remained silent, 
which was a typical way of reacting to the opposition protests. All in all, the first articles and their 
framing was very expected and ordinary way to cover the demonstrations.  
As the rallies continued, it became evident that mass arrests and harsh measures would not 
stop the protestors from expressing their discontent publicly. It started to be apparent that the rallies 
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can threaten the current rule, and that the authorities have to respond to the events and claims made 
by the protestors. After completing the analysis I understood that several frames are connected to the 
same entity, to the idea of rallies being a threat to current regime. My analysis was very detailed, and 
I separated several frames that are connected to the same theme. The first signs of the threat are seen 
in 7th of December, when Kommersant’s article highlights the split in the society. Later that week, the 
frame is also present in Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage. (Split society -frame was present in 
Kommersant 7th, 9th and 12th of December, Komsomolskaya Pravda 12th of December). The most 
obvious frame of threat is the frame of rallies as threat to Russia’s stability (Kommersant 9th of 
December, Komsomolskaya Pravda 9th and 12th of December.) Other frames connected to this entity 
are West change to destabilize Russia (Komsomolskaya Pravda 12th of December), Arbitrary violence 
(Kommersant, 7th and 8th of December) and Unpredicted factor for Russia’s development 
(Komsomolskaya Pravda 12th of December).  
The idea of a threat was present from the beginning to the end of the analysis week, and it 
developed in the course of actions. Even though all of these frames are connected to the same entity, 
I argue that there is no sense to merge them into one frame. All of these frames have distinct features 
that emphasize different ankles of threat, and by merging the frames into one I would simplify matters 
too much. Different frames have different sources of threat: the threat can be exterior (West’s chance 
to destabilize Russia), it can be something unpredictable that is beyond control (Unpredicted factor 
for Russia’s development), but the largest threat is the discontent people, the voters who are seen as a 
ticking time bomb (Split society and threat to Russia’s stability). I argue that diverse ways of framing 
the threat are advocating and promoting the idea that protests will most likely shake Russia’s stability. 
The idea of stability is connected to President Vladimir Putin, who has continuously during his terms 
as President and Prime Minister promoted the idea stability in Russia. Putin has been the guarantor 
of Russia’s secure future. The frames underlining the threat suggest that rallies and turbulence will 
influence Russia’s secure future in a negative, destabilizing way.  
Most of the frames connected to threat portray the threat from the perspective of the ruling 
elite. Only one frame emphasizes the threat from the perspective of opposition and protestors: the 
frame of Arbitrary violence in Kommersant underlines the senselessness of contemporary rule and 
the violent measures exercised by the riot police. A difference between Kommersant’s and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage is that only Kommersant portrays the threat from both 
perspectives: from the authorities’ and the protestors’ perspective. True, the authorities’ perspective 
is more dominant also in Kommersant’s coverage, but it is not the only viewpoint. The sources of 
threat are so various – interior, exterior and erratic, that authorities struggle to control the situation. 
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Authorities did take measures, such as mass arrests, in the first rallies, but this approach was not 
sustainable to control the threat. Suppressing the discontent could not be done only with force. That 
is why the officials were forced to find new means to control the threat.  
According to Shevtsova (2012), the December protests had roots in the incapability and 
reluctance of the authorities to undertake necessary reforms that would prevent mass explosion. 
Furthermore, the power system personalized into one man is suicidal and has hastened the chance of 
revolution, as the revolution appeared to be the only way for change of power, since the ruling elite 
was not willing to step down voluntarily. (Shevtsova, 2012, 215.) Exactly the threat of revolution 
worried authorities: they were concerned that the protest movement would grow so strong that the 
current rulers would be unseated. The Russian authorities had legitimate reasons to worry, because 
the most important elections were yet to come. The Duma elections were originally seen merely as 
formality, as a test of United Russia’s support before the Presidential election in March 2012. 
However, the outcome of the Duma elections made President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin 
understand, that they could not afford to take the victory in upcoming Presidential elections for 
granted. The authorities had to choose carefully their response to angry citizens. 
Framing the protests as threat may have served the interests of authorities. The protestors were 
seen as the source of instability, and Putin was the one that could lead the country back to the secure, 
stabile path. However, the threat frame should not be seen only as negative factor, as the negative 
perspective is the viewpoint of status quo. Shaking the stability can be seen from a positive 
perspective, if we think the goals of the protestors. In fact, destabilization of the current system was 
the goal of at least some of the protestors, who strived for political change. In a relatively centralized 
country such as Russia political chance is not likely to take place without turbulence and flux. 
Based on the analysis I argue that at in the middle of the analysis week Komsomolskaya 
Pravda’s framing is favorable to the status quo than Kommersant’s. The dominant standpoints of 
Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage emphasize the negative outcomes of the rallies. Furthermore, 
enemies are seen everywhere: the West is trying to force Russia into a democratic revolution, the 
opposition is trying to cause mayhem on purpose and the protests can throw Russia into chaos. On 
the contrary, Kommersant provides more balanced coverage: they frame the rallies as split in the 
society, which demonstrates the gap between the rulers and the ruled. In addition, the frame of 
arbitrary violence is negative towards the authorities, as the harsh measures are been questioned. 
Simultaneously, the frames of threat and people’s grassroots movement are present. During the mid-
week, the coverage of Kommersant provides multiple interpretations. It can be seen as a sign of 
attempts to cover the rallies in balanced way, giving the readers various points of views.  
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The officials responded on several ways to the protests: In the beginning of the protest week 
they discredited the demands of opposition and accused the West of orchestrating the rallies. Putin 
warned people about the Orange threat of the revolutions. On the other hand, Putin soon publicly 
recognized the need for dialogue, but he added that people should express their opinions within the 
boundaries of law. He implied that unsanctioned rallies were not an acceptable way to express 
discontent. Towards the end of the protest week Putin’s approach changed into more mediating one, 
as he stated that he was pleased about the rallies, and they were a signal of a robust civil society. In 
addition, the Kremlin spokespeople attempted to portray the mass rallies as entertainment of spoiled 
Muscovites, as a marginal phenomenon of small group of people.  
During the first protest week, the media was full of mixed signals. The official rhetoric 
developed from undermining the rallies to acknowledging the importance of dialogue, and later 
seeing the protests as entertainment. Putin’s rhetoric during the first protest week was a mix of 
authoritarian rule and mediating conciliator, and his approach could appeal both to the silent majority 
and to the loud protestors, and it did seem he was trying to please them both. It is clear that the battle 
of dominant point of views was fierce. Putin and his administration wanted to promote their 
standpoints, and protestors had their own agenda. In the middle of this battle were the media, 
balancing between different camps.  
The key finding of this thesis is the connection between media coverage and official rhetoric. 
It is striking how especially the framing by Komsomolskaya Pravda resembles the development of 
official rhetoric. Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage developed from framing the rallies as threat to 
highlighting the party-like atmosphere of the rallies. The focus shifted from rallies being something 
unwanted and dangerous to protests being a celebration of active civil society. Also Kommersant has 
similarities with the official rhetoric, but not as strongly as Komsomolskaya Pravda, which has been 
accused of being a propagandist newspaper that promotes official standpoints and does not criticize 
the contemporary rule. Kommersant reported about the statements made by Putin and Medvedev, but 
it also reported about the concern of opposition: the opposition questioned the sincerity of the official 
statements. The split in the society was made visible in the coverage, and showing the both sides was 
a sign of unbiased reporting.  
A significant change in the framing process took place towards the end of the analysis week, 
as the framing process changed into more positive tone, and rallies were seen more and more as 
harmless activities and as folk festival. Frames connected to this theme are People’s grass roots 
movement (Kommersant 9th of December, Komsomolskaya Pravda 9th and 12th of December), 
Harmless folk festival (Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda 12th of December) and Protests 
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uniting Russia (Kommersant, 6th and 12th of December). These frames support the need to show that 
Russia is a democratic country, whose citizens can express their opinions and even discontent. The 
rallies become a celebration of civil rights. 
In the articles published after the big December 10th rallies, the threat frame became far less 
dominant. This can be explained by the fact that the large rallies were sanctioned. I argue that Russian 
authorities needed these kinds of peaceful rallies. During the protest week, the spirits of people were 
determinant and events were escalating fast. Sanctioning the mass rallies in December 10th was a 
smart move from the officials, because it provided the unhappy people a chance to express their 
frustration towards the elections results and towards the ruling elite. Sanctioning the rallies was also 
a sign to foreign countries: Russia’s citizens are allowed to express their discontent, which is a sign 
of democracy. 
In the media coverage, the shift from something dangerous and threatening to something fun 
and positive was both obvious and underlining. Both Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda 
framed the rallies as harmless folk festivities and as people’s grass roots movement. Simultaneously 
other frames were present but the idea of harmlessness was the most dominating one in the coverage 
in the 12th of December. Komsomolskaya Pravda published five articles about the rallies on Monday 
the 12th, and that explains the large number of frames during one day. Different articles were seeking 
different ankles and undeniably the amount of articles provided a feeling of versatile coverage. 
However, on a closer look it appears that the different ways of framing work in the advantage 
authorities, supporting the official rhetoric. First of all, the rallies framed as folk festivals and people’s 
movement supports the idea that the need for democratic order is acknowledged in Russia. 
Furthermore, the rallies are also framed as protests approved by authorities: sanctioned rallies clearly 
demonstrate that democratic order exist in Russia, as thousands of people can go to the streets and 
peacefully express their opinions, and the participants have the consent of officials to do so. Earlier 
during the week, Putin had commented, that opposition should demonstrate within the boundaries of 
law. In December 10th rallies the people protested within the boundaries of law as they should, and 
based on the coverage in sanctioned rallies the atmosphere is like in a big happy party. Portraying the 
protests as happy party-like meetings undermines the significance of them. There are no legitimate 
demands or genuine alternatives to contemporary rule, instead the coverage is focused on mediating 
the feelings and the atmosphere.  
Simultaneously with the festivities-frame also threat-frame continued to exist in the coverage. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda continued to present the rallies as a threat to Russia’s stability and also the 
split in society was emphasized. I argue that the frames of threat and festivities as a combination were 
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working in the advantage of officials. On the one hand, the frames emphasized the democratic nature 
of Russia and the fact that Putin and Medvedev were willing to have a dialogue with the discontent 
people. This kind of framing gave hope to the discontent people, as it seemed that genuine dialogue 
was possible. On the other hand, the articles underlined that rallies were threatening Russia’s stability 
and that only the Putin-Medvedev-rule could secure stability on the country. There were no eligible 
alternatives, and revolution would throw Russia into chaos. The split inside the society could be 
stitched up by dialogue, but change of the leaders was not an option.  
What on the surface seemed like pluralistic way of reporting, proved on a closer look to be 
quite accommodating to the official rhetoric. Putin and his team adopted the slogan If not Putin, who? 
and Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage supported the idea of this slogan. No alternatives were 
introduced, and rallies were portrayed as useful channel to express discontent, but they were not seen 
as channel for political change. The coverage portrayed that it was fun to participate in a celebration 
of civil rights. But parties always come to an end and the next day what is left is not much, merely a 
hangover.   
Also Kommersant emphasized the party-like atmosphere of the rallies. It portrayed the 
December 10th rallies as unique, as something you do once in your life, and emphasized that rallies 
are like high class parties, that all the fashionable people attend. However, at the same time The split 
society -frame was present in Kommersant’s article. In December the 12th, the frame of threat is not 
present in Kommersant’s coverage. On the contrary, the coverage was full of positive connotations. 
It became fashionable to be part of the protest movement. Whereas Komsomolskaya Pravda did not 
promote the idea of political change as something positive but as something unwanted, Kommersant 
was more eager to discuss the possible positive effects of the protests. Throughout the coverage 
Kommersant portrays the hope of change and the significance of mass protests, and based on 
Kommersant’s articles one can start to believe that by protesting the people can make a difference. 
The frame of rallies as people’s grass roots movement was relatively upfront in suggesting that the 
protests could change something. It is an important finding that out of the two newspapers only 
Kommersant sees the possibility for chance and provides the idea of political change taking place in 
Russia. Komsomolskaya Pravda, more oriented to obeying the officials, did not present any 
alternatives and portrayed the change as something unwanted and bad.  
As has been showed, based on the analysis it appears that the framing processes of threat and 
folk festivities in Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda were to some extent connected to the 
developments in official rhetoric. The changes in the tone of coverage correspond to the changes in 
Putin’s statements. I was surprised to find this connection between official rhetoric and media 
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coverage to be so obvious and strong. Based on the empirical analysis it is not possible to speculate 
how deliberate these connections are. However, knowing especially the fact that Komsomolskaya 
Pravda has a reputation of serving the interests of the officials, one can assume that the newspaper 
staff has followed the officials’ statements closely and adopted the coverage into a tone favorable to 
official rhetoric.  
Additional explanation to the shift in the coverage is that the nature of rallies changed towards 
the week. The Saturday 10th rallies were large by size, but peaceful and there was nothing obviously 
threatening in them. It was in the advantage of authorities to sanction the protests and to do everything 
in their power to make sure that the rallies would be peaceful. Mass arrests, seen in the demonstrations 
in the beginning of the week, would not have been a choice in rallies of tens of thousands of people, 
as they would have resulted violent clashed and chaos beyond anyone’s control. Furthermore, the 
peacefulness of the protests demonstrated that the discontent of the people was not threatening the 
status quo. I argue that Komsomolskaya Pravda was listening to the subtle signals from the authorities 
and adapting its coverage to the official rhetoric. I do not find it likely that the similarities between 
official rhetoric and press coverage would be purely coincidental.  
The coverage of Komsomolskaya Pravda appears to solely support the discourse of the 
authorities, but Kommersant is more pluralistic in its coverage. Throughout the analysis period 
Kommersant seeks to present different ankles to the rallies, not only the threat but also the uniting 
potential that the rallies have. The frame of split society is present systematically during the week, 
emphasizing the conflict between two camps. Kommersant also frames the rallies as movement 
uniting people, and the potential of rallies uniting people present throughout the analysis week.  
  A noticeable similarity between Kommersant and Komsomolskaya Pravda is the lack of 
certain perspectives: neither of the newspaper takes stand in the actual outcome of the elections, and 
neither of them evaluates the claims of the protesters – are the people entitled to demand annulation 
of the results? Were the elections rigged? The significance and latitude of the rallies is not on a focus 
either. They frame the rallies first as threat, then as folk festivals and as movements uniting Russia, 
even though the amount of people participating to opposition rallies is a small portion of the 
population of Russian federation. This fact is not discussed. Both Kommersant and Komsomolskaya 
Pravda portray the split in the society, between the power and the people. But they fail, possibly on 
purpose, to notice the important third party – the silent majority, who is not opposing results and 
participating to protests.  
The validity and reliability problems of frame analysis have been discussed earlier in this 
thesis. Matthess and Kohring (2008) have criticized the vagueness of frame analysis methods and 
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they have emphasized that there is a danger that the researcher finds the frames he/she is consciously 
or unconsciously looking for. The key result of this thesis is that the press coverage had similarities 
with the official rhetoric. The validity of the conclusions connected of official rhetoric is supported 
by the fact that the background subchapter of authorities’ response to rallies was written only after I 
had conducted the empirical analysis. As I did not know in detail the comments made by authorities 
while I was analyzing the content, I did not have a preconception which would have guided my 
interpretations. Only after conducting the content analysis I became interested in comparing the 
results to statements made by officials, and I quickly understood that the framing processes in news 
articles resembled the official rhetoric. As has been shown, Komsomolskaya Pravda was more 
observant to official rhetoric than Kommersant, but both of them had the development of rallies being 
a threat to rallies being a harmless folk festival. I argue that the similarities demonstrate the features 
of press coverage in neo-authoritarian media system. Whether or not deliberate and conscious, the 
analysis results do show that to some extent Komsomolskaya Pravda and Kommersant advocated 
those viewpoints that also authorities were advocating.  
Frame analysis proved out to be useful method for the analysis, because the empirical data 
consisted of clear continuum that also had a clear past. Framing is a useful tool especially when one 
does not try to analyze article only as individual piece of text, but also as part of a larger entity. The 
rallies formed a continuum with a clearly defined starting point, and in this thesis, only the first part 
of that continuum was studied. It was necessary to narrow down the amount of material, so that the 
analysis would be detailed and thorough. During one week of analysis it was possible to see 
continuum and changes in framing, but at the same time the material was not too extensive. The 
analysis period chosen for this topic was the most intense period right after the Duma elections. After 
the first, most hectic week, rallies were organized more rarely, but they grew bigger by the amount of 
participants. The protest movement continued all the way to the Presidential elections in March 2012 
and even after the elections. As the amount of material was incessant, it was necessary to narrow 
down the focus of the research. There are plenty of ankles to continue the research of Russian protest 
movement and its media content. An interesting topic would be to study the post-Presidential 
elections rallies that took place in March 2012, and one could also compare to the post-Duma 
elections rallies that has been studied in this thesis. One could also widen to work and include more 
newspaper or other media into the analysis, for example compare the content of national television to 
the newspaper coverage.  
Frame analysis was a useful tool for studying the media coverage, but the content-based 
empirical approach made me question the validity and reliability of the analysis. As has been 
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explained in the method chapter, frame analysis is a method that has raised discussion of the validity 
of the analysis. Empirical analysis is by its nature subjective. I attempted to battle the nature of 
subjectivity by making the analysis as visible to the reader as possible. Because of that I chose to 
show in detail not only the results but also the analysis process, article by article. 
Furthermore, the previous knowledge of the researcher can influence the outcome of the 
analysis. As I witnessed several rallies on the scene, I had certain ideas and opinions about the events. 
I saw the harsh measures used by the riot police, and I saw busses full of people sent to jail. I was not 
total stranger to the events that the news texts were reporting about something that I had seen on real 
life. On the other hand, this could be also seen as an advantage. I was familiar with the events and 
developments, and because of that I could solely concentrate on analyzing the way in which the events 
were portrayed. I was able to compare the picture portrayed by the media to the experience that I had. 
I believe my own experiences gave me perspective for the analysis, but it also influenced the 
interpretations I made. Empirical analysis is always to some extent subjective, but subjectivity does 
not necessarily have to be a hindrance.  
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10. Conclusions 
 
The first week after the Duma elections started a protest movement that continued all winter until the 
presidential elections in March 2012 and has continued ever since. In this thesis I have analyzed the 
coverage of the fair elections rallies in Kommersant and in Komsomolskaya Pravda. Both 
Kommersant’s and Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage of the rallies developed towards diverse 
reporting, providing plenty of perspectives. All in all the reporting of Kommersant and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda was trying to balance between the protestors and authorities: during the 
analysis period, juxtaposition between the demonstrators and the authorities was present, and it 
became clear that Russia is divided into two camps. Furthermore, the rallies were frames as a threat 
to Russia’s stability and current rule. Towards the end of the analysis week the juxtaposition, threat 
and the split society -frames became slightly less dominant in the coverage, as the necessity for 
dialogue had been recognized by the authorities and the official rhetoric towards opposition and the 
protestors has changed into more favorable direction. 
Despite the diversity in content, Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage was favorable to the 
authorities, clearly advocating the advantages of the stability and supporting the status quo, and 
emphasizing the destabilizing effects of the rallies. Towards the end of the analysis week, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda appeared to be adapting to the change in official rhetoric, starting to 
emphasize the softer sides of the rallies – the party-like atmosphere and the idea of a robust civil 
society. On the surface the coverage appeared to be pluralist but on a closer look the newspaper’s 
coverage was in fact favorable to officials. Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage appeared to follow 
the twofold tactics of the authorities: on the one hand the threats of the rallies were emphasized and 
the idea of stability promoted. On the other hand, the rallies were framed as folk festivals and the 
necessity of dialogue was acknowledged.  Based on the empirical content analysis it is impossible to 
speculate how deliberate these similarities are, but whether or not deliberate, parallels exist. In a neo-
authoritarian media system, in which the journalists can be very receptive to officials’ signals, these 
parallels should not come as a big surprise.  
Kommersant was focused on the split and juxtaposition in society. The frame of arbitrary 
violence underlined the extent of the split – it had become so wide that the authorities felt necessary 
to suppress the rallies with force. In addition to emphasizing the split, Kommersant framed the rallies 
as people’s movement and activity: the emphasis was on the possible rise of more an active civil 
society and political change. The newspaper was promoting the idea of something good coming out 
of the rigged elections and their aftermath, of the protest movement.  
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The various frames are connected to two large entities: rallies as threat and rallies as harmless 
folk festivities. The threat-frame works in the advantage of the authorities, underlining the need for 
stability in Russia. Towards the end of the week the focus of the framing changed, and the threat-
frame moved slightly to the background. The rallies were portrayed as something positive and 
necessary for the Russian society. This frame works in favor of both the authorities and protestors. 
Based on the shift in the official rhetoric, the authorities wanted peaceful rallies that appeared as a 
celebration of free society and civil rights. The differences between Kommersant’s and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda’s coverage remind of the fact that in Russia both independent and more state-
oriented print media exists. The liabilities are dictated most of all in the level of ownership, and 
journalists should follow the official line of the medium in order to keep their position.  
In the aftermath of the Duma and the Presidential elections, Putin has once again tightened 
his grip of power. Several law has been introduced, laws that restrict the activity of non-governmental 
organizations and limit opposition’s possibility to protest. During the first week of the Duma elections 
it seemed that people’s demands could be met and the vertical of power might develop slowly into a 
more horizontal one – that people’s demands would be met and more power would be given to a 
wider circle of people. However, this is not the case. Since the presidential elections in March 2012 
and his re-election, Putin has made sure he has a solid position as the leader of the Russian Federation.  
For future research I suggest a follow-up study to analyze the protests that took place after 
presidential elections in March 2012. The protests continued all winter and participants were 
committed to make sure that the presidential elections would be fair. The post-Duma elections rallies 
started a development that has had significant effects for Russian legislation. A law was initiated to 
restrict unsanctioned rallies: people have to pay fines, and they might end up in jail. The rallies right 
after presidential elections were not sanctioned and they were suppressed with force and mass arrests. 
It seems that after Putin’s victory the authorities’ accommodating rhetoric towards the opposition had 
become unnecessary, as the Russian rule had reinforced its position. This gave a possibility to return 
towards more authoritarian rhetoric. In a follow-up study I would compare the results of this thesis 
to the rally coverage after the presidential elections. Was the optimistic coverage of folk festivals and 
uniting people’s movement only a temporary phenomenon? Did the result of the presidential victory 
depress and smother the awakening, socially active part of the population? The coverage of post-
Duma rallies protests suggests that unpredictable development, in good and in bad, has begun in 
Russia. The negative is the threat to Russian stability and status quo, the positive side is of the rallies 
the shy blossoming of Russian civil society. Based on one week coverage the conclusion is clear: In 
Russia’s near future – anything is possible.  
95 
 
11. Bibliography 
 
Akhavan-Majid, Roya & Ramaprasad, Jyotika (2000): Framing Beijing. Dominant Ideological 
Influences on the American Press Coverage of the Fourth UN Conference on Women and the NGO 
Forum. International Communication Gazette, 2000, 62:1, 45–59. 
 
Ambrosio, Thomas (2009): Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the 
Former Soviet Union. Abingdon, Oxon, GBR: Ashgate Publishing Group. 
 
Azhgikhina, Nadezhda (2007): The Struggle for Press Freedom in Russia. Reflections of a Russian 
Journalist. Europe-Asia Studies, 59:8, 1245–1262. 
 
Bacon, Edwin (2012): Electoral Manipulation and the Development of Russia’s Political system. 
East European Politics, 28:2, 105–118.   
 
BBC (2011): Protests barely seen on Russian TV. 7.12.2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-16067899  
 
Becker, Jonathan (2004): Lessons from Russia. A Neo-Authoritarian Media System. European 
Journal of Communication, 19:2, 139–163.  
 
D'Angelo, Paul, P. (2002): News Framing as a Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response to 
Entman. Journal of communication, 52:4, 870–888.   
 
De Vreese, Claes H. (2005): News Framing: Theory and Typology. Information Design Journal + 
Document Dedign, 13:1, 51–62. 
 
Dmitriev, Mikhail and Treisman, Daniel (2012): The Other Russia. Discontent Grows in the 
Hinterlands. Foreign Affairs, 91:5, 59–72. Version used in thesis html (no page numbers available 
for quotation). 
 
Entman, Robert (1993): Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of 
Communication. 43:4, 51–58. 
 
Entman, Robert M. (2004): Projections of Power. Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S Foreign 
policy. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago and London. 
 
Freedom House (2013): Freedom in the World 2013.  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet%20-
%20for%20Web_0.pdf  
 
Forbes (2012): The World’s billionaires. http://www.forbes.com/profile/alisher-usmanov/ 
 
Gel’man Vladimir (2005): Political opposition in Russia. A Dying Species? Post-Soviet Affairs, 
21:3, 226–246. 
 
 
96 
 
Goldman, Marshall I. (2005): Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. Cary, NC, USA: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Greene, Samuel A. (2009): Shifting Media and the Failure of Political Communication in Russia. In 
The Post-Soviet Russian Media: Conflicting Signals, edited by Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutchings 
and Natalia Rulyova. Routledge.   
 
Gutiontov, Pavel (2004): Inner Slave Restricting Press Freedom of HR Groups. 29th April 2004, at 
MosNews.com; Johnson’s Russia List No. 8188.  
 
Herspring, Dale R. (2009): Vladimir Putin: His Continuing Legacy. Social Research, 
76:1, 151–174.  
 
Horsti, Karina (2005): Vierauden rajat: Monikulttuurisuus ja turvapaikanhakijat journalismissa. 
Tampere University Press.  
 
Horvath, Robert (2011): Putin's ‘Preventive Counter-Revolution’: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and 
the Spectre of Velvet Revolution. Europe-Asia Studies, 63:1, 1–25. 
 
Kangaspuro, Markku (2012): Putinin toinen kerta. (Putin’s second time), Idäntutkimus (The Finnish 
Review of East European Studies), 2012: 2, 1–2. Aleksanteri Institute. Helsinki University.  
 
Karvonen, Erkki (2000) Tulkintakehys (frame) ja kehystäminen. Tiedotustutkimus, 23: 2, 78–84. 
 
Koesel, Karrie J. and Bunce, Valerie J. (2012): Putin, Popular Protests and Political Trajectories in 
Russia: A Comparative Perspective. Post-Soviet Affairs, 28:4, 403–423. 
 
Koikkalainen, Katja (2009): Talousjournalismin tiennäyttäjät Venäjällä. Kansainväliset vaikutteet ja 
paikalliset erityispiirteet Kommersant- ja Vedomosti-sanomalehdissä. Tampereen yliopisto.  
 
Korteniemi, Eeva (2012): Putinin demokratiapuheista (Putin’s democracy speeches). Idäntutkimus 
(The Finnish Review of East European Studies) 2012:2, 58–64. Aleksanteri Institute. Helsinki 
University.  
 
Lipman, Masha and McFaul, Michael, A. (2001): Managed Democracy in Russia: Putin and the 
Press. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 116–127. 
 
Lipman, Maria, 2011: Duma Elections: Expert Analysis by Carnegie Moscow Center. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/13/duma-elections-2011/8kkf  
 
Luukkanen, Arto (2008): Projekti Putin. Uuden Venäjän historiaa 1996–2008 (Project Putin. New 
Russia’s History) WSOY. Helsinki.  
 
Lukyanov, Fyodor (2009): Putin’s Russia. The Quest for a New Place. Social Research, 76:1, 117–
150. 
 
Lyytikäinen, Laura and Salmenniemi, Suvi (2012): Venäjän keskiluokan kapina. (Revolt by the 
Russian Middle Class.) Idäntutkimus (The Finnish Review of East European Studies), 2012:2, 50–
57. Aleksanteri Institute. Helsinki University.  
 
97 
 
Makarkin, Aleksei (2011): The Russian Social Contract and Regime Legitimacy. International 
Affairs, 87:6, 1459–1474. 
 
Mander, Mary S. (Ed.) (1999): Framing Friction: Media and Social Conflict. University of Illinois 
Press. 
 
Matthes, Jörg & Kohring, Matthias (2008): The Content Analysis of Media Frames: Towards 
Improving Reliability and Validity. Journal of Communication, 58:2, 258–279. 
 
Monaghan, Andrew (2012a): The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia. International Affairs, 
88:1, 1–16. 
 
Monaghan, Andrew (2012b): The End of Putin era? Carnegie Papers. July 2012. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/end_of_putin.pdf 
 
Nelson, Thomas E.; Clawson, Rosalee A; and Oxley, Zoe M (1997): Media Framing of Civil 
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance. American Political Science Review, 91:3, 567–583. 
 
Orttung, W. Robert and Walker, Christopher (2013): Putin and Russia’s Crippled Media. Russian 
Analytical Digest, 123:21, 2–5. 
 
Presseurop: Kommersant http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/source-profile/356511-kommersant 
  
Rojansky, Matthew & Balzer, Harley (2011): More than Moscow: Protests in Russia, 1991 and 
2011–2012. Monday 23.02.2012, in Washington, D.C. Report available online 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/13/more-than-moscow-protests-in-russia-1991-and-2011-
2012/9okx 
 
Sakwa, Richard (2002): Russian Politics and Society. Third Edition. Routledge, London and New 
York. 
 
Sakwa, Richard (2011): Crisis of Russian democracy: the dual state, factionalism, and the 
Medvedev succession. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
 
Scheufele, Dietram A. (1999): Framing as a Theory of Media Effects. Journal of Communication, 
49:1, 103–122.  
 
Shevtsova, Lilia (2012): Russia under Putin: Titanic looking for its Iceberg? Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 45:3–4, 209–216. 
 
Simons, Greg and Strovsky, Dmitry (2006): Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in the 
Age of the War against Terrorism. European Journal of Communication, 21:2, 189–211. 
 
Simons, Greg (2010): Mass Media and Modern Warfare: Reporting on the Russian War on 
Terrorism. Ashgate.  
 
Volkov, Denis (2012): Putinism under Siege. The Protestors and the Public. Journal of Democracy, 
23:3, 55–62. 
 
 
98 
 
Trenin, Dmitri (2011): Duma Elections: Expert Analysis by Carnegie Moscow Center. 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/13/duma-elections-2011/8kkf  
 
Tuchman Gaye (1978): Making News. A Study in the Construction of Reality. Free Press. New. 
York.  
 
Trudolyobov, Maxim (2008): Words or Deeds? Index on Censorship, 2008:37, 97–104. 
 
Valkenburg, Patti M.; Semetko, Holli A. and De Reese, Claes H. (1999): The Effects of News 
Frames on Reader's Thought and Recall. In Communication Research. 26:5, 550–569. 
 
Van Dijk, Teun A. (1985): Structures of News in the Press in: Van Dijk, (Ed.) Discourse and 
Communication. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1985, 69–93.  
 
Van Gorp, Baldwin (2005): Where is the Frame? Victims and Intruders in the Belgian Press 
Coverage of the Asylum Issue. European Journal of Communication, 20:4, 484–507. 
 
White, David (2011): Dominant Party Systems: A Framework for Conceptualizing Opposition 
Strategies in Russia. Democratization, 18:3, 655–681. 
 
Väliverronen, Esa (1995): Metsä sairastaa: ympäristöuhkan määrittely sanomalehdessä. 
Tiedotustutkimus, 18:4, 6–23. 
 
Väliverronen, Esa (2002): Lecture on Framing: http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/yleope/kvali/kvali7.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
Empirical material of the frame analysis 
 
The empirical data was collected during one week study period, from 6th of December to 
12 of December 2011. The material was collected in Integrum Profi database.  
 
 
Kommersant, 8 articles 
 
6.12.2011. The Elections were taken to Chistye Prudy – Riot Police dispersed a March of the 
discontent. Front page, article and two photographs of the protestors in a rally. 
 
7.12.2011. Central Beating Station – A protest against the elections’ results was smothered in 
Moscow. Front page, article and one photograph of a riot police in a rally. 
 
8.12.2011. The police made a new record in arresting protestors – during two days of protesting the 
police has arrested almost 1,000 people. Article. No photographs.  
 
9.12.2011. The power is ready to negotiate with the opposition – the opposition does not believe 
that the conversation will be useful. Front page, article and one photograph from a rally.  
 
9.12.2011. Second round of the elections. The Mayor and the opposition agreed about the place 
where the rally will take place. An article and a picture a women in wheelchair talking to riot 
police. 
 
12.12.2011. Article 1. Only once in a lifetime. Moscow went to the rally like to a party. Front page 
and picture of a newly wedded couple walking through metal detectors. Inside a whole page article 
and two photographs: crowd of protestors; close-up of protestors.  
 
12.12.2011. Article 2. Russia had to go on a sick leave. The protests against rigged elections were 
organized in dozens of cities. Article and a graphic map of all the rallies organized in Russia.  
 
12.12.2011. Article 3. Television went to Bolotnaya (Square) – The Federal Channels reported from 
the demonstrations as they could”. Article, no photograph.  
 
 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 10 articles  
 
7.12.2011. New Yeltsins or Gaponis? Article and a photograph of trucks of the military.  
 
9.12.2011. Article 1. Protests in Moscow: Looking for a fight. Article and a photograph of the riot 
police dragging a protestor. 
 
9.12.2011. Article 2. Double Standards: Our answer to liberals. Short article and a photograph of 
American policemen arresting a protestor. 
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9.12.2011. Article 3. American television channel mounted protests in Moscow. Short article. 
 
9.12.2011. Article 4. Opposition in the internet: We will take with us flowers and balloons. Article, 
no photograph.  
 
12.12.2011. Article 1. “Omon (riot police) were given flowers and journalists could rent balconies. 
Article and a close-up photograph of protestors shouting. 
 
12.12.2011. Article 2. The rallies – not bad, but no dirty tricks? Article, no photograph. 
 
12.12.2011. Article 3. The sounds of Schubert and the March of Santa Clauses. A big photograph of 
the rally in Moscow, second picture of group of Santa Clauses walking. 
 
12.12.2011. Article 4. “We need to find a solution, so that the rallies won’t become a habit.” Short 
analytical commentary. 
 
12.12.2011. Article 5. There were no provocations. Thank god! Analytical commentary.  
 
